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In this PhD dissertation, I undertake to study the theory of intentionality and 
perception developed in the works of the American philosopher John Searle. The term 
‘intentionality’ derives from the Latin word intentio, which is the noun form of the 
verb intendere. It literally means being directed towards some target or thing.1 In philosophy, 
however, ‘intentionality’ is used as a technical term. Therefore, its literal meaning should not 
be confused with its philosophical meaning. Intentionality, philosophers say, is the property of 
mental states that they are about objects and states of affairs in the world. Most events and 
states of the mental lives of human beings or other higher cognitive mammals – perception, 
belief, desire, hope, love, hate, fear, etc. – exhibit this important feature. What unifies such 
mental states is that they all are about something other than themselves. For example, when I 
see a tree, my perceptual experience is about a tree; when I have a belief that my pen is in my 
bag, my belief is about the state of affairs that my pen is in my bag; and so on.  
In this dissertation, I especially focus on the intentionality of perception. Peter 
Strawson once wrote that “a philosopher’s views on [perception] are a key to his theory of 
knowledge and to his metaphysics”.2 I want to add that this is true for a theory of 
intentionality as well. Perception, as Searle puts it, is the primary medium by virtue of which 
subjects are related to the world. Therefore, questions on perception (such as “What is 
perception?”, “Does perception give us direct access to the world?”, “Does perception 
represent the world in the way beliefs or desires do?”, “How can an account of perceptual 
intentionality fit into a broader account of intentionality?”, etc.) have never drifted far from 
philosophical attention. Most philosophers who have developed theories of intentionality have 
also taken great pains to examine perception as well.  
John Rogers Searle (born 1932) is not an exception in that sense. He is a well-known 
philosopher of our period,3 who synthesised his theory of intentionality with his theory of   
                                                          
1 Cf. Jacob (2014). 
2 Strawson (1979), 41. 
3 Searle pursued his graduate degrees at Oxford. At the University of Oxford, he got to know John Austin and 
Peter Strawson and was raised under the influence of their philosophical ideas. In 1959, Searle began to work at 
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perception. Generally speaking, Searle’s research interest embraces a variety of topics which 
belong to a range of different areas of philosophical interest. He has written a number of 
different books on philosophy of mind, social philosophy, and philosophy of science. 
Nevertheless, Searle’s magnum opus, Speech Acts (1969), was devoted to the problems of 
philosophy of language, which stood at the center of his early philosophical inquiry. Since his 
focus of research line in Speech Acts was also continued in Expression and Meaning (1979), 
and since this work has greatly motivated Searle’s theory of intentionality, in this introduction 
I deem it useful to briefly consider its main topic.   
In Speech Acts, Searle focuses on how speech acts – the minimal units of language – 
work.4 However, he soon realises that, to better understand how speech acts function, he has 
to consider intentions. The reason for this is that, when people communicate, they do it 
intentionally. So Searle comes to the idea that the analysis of speech acts involves the concept 
of intention. According to this analysis, when the speaker says something to the hearer, he 
issues a speech act with the intention of letting the hearer to know what he (the speaker) says. 
For example, when I say to my friend “It is raining”, I issue a speech act with the intention of 
letting my friend to know what the weather is.5  
There is also another way that the analysis of speech acts involves the concept of 
intention and other mental concepts. When I say to my friend “I promise to come and visit 
you today”, I am not only issuing a speech act intentionally but also, by virtue of the sentence, 
I am expressing the intention that I will come to visit my friend today. In that sense, of course, 
speech acts do not express only intention; they can also express different mental states of the 
speaker. When I make the statement “It is raining”, I express the belief that it is raining. To 
use another example, when I say to my friend “Please, give me the salt”, I express my desire 
to have the salt. These examples show that, to better understand speech acts, their specific 
relations with mental states should also be explained.      
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the University of California at Berkeley, is now “Willis S. and Marion Slusser Professor Emeritus of the 
Philosophy of Mind and Language” at the same institution (see https://philosophy.berkeley.edu/people/faculty). 
4 He regards speech acts as the minimal units of language because, for him, language users do not use words 
only by referring or predicating. That is to say, when someone usually says something, he does not utter an 
expression such as “This man” and “is tall”. He rather says “This man is tall” or “That man is drinking tea”. 
Therefore, for Searle, referring (“That man” or “This man”) and predicating (“is tall” or “is drinking tea”) are 
only parts of the speech acts. 
5 Searle holds that the speaker has two more intentions here: the intention to get the hearer to recognise the first 
intention, and the intention to get the hearer to recognise that the rules of the language they speak are exhibited 
in the utterance of the sentence. For more on this, see Searle (1969), 49-50.   
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Such a close relation between speech acts and mental states is one reason why Searle’s 
philosophical interests have changed in subsequent years. Apart from his works on the 
philosophy of language, he began to write different works on the philosophy of mind. Some 
philosophers even characterised the change of Searle’s interest as his departure from the 
mainstream topics of analytic philosophy.6  
The two works of Searle which are of most salient importance for me in this 
dissertation are INT and STT. Both of these books are about the philosophy of mind. The first 
book, INT, is the result of Searle’s growing interest in the problems of philosophy of mind, 
which started from the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s.7 The title of this work 
also shows that Searle here ventures into a new subject – intentionality. His primary aim in 
this book is “to develop a theory of Intentionality”.8 Yet this does not mean that he has ceased 
to regard questions on language as central to his philosophical investigations. In the 
introduction of INT, Searle says that another purpose of this work is “to provide a foundation 
for [his] two earlier books, Speech Acts (Cambridge University Press, 1969) and Expression 
and Meaning (Cambridge University Press, 1979), as well as for future investigations of these 
topics”.9 Searle thinks that these topics are related, because he now sees the philosophy of 
language as a branch of the philosophy of mind. In INT, he tries to elucidate some similarities 
and relations between language and mind. For him, the representational capacities of speech 
acts are derived from the representational capacities of mental states.10 Therefore, in his view, 
if somebody wants to give a complete account of speech and language, then he should also 
explain how mental states relate the subject to reality. So it seems that a new subject matter – 
intentionality – does not radically shift Searle’s attention away from the topics of the 
philosophy of language. Searle even dedicates some chapters of INT to the philosophical 
problems of language. In Chapters 6-9 of this book, he considers the problems of meaning, 
intensional reports, and proper names. Nevertheless, in this dissertation, without directly 
                                                          
6 See e.g. Kemmerling (1991). 
7 Some ideas expressed in INT were indeed anticipated by Searle’s papers published between 1979-1982 (see 
Searle (1979b), (1980a,b,c), (1982)). Searle says that it is very useful to publish philosophical ideas in a 
preliminary form before expressing them in a separate book, because, before the book has been published, the 
ideas expressed in the papers elicit critical comments that can be taken into account by the author later. I make 
no references to the papers whose ideas were repeatedly expressed in INT, because in comparison to these 
papers, INT is a later and riper product of Searle’s development of them.    
8 INT, vii. 
9 Ibid. 
10 To Searle this is another way of saying that the intentionality of language is derived from the intentionality of 
mental states. I will have more to say about this later. 
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dealing with the problems of philosophy of language, I will mainly focus on those chapters of 
INT which are directly related to the problems of intentionality.  
The second book, STT, is one of Searle’s last works. In this book, Searle elaborates a 
theory of perception which sets out to explain “the relationship between perceptual 
experiences and the real world”. Indeed, this is not a new subject matter for Searle. In INT, he 
had also given a philosophical analysis of perception as part of his theory of intentionality. In 
STT, he continues this analysis. Nevertheless, in this later book, Searle makes some revisions 
to his early theory of perception and lays out a new method to analyse the intentionality of 
perception. Moreover, in STT, he considers some new topics about the philosophy of 
perception; as we will see later, he criticises Disjunctivism and the classical theories of 
perception.       
In this study, I will investigate Searle’s theory of intentionality and perception 
elaborated in these different periods of his philosophical development. My purpose in this 
dissertation is neither to deliver a complete systematic account of his philosophy, nor to carry 
out a historical investigation which aims at showing Searle's place in the history of 
philosophical thought. Rather, what I intend to do in this dissertation is to critically analyse 
the relevant ideas from his works and also to attempt to give solutions to some problems that 
are related to these issues. In the dissertation, I will also consider some of Searle’s critics – the 
relevant works of Daniel Dennett, Hilary Putnam, and Fred Dretske. 
The dissertation contains eight chapters. It can be understood as consisting of two 
parts. The first part (Chapter I-III) elucidates Searle’s theory of intentionality and his notion 
of Background. The second part (Chapter IV-VIII) focuses on Searle’s analysis of perception. 
A fuller description of the content of these chapters is this: Chapter I outlines Searle’s use of 
the term ‘intentionality’; Chapter II, which is a relatively long one, examines the more central 
notions and theses of Searle’s theory of intentionality; Chapter III focuses on his hypothesis 
of Background; Chapter IV considers Searle’s arguments for the intentionality of perceptual 
experiences; Chapter V exposes the features which Searle regards as belonging to perception 
(these features, for him, distinguish the intentionality of perception from the intentionality of 
other mental states); Chapters VI and VII examine how Searle applies the central theses of his 
theory of intentionality and the notion of Background to the analysis of perceptual 
experiences; and, finally, Chapter VIII considers Searle’s naïve (or Direct) realistic views on 




CHAPTER I  
 
 
General Remarks on Searle’s Notion of Intentionality 
 
 
Searle starts the first chapter of his major work on intentionality1 by telling us that:   
 
Intentionality is that property of many mental states and events by which they are 
directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world. If, for example, I 
have a belief, it must be a belief that such and such is the case; if I have a fear, it 
must be a fear of something or that something will occur; if I have a desire, it must be 
a desire to do something or that something should happen or be the case; if I have an 
intention, it must be an intention to do something. And so on through a large number 
of other cases.2  
 
Searle makes two important claims in this passage:  
 
(1) Intentional states are mental states;  
(2) Intentional states are about/of, or directed at, something.  
 
Of course, these are not the theses that are accepted only by Searle. There have been, and are 
today, many philosophers who have dealt, and deal, with the same issues and who have 
shared these introductory theses.3 Searle also maintains that by using them he “[follows] a 
long philosophical tradition”.4 Yet however familiar to us ‘intentionality’ may be, I think that 
it would be helpful to elucidate in the first chapter how exactly Searle uses this term.  
To do this, I will first briefly consider Searle’s notion of mind. The first thesis shows 
that, like the classical theorists of intentionality (such as F. Brentano and E. Husserl), Searle 
                                                          
1 In INT, Searle capitalises ‘intentionality’ in order for the reader not to confuse it with the term ‘intention’. He 
uses the former as a technical term, but the latter to denote “just one kind of Intentionality among others”. I do 
not follow the capitalised version of ‘intentionality’ because I do not focus on intentions. I hope that in my work 
there is no danger of such confusion. 
2 INT, 1; emphases added. 
3 See Jacob (2014). 
4 INT, 1. 
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also characterises intentionality in terms of the notion of mind.5 Moreover, in the first section 
below, I will try to explain Searle’s distinction between conscious and unconscious mental 
states. Since Searle considers intentional states to be mental, he applies this distinction to 
them as well. In the second section, I will focus on Searle’s characterisation of intentionality 
as directedness and aboutness/of-ness of mental states. In the third section of this chapter, the 
focus will be on Searle’s use of three different notions of intentionality – intrinsic, derived, 
and as-if intentionality. For him, only the notion of intrinsic intentionality applies to mental 
states, whereas the other two notions of intentionality are invoked to characterise non-mental 
entities. Furthermore, in the remainder of the third section, I will be concerned with Dennett’s 
criticism of Searle’s distinction between intrinsic and derived intentionality.        
 
 
1. Mind and intentionality 
 
(1) presupposes an intrinsic relation between intentionality and the mind. Therefore we 
need to consider the notion of mind as well.  
The term ‘mind’ is notoriously difficult to define. That is why, for most philosophers, 
it is convenient to introduce this term with the assistance of examples that are indisputably 
considered to be mental phenomena. These are phenomena that are well-known to everybody: 
perceiving, believing, desiring, loving, being in a pain, etc. Examples of mental phenomena 
are very diverse, and the problem here is that it is almost impossible to identify a common 
feature in terms of which these phenomena can equally be considered to be mental. To put it 
otherwise, the concept of mind used in philosophy seems to be very loose, because it is 
impossible to give an explanation of the mental by virtue of clear concepts which could pick 
out a single property constituting all these diverse phenomena. Therefore, there is no clear 
answer to the question “What is the hallmark of the mental?”  
Although Searle also avoids giving a definition for the term ‘mind’, he does register 
some important characterisations of mental phenomena, which can help us to understand his 
use of the notion of mind. His foremost characterisation is that mental states are biological 
features of the brain. In Searle’s picture, mental phenomena can be compared with biological 
phenomena such as digestion or the circulation of the blood: 
 
                                                          
5 Some philosophers argue that entities without mental life can also have intentional states (see e.g. Dennett 
(1987), Milikan (1984)). 
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[M]ental states are as real as any other biological phenomena, as real as lactation, 
photosynthesis, mitosis, or digestion. Like these other phenomena, mental states are 
caused by biological phenomena and in turn cause other biological phenomena. If 
one wanted a label one might call such a view “biological naturalism”.6  
 
What Searle says in this passage, however, does not mean that he is going to explain 
mental phenomena in purely naturalistic terms. He has in fact a critical attitude towards such 
theories. Searle thinks that mental phenomena as biological properties are supervenient on the 
neurophysiology of the brain, and their ontology, which is subjective,7 is distinct from the 
ontology of brain states.8 
The next important point in Searle’s characterisation of mental phenomena is that he 
has a neat answer to the question “What is the hallmark of the mental?” To this question he 
maintains that “the primary and most essential feature of minds is consciousness”.9 In his 
view, consciousness is the hallmark of the mental. Of course, this does not mean that mental 
states must always be conscious. Searle divides mental phenomena into two classes in this 
respect: conscious mental phenomena and unconscious mental phenomena. He calls the 
second class unconscious not because they have nothing to do with consciousness, but 
because they can in principle be conscious.10 For example, if I am now thinking that it is 
raining, then I am entertaining a conscious mental phenomenon. Nevertheless, at any given 
moment, the subject has an indefinite number of beliefs (or other kinds of intentional states) 
of which he is not conscious. While being in a deep sleep (in other words, while being 
unconscious) somebody can say about me, for example, that he believes that Berlin is the 
capital of Germany. In INT, Searle explains this point in the following way:   
                                                          
6 INT, 264. 
7 In Searle’s usage, the term ‘subjective’ has a specific sense. The main point in his use of this term is to 
emphasise that all conscious mental states are experiences with a specific quality which cannot be captured by a 
third-person description. For Searle, to say that conscious states have subjective ontology is to say that they are 
not accessible to any observer, except the person who possesses them. He holds that the existence of conscious 
states is a first-person existence, and therefore the term ‘subjective’ here refers to an autonomous ontological 
category (cf. RM, 94). 
8 In this dissertation I won’t focus on this issue in a detailed way. What I want to note here is that Searle seems 
not to be clear enough when he maintains, on the one hand, that intentional states are biological features of the 
brain and, on the other hand, that they have logical properties. He does not explain with adequate clarity how an 
entity can be both biological and have logical properties (later on, in Chapter II, I will examine Searle’s notion of 
logical property).      
9 Searle (1998), 40. 
10 See his connection principle in Searle (1990) or RM, Chapter 7. 
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I have many beliefs that I am not thinking about at present and I may never have 
thought of. For example, I believe that my paternal grandfather spent his entire life 
inside the continental United States but until this moment I never consciously 
formulated or considered that belief.11 
 
Yet, though unconscious, this belief is also a mental phenomenon because it can also be 
consciously entertained.  
Furthermore, Searle distinguishes unconscious mental phenomena from nonconscious 
phenomena:  
 
Think of the difference, for example, between my belief (when I am not thinking 
about it) that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, and the myelination of the axons in my 
central nervous system. There is a sense in which both are unconscious. But there is a 
big difference between them in that the structural states of my axons couldn't 
themselves be conscious states, because there isn't anything mental about them. I 
assume for the sake of this argument that myelination functions essentially in the 
production of my mental states, but even if myelinated axons were themselves 
objects of experiences, even if I could feel inwardly the state of the myelin sheathes, 
still the actual structures are not themselves mental states. Not every unconscious 
feature of my brain that (like myelination) functions essentially in my mental life is 
itself a mental feature. But the belief that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris is a genuine 
mental state, even though it happens to be a mental state that most of the time is not 
present to consciousness. So here are two states in me, my belief and my axon 
myelination: both have something to do with my brain, and neither is conscious. But 
only one is mental […]12 
 
So Searle proposes to call the phenomena like myelination nonconscious. Moreover, 
he uses the term ‘unconscious’ to denote mental states that are accessible to consciousness. 
Searle thinks that what can be called mental either is conscious or can be conscious. And of 
greater importance here is that this applies to intentional states as well. Thus, in Searle’s view, 
                                                          
11 INT, 2. 
12 RM, 154. 
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intentional states are also subdivided into two classes: conscious intentional states and 
unconscious intentional states. 
 
 
2. Intentionality as directedness 
  
In INT, Searle brings several examples to introduce the notion of intentionality. For 
him, the following mental states are intentional: 
 
[B]elief, fear, hope, desire, love, hate, aversion, liking, disliking, doubting, 
wondering whether, joy, elation, depression, anxiety, pride, remorse, sorrow, grief, 
guilt, rejoicing, irritation, puzzlement, acceptance, forgiveness, hostility, affection, 
expectation, anger, admiration, contempt, respect, indignation, intention, wishing, 
wanting, imagining, fantasy, shame, lust, disgust, animosity, terror, pleasure, 
abhorrence, aspiration, amusement, and disappointment.13 
 
As we saw in the passage quoted on the first page of this chapter, Searle maintains that the 
characteristic feature of these mental states is that they all are directed at certain objects.  
This is a well-known characterisation of intentionality. But it is interesting that, for 
Searle, it is more than a characterisation. In STT (p. 55), he claims that directedness defines 
intentionality. However, this is not convincing in itself, because, as far as it concerns 
directedness, to say that “intentional states are those that are […] directed at objects and 
states of affairs in the world” is to make a metaphorical characterisation of intentionality. And 
one cannot give a definition in terms of a metaphorical expression.  
To see that in (2) this expression is used metaphorically, let us consider some 
vernacular uses of the verb ‘to be directed at/on/to’:  
 
(a) The light is directed on to the surface of the table.   
(b) This bus is directed to the central station.  
 
In these sentences, ‘to be directed to’ is the verb form of ‘direction’ which suggests the 
meaning course pursued by one moving object to another.14 Here, ‘to be directed to’ functions 
as a two-place predicate. Vernacular sentences with this verb, such as (a) and (b), are satisfied 
                                                          
13 INT, 4. 
14 Cf. Harper (2001-2019), https://www.etymonline.com/word/direction#etymonline_v_31451.  
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only when there is a physically (more exactly, a spatially) realised relation in which one 
object changing its location moves toward another location. Of course, in this kind of use, it is 
taken granted that both objects exist. However, in the case of intentionality, the existence of 
both relata is not a necessary condition for an intentional relation to be possible. When 
philosophers speak of intentionality, they say that this is a specific kind of relation, because 
one of the relata here, i.e. the intentional object, can be non-existent. For example, one can 
think of Pegasus or of the unicorn, or one can hallucinate that one sees a dagger in front of 
himself. “For this reason”, as Brentano puts it, “one could doubt whether we really are dealing 
with something relational here, and not, rather, with something somewhat similar to 
something relational in a certain respect, which might, therefore, better be called ‘quasi-
relational’”.15 So if we compare the use of ‘to be directed to’ in (2) with its use in ordinary 
contexts, we can see that the term changes its ordinary meaning, because, in (2), ‘to be 
directed to’ refers to “quasi”-directedness rather than to a real relation. Furthermore, even if 
the object of the intentional state exists, one cannot again use ‘to be directed’ in (2) in the way 
that it is used in (a) and (b). Consider, for example, an astronomer who thinks of a star in the 
Andromeda Galaxy. Even if this star exists, it would still be odd to assume that the intentional 
state of the astronomer is directed to that star in the sense that the bus is directed to the central 
station. The reason for this is that, in the case of the astronomer, we have no evidence to assert 
that there is something in the subject which, changing its location, moves toward the object.  
That is why, when we use ‘to be directed’ in contexts like (2), it becomes figurative for two 
reasons: firstly, one of the relata might not exist; secondly, even if both relata exist, the term 
is not about the change of the object’s location in space. 
Nevertheless, one cannot say that (2) does not give a sense to the term ‘intentionality’. 
Even if we put ‘to be directed to’ aside, we can see that, in (2), like most contemporary 
philosophers, Searle also uses the explanatory phrases ‘about’ and ‘of’. In Searle’s view, if 
one wants to clarify whether a given mental state is intentional, one can ask the question, 
“What is a certain mental state about or of?” For him, this is a clue to the distinction between 
intentional and non-intentional mental phenomena:16   
 
If I tell you I have a belief or a desire, it always makes sense for you to ask, “What is 
it exactly that you believe?” or “What is it that you desire?”; and it won't do for me 
                                                          
15 Brentano (1995), 212. 
16 Examples for non-intentional mental phenomena, for Searle, are “forms of nervousness, elation, and 
undirected anxiety” (INT, 1). 
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to say, “Oh I just have a belief and a desire without believing anything or desiring 
anything”. My beliefs and desires must always be about something. But my 
nervousness and undirected anxiety need not in that way be about anything. Such 
states are characteristically accompanied by beliefs and desires, but undirected states 
are not identical with beliefs or desires. On my account if a state S is Intentional then 
there must be an answer to such questions as: What is S about? What is S of? What is 
it an S that?17 
 
Nevertheless, Searle has an important misgiving concerning this characterisation. He 
tells us that in some cases reports on our mental states can mislead us, because some words 
we use in these reports are ambiguous. Searle is especially sensitive to the cases where we use 
the preposition ‘of’ in reporting our mental states. One peculiarity of ‘of’ consists in the fact 
that this preposition is used for reporting both non-intentional conscious states and intentional 
phenomena. Searle warns that this does not mean that such conscious states must be 
intentional:  
 
In defense of the view that there is an identity between consciousness and 
Intentionality it is sometimes said that all consciousness is consciousness of, that 
whenever one is conscious there is always something that one is conscious of. But 
this account of consciousness blurs a crucial distinction: when I have a conscious 
experience of anxiety, there is indeed something my experience is an experience of, 
namely anxiety, but this sense of "of" is quite different from the "of" of 
Intentionality, which occurs, for example, in the statement that I have a conscious 
fear of snakes; for in the case of anxiety, the experience of anxiety and the anxiety 
are identical; but the fear of snakes is not identical with snakes. It is characteristic 
of Intentional states, as I use the notion, that there is a distinction between the state 
and what the state is directed at or about or of […] On my account the "of" in the 
expression "the experience of anxiety" cannot be the "of" of Intentionality because 
the experience and the anxiety are identical.18 
 
To sum up, in the quoted passages above, Searle puts forward two criteria to 
characterise intentionality. The first is that there must be an answer to the aboutness/of-ness 
                                                          
17 INT, 1-2. 
18 Ibid. 2. 
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questions about an intentional mental state, and the second is that, in the case of 
intentionality, mental states themselves are distinct from their objects – they cannot be 
identical with their objects (henceforth, for the sake of brevity, I will call the second the non-
identity criterion). 
The non-identity criterion suggests that when one holds that a mental state is 
intentional, one presupposes that there is an intentional relation between two entities – a 
mental state and its intentional object (for example, if one believes that Earth rotates around 
the Sun, then one’s belief is distinct from the intentional object – the Earth’s rotation around 
the Sun). That seems to be clear enough because, in the case of intentionality, there must, by 
definition, be two interdependent sides (the intentional state and the object) in order for the 
state to be directed to something.  
Against Searle’s non-identity criterion, however, one might argue in the following 
way. The criterion cannot generally apply to all intentional cases because we can possess 
mental states whose intentional objects do not exist. In such cases, one might continue, the 
intentional object is not separate from the mental state. Suppose, for example, that I have an 
idea of the unicorn. Since the unicorn does not exist, one can be prone to hold that an 
intentional state whose part is the idea of the unicorn is not separate from its intentional 
object. Such examples can motivate an opponent of Searle’s non-identity criterion to maintain 
that, when we entertain thoughts that are not directed to existing objects, the distinction 
between intentional state and its object becomes blurred, because we cannot find anything 
distinct outside our minds in order for the intentional state to be directed at it.  
Searle nonetheless mentions another important feature of intentional states in terms of 
which he could block this possible objection. He maintains that each intentional state, 
independent of whether its object exists or not, has conditions of satisfaction19 (for example, 
the belief that Pegasus has two wings also has conditions of satisfaction, even though Pegasus 
does not exist). To say that intentional states with non-existent objects also have conditions of 
satisfaction is to say that they represent the world counterfactually. It can be held that, though 
it is not (empirically) case that the objects of such mental states exist, it is theoretically (or 
conceptually) possible that they possess objects. This can further mean that, for each 
intentional state with a non-existent object, there is always an implicit supposition that if such 
and such conditions obtained, then the intentional state in question would have an existing 
                                                          
19 Conditions of satisfaction of a mental state are the conditions “which […] must obtain if the state is to be 




object (for example, the belief that Pegasus has two wings would have an object, or would be 
satisfied, if Pegasus existed and had two wings). Thus, Searle can maintain that an intentional 
state with a non-existent object is also directed to something, which, if it existed, would be 
distinct from the intentional state itself.20 
 
 
3. Intrinsic, derived, and as if intentionality 
 
At first glance, Searle’s classification of intentional states into conscious and 
unconscious states can suggest that the term ‘intentionality’ in his usage applies only to 
mental phenomena. Nevertheless, in Searle’s works, one can find three distinct notions of 
intentionality – intrinsic, derived, and as if intentionality. The latter two notions, in contrast to 
the first one, are invoked to apply to non-mental entities. Searle introduces the distinction of 
intrinsic (original) intentionality from derived and as if intentionality on the basis of the 
differences among the following cases:  
 
1. I am now thirsty, really thirsty, because I haven't had anything to drink all day. 
2. My lawn is thirsty, really thirsty, because it has not been watered in a week. 
3. In French, "j'ai grand soif" means "I am very thirsty."21 
 
Searle says that the first sentence literally ascribes a real, intrinsic intentional state. When one 
says “I am thirsty” and the statement is true, then one describes one’s intrinsic intentional 
state – the desire to drink water. As a rule, we ascribe intrinsic intentionality to humans and 
other higher animals.  
                                                          
20 Notice that Searle’s notion of condition of satisfaction might be problematic in this respect. Since this notion is 
theoretically laden, the decision to use it to characterise intentionality carries Searle’s theoretical presuppositions 
in itself. Searle uses the notion of conditions of satisfaction in combination with the notion of propositional 
content by arguing that mental states with propositional contents have (or determine) conditions of satisfaction. 
This makes it difficult to accept Searle’s characterisation as a general one, because, as we will see in the 
following chapters, one cannot say that all intentional states have conditions of satisfaction. Here, we could use 
the notion of an intentional object instead of the notion of conditions of satisfaction. The notion of an intentional 
object applies to the very broad class of entities which can be either existent or non-existent. However, we must 
also take into account that Searle’s own notion of an intentional object, which is a specific one, is distinct from 
the broadly accepted notion of an intentional object. Searle holds that intentional objects are only existent 
entities. Therefore, to defend Searle’s non-identity criterion, one should not use his notion of an intentional 
object. I shall have more to say about Searle’s notion of an intentional object and the notion of conditions of 
satisfaction in the next chapter.       
21 RM, 78. 
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The second sentence, however, is used metaphorically. It is obvious that the lawn has 
no mental life at all; hence, it cannot literally be thirsty. “When I say that it is thirsty”, says 
Searle, “this is simply a metaphorical way of describing its capacity to absorb water”.22 To 
Searle it is harmless to say that the lawn is thirsty, “even though [one does not] suppose for a 
moment that it is literally thirsty”.23 The second sentence is not a sentence ascribing “any 
intentionality at all, intrinsic or otherwise; it is merely used to speak figuratively or 
metaphorically”.24 Searle therefore calls it as-if intentionality.  
When it comes to the third sentence, in Searle’s view, this sentence, like the first, is 
used literally to ascribe intentionality to the French sentence. However, its intentionality is not 
intrinsic to the sentence itself, because the sentence is just “a syntactical object”. The 
intentionality of the sentence is derived from the intentionality of its users, i.e. of French 
speakers; words and sentences of a language are not originally intentional. Therefore, Searle 
ascribes to the latter sentence a derived intentionality.  
 
3.1. Dennett’s criticism  
A heated debate between Searle and Dennett relates to these distinctions. Dennett 
claims that there is no need to make any distinction between intrinsic and derived (or as-if) 
intentionality. He thinks this because he does not share the motivation for the distinction that 
forces Searle to introduce different notions of intentionality – namely, the idea that 
intentionality is a mental phenomenon, and that other entities (a sentence, or a computer, for 
example), which might at first glance seem to be intentional, do not possess original 
intentionality. In Dennett’s picture, there is only one kind of intentionality, and this might also 
be possessed by the entities without mental life. His view on intentionality can also be 
illustrated by the following quotation in a work co-authored with J. Haugeland: 
 
If we make an initial rough catalogue of the things that can be about things, it will 
include a great variety of mental states, and events (ideas, beliefs, desires, thoughts, 
hopes, fears, perceptions, dreams, hallucinations [...]) but also various linguistic 
items (sentences, questions, poems, headlines, instructions [...]) and perhaps other 
                                                          
22 Searle (1990), 586. 




sorts of representations as well (pictures, charts, films, symphonic tone poems, 
computer programs, [...]).25  
 
Searle’s view, on the contrary, suggests that if we use ‘intentionality’ in a Dennettian 
way, then it will become a debased term with uncertain applications. The reason for this is 
that, in Searle’s picture, if poems or computers had (intrinsically) intentional properties, then 
everything that surrounds us in daily live (household machines, chairs, tables, etc.) would turn 
out to exhibit intentionality. For they are also tools used for certain purposes; they also “refer” 
or are dispositional “to refer” to certain destinations (for example, machines are designed to 
be used for certain purposes, chairs are constructed to sit on, etc.). Searle thus thinks that 
Dennett’s view of intentionality encounters the reductio ad absurdum problem: 
 
[A]ny attempt to deny the distinction between intrinsic and as-if intentionality faces a 
general reductio ad absurdum. If you deny the distinction it turns out that everything 
in the universe has intentionality. Everything in the universe follows laws of nature, 
and for that reason everything behaves with a certain degree of regularity, and for 
that reason everything behaves as if it were following a rule, trying to carry out a 
certain project, acting in accordance with certain desires, and so on […] The price of 
denying the distinction between intrinsic and as-if intentionality, in short, is 
absurdity, because it makes everything in the universe mental.26  
 
However, Searle’s objection to Dennett here is unfair because Dennett himself 
foresees this problem. Dennett tries to rebut the reductio ad absurdum objection by 
distinguishing between: 
  
those intentional systems that really have beliefs and desires from those we may find 
it handy to treat as if they had beliefs and desires […]  
For instance, it seems the lectern in this lecture room can be construed as an 
intentional system, fully rational, believing that it is currently located at the center of 
the civilized world (as some of you may also think), and desiring above all else to 
remain at that center.27  
                                                          
25 Dennett & Haugeland (1987), 384. 
26 Searle (1990), 587. 




Why, then, should we not attribute the corresponding belief and desire to the lectern? 
Dennett’s answer is that, because the other stances – more accurately, the physical stance – 
explain why the lectern does not move, the intentional stance towards it is not required.28 In 
the case of human beings, animals or computers, on the other hand, the intentional stance for 
Dennett seems to be indispensable, because in such cases the explanations from the physical 
and the design stances are unhelpful. Thus, according to Dennett’s theory, the lectern cannot 
be an intentional system, for the other stances explain or predict its behaviour much better 
than the intentional stance; the intentional stance would be not “in place” for this case. 
Therefore, Dennett thinks, there is no need to ascribe intentionality to lecterns.  
Of course, Searle would not agree with this answer because he does not accept the 
notion of intentional stance, on the basis of which Dennett answers this question. Yet the 
point here is that, given the framework of his own theory, Dennett does not face the reductio 
ad absurdum problem. Therefore, Searle’s objection to him seems to be inapt. For this reason, 
let us put aside Searle’s reductio ad absurdum objection.  
After all, Dennett provides us with interesting arguments to deny the distinction 
between intrinsic and derived intentionality. He thinks that the original (or intrinsic) / derived 
(or as if) division causes a problem.29 In Dennett’s view, if we accept that there is derived 
intentionality, we will have to acknowledge that intentionality of the subject, i.e. our own 
intentionality, is also derived and, in this sense, is not distinct from intentionality of robots. 
To elaborate this idea, he uses Dawkins’ (1976) Darwinian view that we, together with all 
other biological species, are:  
                                                          
28 For him, there are three strategies, or stances, to explain and predict behaviour of different systems: physical, 
design, and intentional. The physical stance explains systems by virtue of the data concerning their physical 
states and of physical laws. To use Dennett’s chess-playing computer example, one can principally explain the 
functioning of the computer in terms of its microphysical structures and the corresponding laws of physics. If 
one does this, one uses the physical stance. The design stance, however, explains systems in terms of the 
assumption that they are designed to fulfil certain purposes. We do not need to know the details of the physical 
structure of (say) a washing machine in order to predict that it will stop after forty minutes if we have set it to 
stop after forty minutes. The washing machine is simply designed to do so. The intentional stance, in turn, 
explains the behaviour of complex systems by ascribing to them intentional states. It treats complex systems as 
rational beings. When we play chess against a computer, we can suppose that it will choose the most rational 
moves to beat us. We can suppose that the computer desires to put us in checkmate and to avoid being 
checkmated. Also, we can suppose that the computer believes that the chess pieces are in such and such a 
position on the board, and that such and such moves make better its position. In Dennett’s view, the intentional 
stance is used when the system creates difficulties for the explanations from the other stances. 
29 Here, I deliberately conflate Searle’s distinction between derived and as if intentionality. It seems to me that 




“survival machines” designed to prolong the futures of our selfish genes. We are 
artifacts, in effect, designed over the eons as survival machines for genes that cannot 
act swiftly and informedly in their own interests.30  
 
The core idea here is that we, as human beings, should be regarded as evolved robots. If so, 
then – Dennett continues – “our intentionality is derived from the intentionality of our 'selfish' 
genes [...] whose intentionality is surely a paradigm case of mere as if intentionality”.31 It thus 
turns out, according to Dennett’s picture, that the intentionality of mental states is no more 
original than the intentionality of robots. But this, for Dennett, causes a problem because if 
intentionality of the human being (the term ‘intentionality’ is used literally here) is derived 
from the intentionality of our genes (here, the same term is used metaphorically), then we had 
to answer a bizarre question: “How could the literal depend on the metaphorical?”32 That is 
why Dennett suggests for us to drop this distinction. 
However, for those who use the notion of derived intentionality, there cannot be such a 
problem. Rather, Dennett’s suggestion follows from his conflation of two understandings of 
derivedness: biological derivedness and semantic derivedness. To explicate the difference 
between these understandings, let us suppose that genes have the derived intentionality and 
the intentionality of human beings is derived from it. To put it otherwise, imagine that there is 
only the chain of derived intentionalities without the intrinsic or original one. It is only 
Mother Nature whose intentionality might be considered to be the original one, but we do not 
regard it so because Mother Nature has no conscious or purposeful engineering in the 
evolution of genes. We would then have the sequence of derived intentionalities, at the start of 
which would stand genes, for they are phylogenetically more basic. As the second element, 
we would have our own intentionality; as the third, the intentionality of artifacts created by 
human beings, because the latter, in its own turn, were derived from the former. But wait. 
Would the elements of the sequence be related to one another with the same kind of relation? 
I am not convinced that they would be. The derivedness relation between genes and us would 
not be the same as the derivedness relation between us and artifacts. Because even if the 
intentionality of human being were derivable from the intentionality of genes, it would be 
derived by virtue of the laws of evolution. However, we could not say that the intentionality 
                                                          
30 Ibid. 298. 
31 Ibid. 298-299. 
32 Ibid. 299. 
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of artifacts is evolutionally derived from the intentionality of mind. The latter relation would 
not be a kind of biological relation. We could say that our intentionality is derived from genes 
because in order for them to be able to survive, the organism which is composed of these 
genes has to produce intentional states. But once our intentional states have been evolved by 
the biology of genes, they would not pass down the same kind of relation to artifacts created 
by us. Evolution, or natural selection, would be irrelevant for the artifacts we create. In other 
words, artifacts could not be biologically derived from us, simply because they are neither our 
biological parts, nor copies of our genes.  
Accordingly, the philosophers – including Searle – who willingly use the term 
‘derived intentionality’ do not mean any biological feature under this term. When they say 
that artifacts have a derived intentionality, they mean that we, as creators of those artifacts, 
assign certain tasks to them, and then interpret their activity as deciding or intending to fulfill 
these tasks. This kind of derived intentionality is much like the intentionality of language. We 
consider the intentionality of language to be derived from our intentionality because we use 
language for communicative purposes. In other words, words of the language have also been 
loaded with tasks by us (they have meanings to express). Artifacts, in this sense, can be 
regarded as being similar to sentences: Just as sentences can be true or false, so artifacts can, 
or cannot, fulfill their tasks. Correspondingly, when some philosophers say that the 
“intentionality” of sentences or artifacts is derivable from the intentionality of the mind, they 
do not mean anything biological here, but rather that sentences or artifacts have purposefully 
assigned meanings or tasks.  
So the problem with Dennett’s usage is that when he says that both our intentionality 
and the intentionality of artifacts are derived, he conflates the semantical use of ‘derived’ with 
its possible biological use. Searle’s distinction between intrinsic and derived intentionality, 
however, is a semantic issue; the biological questions seem to be irrelevant here. Searle seems 
to be right in making this distinction because the distinction presupposes that genuine 





In this chapter it has been shown that, to make his use of the term ‘intentionality’ 
clearer, Searle mentions the following important points: first, that intentional states are not 
always conscious – there are unconscious intentional states as well; second, that some, but not 
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all, mental states and events have intentional properties – namely, there are also non-
intentional mental states; and third, that there are three kinds of intentionality: intrinsic, as-if, 
and derived intentionality. Moreover, it has been concluded that Dennett’s criticism of 







The Fundamentals of Searle’s Theory of Intentionality 
 
 
This chapter begins with an exposition of some general features of Searle’s theory, 
such as his characterisation of intentionality as representation and as a logical property. It then 
focuses on the main ingredients of this theory, specifically, on the notion of psychological 
mode, direction of fit, conditions of satisfaction, and intentional content. These are the notions 
with which Searle builds the most significant part of his theory. The main body of the chapter 




1. Intentionality as representation 
 
Besides the general expressions such as ‘directed’ and ‘about’, Searle uses another 
term – ‘representation’ – to characterise intentionality. An intentional relation between the 
subject and the world, for him, is a representational relation. However, he understands that to 
characterise intentionality as representation can be misleading, because ‘representation’ is an 
ambiguous term; it has different uses in philosophy and cognitive psychology. Searle thus 
needs to clarify his use of this term for the reader. He chooses a belief as an example to 
explain this point. He writes:  
 
When I say, for example, that a belief is a representation I am most emphatically not 
saying that a belief is a kind of picture, nor am I endorsing the Tractatus account of 
meaning, nor am I saying that a belief re-presents something that has been presented 
before, nor am I saying that a belief has a meaning, nor am I saying that it is a kind 
of thing from which one reads off its conditions of satisfaction by scrutinizing it […] 
To say that a belief is a representation is simply to say that it has a propositional 
content and a psychological mode, that its propositional content determines a set of 
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conditions of satisfaction […], that its psychological mode determines a direction of 
fit of its propositional content […]1  
 
The main purpose of this passage is to explain that the author is not going to use the 
term ‘representation’ in its well-known sense. That is to say, Searle rejects the wide-spread 
meaning of this term by distinguishing his own use from the use of the term that denotes 
pictorial and conventional kind of representations. The last sentence of the passage above 
clarifies in what sense, indeed, he prefers to use ‘representation’. According to it, the 
statement that an intentional state is representation is a composite thesis that contains the 
following sub-theses:  
 
1) An intentional state has two essential features – psychological mode and 
    intentional content.2  
2) They determine the other two essential features of the intentional state:  
    the intentional content determines the conditions of satisfaction; the 
    psychological mode determines a direction of fit of the intentional state.  
 
Thus, Searle’s thesis that intentionality is a representation must be explained in terms 
of four fundamental notions of his theory. In other words, for Searle, ‘representation’ is a 
catch-all term or, as he himself describes it, “a shorthand for a constellation of […] notions 
such as conditions of satisfaction, Intentional content, direction of fit, etc.”3 (These are the 
central notions of Searle’s theory. Henceforth, for the sake of brevity, I will call them the 
central notions).4 
Let us take an example and explain, based on this, why we need such diverse notions 
for a theory of intentionality. Consider the true sentence ‘I believe that my laptop is on the 
table’. The sentence refers to my intentional state – to the belief – which, in turn, is about or 
represents a state of affairs. Thus, prima facie, we can distinguish two aspects here: first, the 
intentional state itself; second, the state of affairs or the intentional object, which the 
                                                          
1 INT, 11-12; emphasis added. 
2 Sometimes, Searle uses the term ‘representational content’ to capture intentional states with non-propositional 
content, as well. Yet he claims that all intentional states have a propositional content in the final analysis, 
because they “contain” beliefs and desires (see INT, Chapter I).  
3 INT, 45. 
4 Searle is not the first philosopher who uses these notions. Similar accounts of these issues, maybe in different 
idioms, emerged almost in every phenomenological theory of intentionality (see, for example, Twardovski 
(1982), Husserl (2001). See Beyer (1997) for a comparison of Searle’s theory with Husserl’s). 
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intentional state is directed at.5 Yet this would be a coarse-grained analysis of the case. For we 
know, at least from the introspection, that there can be various kinds of intentional states that 
refer to the same state of affairs: I can desire that my laptop should be on the table, perceive 
that my laptop is on the table, or imagine that my laptop is on the table, etc. All these concepts 
– desiring, perceiving, imagining – apply to different psychological modes that represent the 
same state of affairs in different manners.6 However, these would not again be sufficient for 
the individuation of an intentional state, because there can be cases where the psychological 
mode and the state of affairs which the intentional state is directed at are the same, but the 
intentional states are still different. For example, of the same object, I might have a thought 
that my laptop is on the table, or a distinct thought that my lovely gadget is on the table. Given 
that my lovely gadget is my laptop, these two intentional states are distinct, though they are 
directed at the same object. Searle would say that what distinguishes them from each other is 
their (intentional) content. In the first case, the intentional state is directed at the state of 
affairs by virtue of the content my laptop is on the table, but in the second by virtue of the 
content my lovely gadget is on the table. In this instance, we can say that these are two 
different ways of being directed to the same object. Namely, they are two different intentional 
states.  
So far, based on the example above, I have shown the salient motivations for 
distinguishing notions from one another, in a theory of intentionality. Nevertheless, Searle’s 
theory, which is in agreement with these motivations, contains additional important points in 
that respect. In the next sections, I shall dwell on them to capture all main ingredients of his 
theory. But first, I will turn to his next general thesis about intentionality (or representation).  
 
                                                          
5 In Searle’s view, to say that intentionality is representation is to say that intentional states represent their 
conditions of satisfaction. Metaphorically speaking, the latter is the target of the intentional state. In one sense, 
the state of affairs is the conditions of satisfaction of the intentional state, because for my belief to be true, the 
state of affairs that my laptop is on the table must obtain. Therefore, by staying with Searle’s terminology, we 
can say that the second important point here also concerns the conditions of satisfaction of the intentional state. 
Later on I will explain this notion in a detailed way. 
6 Husserl, who is a founder of a classic theory of intentionality, puts this point in the following way: 
 
I also regard it as relevantly evident [...] that there are different ‘manners of consciousness’, different 
intentional relations to objects: the character of our intention is specifically different in the case of 
perceiving, of direct ‘reproductive’ recall, of pictorial representation (in the ordinary sense of the 
interpretation of statues, pictures etc.) […] To me it seems irrefragable that we only know of such 
differences because we envisage them in particular cases (apprehend them adequately and 
immediately), can then compare them and range them under concepts, and can thus make them into 
objects of varying acts of intuition and thought. (Husserl (2001), 105-106) 
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2. Logical analysis and logical properties 
 
The next thesis says that the central notions of Searle’s theory apply to the logical 
properties of a mental state. Namely, Searle considers intentional content, psychological 
mode, direction of fit, and conditions of satisfaction to be logical properties of mental states. 
But what does it mean to say that they are logical? In INT, Searle does not answer this 
question appropriately. Instead, in that work, his account of the logical properties is based on 
contrasting them with the ontological status of intentional states. Searle’s idea that intentional 
states have logical properties presupposes that one should not make any claims on the 
existence of those properties. “[T]he question concerning the logical nature of Intentionality”, 
says Searle, “is not an ontological problem at all”.7 For example,  
 
If the question “What is a belief really?” is taken to mean: what is a belief qua 
belief?, then the answer has to be given, at least in part, in terms of the logical 
properties of belief: a belief is a propositional content in a certain psychological 
mode, its mode determines a mind-to-world direction of fit, and its propositional 
content determines a set of conditions of satisfaction.8  
 
In INT, Searle further maintains that although intentionality is realised in the 
neurology of the brain and the central nervous system, the notion of intentionality is not 
related to the psychological or neurological explanations, either. “[T]he question of how 
Intentional states are realized in the ontology of the world”9, for Searle, is ultimately 
irrelevant to the explanation of intentionality.  
Yet to say that something is a logical property because the questions about its 
existence and realisation are irrelevant is not good enough answer for its characterisation. 
Searle is seemingly aware of the point and, in The Phenomenological Illusion, tries to 
complete this gap. In that work, Searle elucidates his method of logical analysis by virtue of 
which he figures out the logical properties in question. For this reason, the consideration of 
this method can be helpful to better understand his idea that the central notions apply to the 
logical properties. 
                                                          
7 INT, 14. 
8 Ibid. 14-15. 
9 Ibid. 15. 
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Searle explains his logical analysis by comparing it to the phenomenological methods 
of Husserl and Heidegger. According to Searle, the basic defining feature of the logical 
analysis is that, in contrast to the phenomenological method, which mainly relies on the 
introspective abilities of the subject, it does not concentrate on the experience itself. Rather, it 
investigates conditions under which an intentional state or a speech act would be satisfied. 
The paradigm case of a logical analysis, for Searle, is Russell’s theory of descriptions.10 In 
this theory, “[Russell] tries to describe the conditions under which the sentence would be true. 
He arrives at his famous analysis by analyzing truth conditions [of assertive sentences]”.11 
Searle, in turn, extends Russell’s logical analysis into other kinds of speech acts and 
intentional states. He does this by introducing the notion of conditions of satisfaction to 
umbrella the analysis of all different cases. This kind of analysis is distinct from the 
phenomenological method because the latter, in contrast to the former, cannot discover “all 
sorts of conditions which simply have no immediate phenomenological reality”.12 In Searle’s 
picture, our introspective abilities cannot bring into light all conditions of satisfaction of a 
mental state, because many of them are not available to consciousness. For example, the 
conditions of satisfaction of some kinds of intentional states (perception, memory, and action) 
have a specific causal condition that cannot be merely discovered via phenomenological 
reflection.  
Let us take visual experience to elucidate this point. The visual experience has a 
feature Searle calls the causal self-referentiality. This means that, for a visual experience to be 
satisfied, it is necessary for it to be caused by its very object. Searle says that he borrows this 
point from Paul Grice’s analysis of seeing:  
 
Grice gives a classic instance of this in his proof that there is a causal condition on 
seeing, even in cases where that causal condition is not experienced as part of the 
phenomenology of the visual experience. Thus, suppose I see an object, but a mirror 
is then inserted in such a way that I have exactly the same type of experience I had 
before, and I still take myself to be seeing the same object; but, in fact, the mirror 
image is reflecting a different but type-identical object. I am no longer seeing the 
                                                          
10 See Russell (1905). 
11 Searle (2008), 113. 
12 Ibid. 116. 
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object I was originally seeing because that object is not causing my visual 
experience.13  
 
The point here is that if the causal condition is not satisfied, then we cannot say that the 
intentional state in question is satisfied, either. 
Now, Searle puts forward a disputable idea. He maintains that the feature of causal 
self-referentiality of visual experiences “enters into” their intentional contents. This is, for 
him, because the causal self-referentiality is part of conditions of satisfaction of the 
experience, which are determined by the intentional content. In his view, to say that 
intentional content determines the conditions of satisfaction (whose part is the causal self-
referentiality) is to say that it is the intentional content that requires that the object seen “must 
be the cause of that very visual experience”.14 Therefore, “[t]he Intentional content of the 
visual experience is entirely specified by stating the conditions of satisfaction of the visual 
experience […]”.15 Thus, according to Searle’s theory, which is based on his logical analysis, 
the whole intentional content of the visual experience of (say) a yellow station wagon should 
be made explicit in the following form: 
 
I have a visual experience (that there is a yellow station wagon there and that there is 
a yellow station wagon there is causing this visual experience). 16  
 
Yet a phenomenological analysis does not describe the visual experience in this way. 
For a phenomenologist, there is no phenomenological fact that the causal self-referentiality is 
part of the intentional content because we do not experience it when we see something. If we 
ask the question “How do you make explicit the content?”, a phenomenologist will probably 
answer that the intentional content of a perceptual state is brought into light by the subject, 
who directly experiences it from a first-person perspective by virtue of his reflection on the 
mental state. Thus, according to the phenomenological method, the specification of the 
intentional content should be committed to the subject’s way of representation of objects or 
states of affairs the intentional state is directed to. Hence, the phenomenological description of 
the visual experience of a yellow station wagon should simply be as follows:       
 
                                                          
13 Ibid. 115-116. 





I have a visual experience (that there is a yellow station wagon there). 
 
Searle, however, argues that such a description is only the beginning of the analysis, 
because what is brought into light by virtue of the phenomenological reflection is only part of 
its satisfaction conditions; the logical analysis should also add the causal condition to the 
specification.  
Therefore, what we can conclude from the example above is that Searle’s notion of 
intentional content does not apply to the phenomenological but the logical property. Because 
the latter cannot be discovered by the phenomenological method, it should be distinguished 
from the corresponding notions of the phenomenologist philosophers. So, in Searle’s view, 
having an intentional content, as a property of intentional states, is discovered by logical 
analysis.  
One important point concerning this discussion, nevertheless, is that to say that 
something is or is not a phenomenological property, without the clarification of what a 
phenomenological property is, might also be misleading. I think that the question whether 
there is a tension between Searle’s view that his central notions apply to the logical properties 
and the view that they apply to the phenomenological properties depends partly on what we 
mean under the term ‘phenomenological property’. Considering that Searle compares his 
method with Husserl’s and Heidegger’s, a difficulty concerning this term might be that the 
contemporary notion of phenomenological property is not the same as the notion of 
phenomenological property of the phenomenologists of a hundred years ago. When the 
contemporary philosophers speak of phenomenological properties, they mainly mean what it 
is like-ness, or qualia, of conscious states. However, the classics of phenomenology, 
especially Husserl, did not use this term in such a narrow sense. For him, the 
phenomenological investigation could not be confined to what it is like-ness of conscious 
states. In Husserl’s view, the latter is only a real concrete part of our mental life, discovered 
by the phenomenological method. Also, apart from the qualitative features of conscious states, 
this method, for Husserl, can bring out more abstract features, which Searle would probably 
regard as logical properties.17 (For example, by virtue of his method, Husserl invokes an 
abstract entity, called noema, to explain intentionality of mental states.)18  
                                                          
17 It is not accidental that the central notions of Searle’s theory are very similar to the corresponding notions of 
Husserl. There are philosophers who maintain that Searle’s theory contains many points that are known to us 
from Husserl’s works (see Beyer (1997), McIntyre (1984)). 
18 The noema consists of two important parts – thetic part and noematic Sinn – which correlate with parts of a 
concrete intentional state. The thetic part determines psychological mode, and the noematic Sinn (which is 
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So, we must distinguish two notions of phenomenological property: the narrow notion 
and the broad notion. If we take the term ‘phenomenological property’ to refer to only qualia 
of conscious states, then, of course, we use the narrow notion of this term. In this case, we 
must distinguish it from Searle’s notion of logical properties. However, if we use this term in 
the broad (Husserlian) sense, then we have to say that, apart from qualia  (what it is like-ness), 
our mental life has abstract features that are also picked out by the notion of 
phenomenological property. In that case, we cannot say that phenomenological properties are 
considerably distinct from what Searle calls logical property.19  
Thus, concluding this section, we can say that Searle’s logical properties are 
characterised by virtue of two important features: first, the questions about them have no 
ontological implications; they are “ontologically neutral”. Second, in contrast to the 
phenomenological properties (if the term ‘phenomenology’ is used here in the narrow sense), 
the important aspects of logical properties cannot be revealed by simply introspecting on the 
phenomenal part of an experience. 
 
 
3. Psychological mode and direction of fit 
 
We have seen in the first section of this chapter why, in a theory of intentionality, one 
needs to distinguish the psychological mode from other parts of a mental state. This was 
because psychological modes have certain features which are distinct from other features of 
intentional states. Psychological modes specify the manner in which an intentional state is 
directed towards an object (as mentioned above, a psychological mode can be a belief, a 
desire, hope, fear, etc.). 
The important feature of this notion in Searle’s theory is that it is introduced in 
combination with the notion of a direction of fit. To explicate the notion of direction of fit, let 
us consider the passage from G. E. M. Anscombe (2000), which is Searle’s inspiration for this 
notion. Anscombe tells us the following story:   
 
[L]et us consider a man going around town with a shopping list in his hand. Now it is 
clear that the relation of this list to the things he actually buys is one and the same 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
similar to Searle’s notion of intentional content) makes possible the directedness of the mental state to an object 
under a certain aspect.  
19 The important exclusion here, as has been shown, is that Searle, in contrast to Husserl, argues that the 
intentional content can contain the features such as causal self-referentiality. 
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whether his wife gave him the list or it is his own list; and that there is a different 
relation when a list is made by a detective following him about […] What then is the 
identical relation to what happens […] which is not shared by the record? It is 
precisely this: if the list and the things that the man actually buys do not agree, and 
this and this alone constitutes a mistake, then the mistake is not in the list but in the 
man’s performance (if his wife were to say: “Look, it says butter and you have 
bought margarine,” he would hardly reply: “What a mistake! We must put that right” 
and alter the word on the list to ‘margarine’); whereas if the detective’s record and 
what the man actually buys do not agree, then the mistake is in the record.20 
 
Searle, in recourse to this story, compares the list with a propositional content and 
maintains that the content’s relation to the world is determined depending on the kind of the 
psychological mode which it is combined with.21 The gist of the idea here is that the shopper’s 
list, in contrast to the detective’s, has the world-to-word direction of fit; in other words, in 
order for everything to be correct, the world (or more exactly, some things in the world) 
should fit with the words in the list but not vice versa. To the extent that the shopper’s list is 
an expression of his desire or intention to buy the things to which the words in the list refer, 
Searle compares the shopper’s list with the corresponding mental states. He thinks that just as 
the shopper’s list has the world-to-word direction of fit, so desires and intentions have the 
world-to-mind direction of fit. The words in the detective’s list, however, express his beliefs. 
In the detective’s case, in order for everything to be correct, the words in the list should fit 
with the world. That is to say, just as the detective’s list has the word-to-world direction of fit, 
so his corresponding belief has the mind-to-world direction of fit. It can be concluded that, in 
this picture, an intentional state has either a world-to-mind direction of fit or a mind-to-world 
direction of fit.  
As has been implied in Anscombe’s example, a good way to identify the kind of 
direction of fit is to consider unsatisfied intentional states. To say that there are unsatisfied 
intentional states is to say that there can be discrepancies between the intentional contents and 
the world. For example, one can have false beliefs, unfulfilled desires and intentions, etc., 
which do not correspond to the world. In terms of the notion of direction of fit, it is possible to 
know how these discrepancies are rectified. Beliefs have the mind-to-world direction of fit 
because if, for example, one’s belief that the laptop is on the table is false, then it is not some 
                                                          
20 Anscombe (2000), 56. 
21 Cf. Searle (1979), 4. 
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state of affairs in the world which must be corrected, but rather the belief itself. In this case, 
for the things to be correct, one has to give up the false belief, rather than expecting 
appropriate changes in the world. Desires and intentions, however, possess the world-to-mind 
direction of fit; in order for them to be satisfied, the world must fit with them, but not vice 
versa. Searle explains these points as follows:    
 
If my beliefs turn out to be wrong, it is my beliefs and not the world which is at fault, 
as is shown by the fact that I can correct the situation simply by changing my beliefs. 
It is the responsibility of the belief, so to speak, to match the world, and where the 
match fails I repair the situation by changing the belief. But if I fail to carry out my 
intentions or if my desires are unfulfilled I cannot in that way correct the situation by 
simply changing the intention or desire. In these cases it is, so to speak, the fault of 
the world if it fails to match the intention or the desire, and I cannot fix things up by 
saying it was a mistaken intention or desire in a way that I can fix things up by 
saying it was a mistaken belief.22 
 
The importance of the notion of direction of fit for Searle is that, as noted earlier, he 
states a central thesis of his theory in terms of this notion:  
 
(PM): The psychological mode of an intentional state determines a direction of fit.  
 
The gist of this thesis is simple. It shows how the direction of fit of an intentional state is 
dependent on its psychological mode. We have already illustrated this with the examples 
mentioned above. Nevertheless, there are some difficulties with (PM), which mainly have to 
do with the notion of direction of fit. Therefore, firstly, my focus in the following will centre 
on the problems with this notion, and then on the (PM) again, in order to see how these 
drawbacks affect the thesis in question. 
 
3.1. The problem with the notion of direction of fit 
 
Searle’s purpose for using the notion of direction of fit is taxonomic. With this notion 
he wants to subdivide different kinds of intentional states into two classes. In Expression and 
Meaning, where Searle uses the notion of direction of fit to analyse speech acts, he says that 
“[i]t could be elegant if we could build our taxonomy entirely around this distinction in 
                                                          
22 INT, 8. 
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direction of fit […]”.23 Also, in INT, he first subdivides all intentional states into two broad 
categories – “Cognition” (believing, feeling certain, supposing, etc.) and “Volition” (desiring, 
wishing, lusting, etc.) – and then considers possibility of pairing them with two directions of 
fit.24 However, Searle soon realises that, for both speech acts and intentional states, there are 
difficulties in turning this notion into “the entire basis of the distinctions”. The problem Searle 
discovers is that some intentional states possess neither a mind-to-world nor a world-to-mind 
direction of fit. A sorrow and a pleasure, for example, belong to these kinds of intentional 
states. They can be neither true or false, like beliefs, nor fulfilled or unfulfilled, like desires 
and intentions. In the case of a sorrow or a pleasure, for Searle, neither the world nor the mind 
takes responsibility to be fitted with each other. This is the problem which Searle himself 
discovers before his critics do; the application area of the notion of direction of fit is not 
general enough to cover all intentional states.25  
It seems to me that the trouble with the taxonomic use of this notion is deeper than 
Searle considers it to be. Generally, two problems with it can be identified. The first is what 
Searle himself mentions: namely, that some kind of intentional states have no direction of fit. 
Here, it should be added that not only do sorrows, joys and some other intentional states such 
as love and hate (which can be categorised as feelings) have no direction of fit, but also some 
cognitive intentional states, such as assuming and imagining, do not possess this feature 
either. Consider a scientist who is assuming a hypothesis but is not making any claim 
concerning its truth. In this case, although he entertains thoughts which can be specified as 
cognitive intentional states, his thoughts have no “responsibility for fitting” the world. As J. 
David Velleman puts it:   
      
A lack of correspondence between the world and an assumption […] doesn't 
constitute a failure for which one party or the other must be to blame. If the 
assumption is made solely for the sake of argument, then it neither takes 
responsibility for fitting the world nor makes the world responsible for fitting it. Fit 
                                                          
23 Searle (1979), 4. 
24 Cf. INT, 29-30. 
25 The same issue concerns his notion of conditions of satisfaction. Below it will be shown that Searle offers a 
hypothesis according to which although some intentional states have no directions of fit and conditions of 
satisfaction, they contain paradigm intentional states with these features. He tries to soften the problem in terms 
of this hypothesis. 
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between such an assumption and the world is of no importance and is therefore 
neither party's responsibility.26  
 
The trouble with non-propositional imaginations in this respect is deeper than the 
trouble with sorrows and pleasures. The reason for this is that sorrows and pleasures, in 
contrast to non-propositional imaginations, possess derived directions of fit. For sorrows and 
pleasures, in contrast to imaginations, are founded on paradigm intentional states (their 
existence is dependent on beliefs and desires with which they share the same intentional 
content).27 For example, since the pleasure p is founded on the belief p and the desire p, it has 
both the derived mind-to-world direction of fit (because of the belief p) and the derived 
world-to-mind direction of fit (because of the desire p). This is also suggested by the fact that 
pleasures, as Searle tells us, are either appropriate or inappropriate. (To say that the pleasure p 
is appropriate is to say that both the founding belief p and the founding desire p are satisfied.) 
Imaginations, however, can be neither satisfied or unsatisfied, like beliefs and desires, nor 
appropriate or inappropriate, like sorrows and pleasures, because they cannot be founded on 
(or, to use Searle’s phrase, do not “contain”) beliefs and desires. In this sense, imaginations are 
more alien to Searle’s theory.  
The second problem with the taxonomic use of the notion of direction of fit, which is 
often mentioned in philosophical writing on this issue,28 is that pairing two broad categories 
of intentional states, “Cognition and Volition” (as Searle calls them), with two directions of fit 
– i.e. that cognitive intentional states have the mind-to-world direction of fit and conative 
intentional states the world-to-mind direction of fit – disguises some cognitive features of 
conative intentional states. G. F. Schueler (1991) focuses on this point by using hopes as an 
example. He mentions that, although hopes have the world-to-mind direction of fit, one 
cannot hope that p if one knows that being the case that p is impossible. To use Schueler’s 
own example, “[i]f […] I know that today is Sunday (and know the days of the week) then I 
can't hope that tomorrow is not Monday […]”.29 In this sense, hopes, says Schueler, have 
“cognitive or believe-like features”, and to say that they have the world-to-mind direction of 
fit “covers up or ignores this”.30 
                                                          
26 Velleman (1992), 13. 
27 I borrow the notion of founding from Smith (2004), who applies this Husserlian notion to background 
conditions of intentional states.   
28 See e.g. Archer (2015), Frost (2014). 




One might add some other examples which can prima facie reinforce this second 
problem; even some desires seem to have cognitive features, for they, like hopes, also happen 
to be founded on beliefs. For example, if Anna desires to buy a new car A which costs, say, 
9,000 Euros, but does not have enough money to realise this desire, then on the basis of the 
belief that she does not have enough money to buy A, she can form a new desire to buy a 
more affordable car B (such intentional states can be called rational desires). One might 
argue, in terms of such examples, that some desires also have the mind-to-world direction of 
fit, in addition to their world-to-mind direction of fit, because the subject, in forming rational 
desires, should also take into consideration the facts of the world; in such cases, one might 
say, the subject takes responsibility that her desire fits the world.  
Yet, however tempting this idea might be, I think that it cannot give us enough 
justification to say that rational desires also have the mind-to-world direction of fit. A closer 
look suggests that the feature of mind-to-world direction of fit which are attributed to rational 
desires, as well as to hopes, is not their feature per se; rather this feature belongs to the beliefs 
which found such desires, or it is a derived feature of rational desires. To look again at the 
example above, the feature of Anna’s desire to fit the fact that she does not have 9,000 Euros 
is indeed derived from the feature of her belief that she does not have 9,000 Euros – this belief 
leads to her desire to buy B. If one holds that the feature of the mind-to-world direction of fit 
belongs to both the founding belief and the desire (or the hope) in question, one would 
multiply entities beyond necessity. 
This discussion shows that the second problem concerning the taxonomic use of the 
notion of direction of fit is not as severe as it is considered to be. Cognitive or belief-like 
features of hopes and rational desires are their derived features which originally belong to the 
founding mental states.  
 
3.2 Back to the relationship between psychological mode and direction of fit 
 
With (PM), the question is: To what extent can the problems mentioned about the 
notion of direction of fit injure the plausibility of this thesis? Firstly, the second problem 
should be distinguished from the first in that respect. This is because pairing cognitive and 
conative intentional states with two directions of fit, even if this disguises cognitive features 
of some conative states, does not make (PM) implausible. If one is not happy with the thesis 
on the ground that it says nothing about the determination of derived features, then (PM) can 
easily be qualified as follows. The psychological mode can determine original and derived 
direction of fits of the intentional state. However, the first problem, I think, does affect the 
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plausibility of (PM). This problem can be expressed in the following questions: If some 
intentional states have no direction of fit, how can their psychological modes determine it? 
Does it mean that (PM) should be confined to paradigm intentional states?  
To find an answer for these questions is not so easy, because Searle is not clear 
enough on the issue that the central theses of his theory apply to all intentional states. 
Nonetheless, he puts forward a hypothesis in which it can be identified whether he thinks 
(PM) is general enough to apply them to all intentional states. He writes:  
 
[A]ll Intentional states, even those which do not have a direction of fit and those 
which do not have a whole proposition as content, nonetheless contain a [belief] or a 
[desire] or both […] If that hypothesis is true then the analysis of Intentionality in 
terms of representation of conditions of satisfaction under certain aspects and with a 
certain direction of fit is very general in its application and not simply confined to the 
central cases.31  
 
Although Searle does not make a strong claim here, he thinks that, if all intentional 
states “contain” a belief or a desire – and he thinks they do (he uses the verb ‘contain’ in this 
context in several places) –, then it can be said that the central theses and the notions of his 
theory apply to all intentional states. He argues that, although a sorrow and a pleasure have no 
directions of fit in the way that beliefs and desires do, they nevertheless “contain” beliefs and 
desires. For example, according to Searle’s theory, my sorrow for stepping on your foot 
“contains” the belief that I stepped on your foot and the desire that I should not step on your 
foot. Searle formulates the analysis of sorrows the following way: 
 
Sorry (p) → Bel (p) & Des (~p). 32 
 
However, the problem here is that there are intentional states which do not “contain” 
or “involve” beliefs and desires. A non-propositional imagination x, for example, does not 
“contain” any belief. But it is still an intentional state because it is directed towards 
something.  
                                                          
31 INT, 35. 
32 Ibid. 32. 
34 
 
So the drawback of the hypothesis has important consequences for Searle’s theory of 




4. Conditions of Satisfaction and Intentional Content 
 
A central thesis of Searle’s theory of intentionality is:  
  
(DET):   Intentional content determines the conditions of satisfaction of the 
               intentional state.        
 
In this section I will consider this thesis. But, since getting clearer on it requires a better 
understanding of Searle’s notion of conditions of satisfaction, I will first focus on this notion 
and the problems related to it. In particular, I will show how the ambiguity of the term injures 
(DET), and then separately examine (DET) itself.  
   
4.1 Conditions of satisfaction 
 
This is a term which is not so easy to understand, although Searle introduces it in a 
simple way. He writes: “Conditions of satisfaction are those conditions which […] must 
obtain if the [intentional] state is to be satisfied”.33 For example, a belief is satisfied if what is 
believed is true, a desire is satisfied if what is desired happens to be the case, an intention is 
satisfied if what is intended is realised, etc. As one can notice, here the term ‘conditions of 
satisfaction’ is a broadening of the term ‘truth-conditions’. The latter term applies to beliefs 
and assertive sentences. In other words: one’s belief p, or the assertive sentence p, is true if 
and only if p is the case. Yet the term ‘truth-conditions’ cannot be used to speak of intentional 
states such as desires, intentions, etc. One does not say that a desire will be true, but rather 
that a desire will be satisfied, or fulfilled. Searle thus uses the term ‘conditions of satisfaction’ 
to cover all these different cases. He writes: 
 
We need a notion more general than the notion of truth because we need a notion that 
covers not only those intentional states like beliefs that can be true or false, but states 
like desires and intentions, which can be fulfilled or frustrated, carried out or not 
                                                          
33 Ibid. 13. 
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carried out. Just as I can believe that I will go to the movies tonight, and thus have a 
state that is true or false, so I can desire to go to the movies tonight or intend to go 
the movies tonight. But my desires and intentions cannot be literally true or false. 
What stands to my belief as its truth conditions – that I go to the movies tonight – is 
exactly what stands to my desire as its fulfilment conditions – that I go to the movies 
tonight. I will say then that such intentional states such as beliefs and desires have 
conditions of satisfaction, a term that covers truth conditions for belief, fulfilment 
conditions for desires, carrying-out conditions for intentions, and so on.34  
 
Yet the notion of conditions of satisfaction, I think, has some drawbacks. First, it is 
loose as a theoretical notion. Second, the term ‘conditions of satisfaction’ is ambiguous. 
Third, in one sense it can be confused for the notion of intentional object.  
Let me now consider these issues one by one.  
The looseness of the notion of conditions of satisfaction. This drawback has to do with the fact 
that in some cases Searle loads the term with a meaning which sets it apart from the meaning 
of ‘truth conditions’. These are the cases where Searle maintains that certain features, such as 
the causal self-referentiality of perceptions or of remembering, and the consistency of beliefs 
are also parts of the conditions of satisfactions of those mental states. For example, in the case 
of remembering, Searle says, it is part of the conditions of satisfaction of the remembering 
that the occurrence of the remembered event must cause the memory of it.35 Searle calls this 
causal self-referentiality of remembering and thinks that it is a necessary condition for having 
a memory of something.36 Or, if one takes the category of beliefs, he says that “[g]iven that an 
animal holds two inconsistent beliefs, beliefs of the form p and not p, […] the animal [has] 
reason to abandon at least one of them […] Because it is part of the conditions of satisfaction 
of a belief that it cannot be true if its negation is true”.37 (I will continue to call this feature the 
consistency of beliefs.) 
The problem with such a use of ‘conditions of satisfaction’ is that, if it is said that the 
conditions of satisfaction are fixed only by intentional content, then it cannot be maintained 
that the features such as causal-self referentiality belong to them. Moreover, the causal self-
referentiality, or the consistency of beliefs, cannot be specified as part of the intentional 
                                                          
34 Searle (1998), 100. 
35 Cf. INT, 52. 
36 He maintains that intentions are also causally self-referential (see INT, chapter 3). 
37 Searle (2008), 172. 
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content. Such features do not correspond to what the content of mental states transmits to us; 
they do not represent anything. 
A simple way to show this would be to point to those features which are not given to 
introspection. One might say, for example, that the fact that features such as causal self-
referentiality are not allowed to be specified as part of the content because they are not 
accessible to introspection: no matter how much I reflect on the content of my memory, I 
cannot find the causal self-referentiality in the content.38 Yet, to block this argument, Searle 
claims that to say that the causal self-referentiality enters into the content does not mean “that 
[the content] contains a verbal or other representation of itself”.39 For Searle, this part of the 
content does not represent anything. Thus, on Searle’s picture, the intentional content of some 
kinds of intentional states contains two different parts: namely, a representational and 
nonrepresentational part. 
However, notice that it is analytically false to say that non-representational features, 
such as causal self-referentiality, enter into the intentional content. As M. Schmitz puts it, 
“[…] the notion of intentional content is precisely designed to capture the contents of minds 
with regard to their representational significance”.40 Moreover, even if one, like Searle, 
wanted to change this notion by re-defining it so that it captures some non-representational 
features, the features such as causal self-referentiality would not still be good candidates for 
that to which this new notion can be applied. To see this, let me consider one important 
feature of the content of most intentional states, namely the variation possibility. According to 
this possibility, besides the intentional state whose content it is, the content in question can 
also be part of other intentional states as well. In other words, the intentional content can be in 
different intentional states which have different psychological modes. For example, the 
content that the door is open can be the content of a belief, or of a desire, or of another 
intentional state. Accordingly, if features such as the causal self-referentiality of perception 
and memories, the consistency of belief states, etc. all belonged to the intentional content, 
then, like the other parts of the content (such as the door is open), they could also be parts of 
intentional states with different modes. However, what is seen when the mode of the 
intentional state changes is quite distinct. Although the contents such as the door is open is 
shareable among intentional states which can have propositional contents, features such as the 
causal-self referentiality or the consistency of beliefs depend only on whether the mode of the 
                                                          
38 See Searle (2008), 115. There, Searle says that a similar critical remark was made by Dagfin Føllesdal; see 
also Armstrong (1991). 
39 INT, 49. 
40 Schmitz (2012), 62. 
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intentional state is kept constant; by changing the psychological mode, these features are 
abandoned. This shows that it is reasonable to maintain that features such as the causal self-
referentiality belong to the psychological mode of the intentional state, rather than holding 
that they “enter into” the content.41  
Another similar possibility to show that the features in question depend on the mode of 
the intentional state is to keep the psychological mode by changing the content. For example, 
if we take the belief that it is raining and the belief that the door is open, we can see that, 
although the contents of these beliefs are different, the feature of consistency remains. If 
belief states really possess such a feature, then it belongs to these states regardless of what 
their content is. It is therefore incorrect to say that such features are part of the intentional 
content. 
Also, if conditions of satisfaction are given in terms of intentional content, the features 
in question cannot be part of the conditions of satisfaction either.  
The ambiguity of the term. Searle himself confesses the ambiguity of the term ‘conditions of 
satisfaction’, although he thinks that this is “quite harmless”. He writes:  
 
The expression ‘conditions of satisfaction’ has the usual process-product ambiguity 
as between the requirement and the thing required. So, for example, if I believe that 
it is raining then the conditions of satisfaction of my belief are that it should be the 
case that it is raining (requirement). That is what my belief requires in order that it be 
a true belief. And if my belief actually is a true belief then there will be a certain 
condition in the world, namely the condition that it is raining (thing required), which 
is the condition of satisfaction of my belief, i.e., the condition in the world which 
actually satisfies my belief. I think this ambiguity is quite harmless, indeed useful, 
provided that one is aware of it from the start.42 
  
Searle distinguishes here between two notions of conditions of satisfaction: conditions of 
satisfaction as a requirement, and conditions of satisfaction as a thing. This distinction should 
be kept in mind. In the first sense, ‘conditions of satisfaction’ refers to the requirement, as 
                                                          
41 Cf. Bach (2007). 
42 INT, 13. Notice that in this passage Searle also regards the notion of belief as a normative notion. He says that 
“the conditions of satisfaction of my belief are that it should be the case that it is raining (requirement)” (INT, 13; 
emphasis added). This suggests that, in Searle’s view, the connection between the belief and its conditions of 
satisfaction is also normative. However, I think that this is not a correct characterisation of belief states. The 
notion of belief cannot be a normative notion because there are neither norms of belief, nor norms of truth 
conditions (see Kemmerling (2017), chapter 21, for a detailed discussion).  
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Burge puts it, “that has to be met for an Intentional state to be veridical (here the [condition of 
satisfaction] itself has Intentional or referential properties)”.43 In the second sense, ‘conditions 
of satisfaction’ refers to the thing in the world which fulfills the requirement of the intentional 
content. It is noteworthy that Searle neglects the negative role of this ambiguity, and, as we 
will see later, this negligence has serious effects on his theory.44 
Conditions of satisfaction and intentional object. An important point concerning the notion of 
conditions of satisfaction (as a thing required) is that it ought not to be confused with Searle’s 
notion of an intentional object. Searle distinguishes carefully between these two notions. In 
his picture, the conditions of satisfaction of an intentional state might or might not obtain, but 
intentional objects only exist. Therefore, the ontological status of conditions of satisfaction 
and intentional objects are distinct. To say that an intentional state has conditions of 
satisfaction is to say that its content represents a state of affairs which may or may not obtain 
in the actual world. The conditions of satisfaction are the conditions which are required for the 
satisfaction of the intentional state, but the fact that the intentional state has conditions of 
satisfaction does not guarantee that the required conditions actually obtain. However, when it 
comes to intentional objects, for Searle, it cannot be said that, like unicorns and other fictions, 
they can also be non-existent. On Searle’s account, although there are intentional states that 
are about non-existent entities, one need not be committed to the view that some intentional 
objects do not exist. Consider, for example, the belief that the present King of France is bald. 
Given that there is no present King of France, Searle thinks that this belief has no intentional 
object. For him, “if nothing satisfies the referential portion of the representative content then 
the Intentional state does not have an Intentional object”.45 What is more, in Searle’s view, in 
such cases there is no need to invoke Meinongian entities in order for intentional states to be 
about something. He writes: 
  
                                                          
43 Burge (1991), 196. 
44 Furthermore, in this passage, Searle characterises the ambiguity by saying that it is “the usual process-product 
ambiguity”. However, it is difficult to see how ‘conditions of satisfaction’ is ambiguous in this sense, because the 
process-product ambiguity is the ambiguity in which the expression in question can be used to refer to its 
reference as both a process and the product of this process. But it is hard to see how conditions of satisfaction 
can be understood as a process on the one hand, and as the product resulting from that process on the other. 
Therefore, I suggest giving up treating this expression as having process-product ambiguity, and I only focus on 
the distinction between conditions of satisfaction as the requirement and conditions of satisfaction as the thing 
required. 
45 INT, 17. 
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[A]n Intentional object is just an object like any other; it has no peculiar ontological 
status at all. To call something an Intentional object is just to say that it is what some 
Intentional state is about. Thus, for example, if Bill admires President Carter, then 
the Intentional object of his admiration is president Carter, the actual man and not 
some shadowy intermediate entity between Bill and the man.46 
 
His position is thus that, in order for something to be an intentional object, it must 
exist. Intentional objects, for him, are just existing entities which intentional states can be 
directed towards.   
However, at first glance, this view can too seem to be problematic, for it can raise the 
following questions: How can intentional objects be regarded as real entities, if intentional 
states can be about non-existent entities?47 Or, how can an intentional state without an 
intentional object still be intentional? These are the questions which can be answered by 
considering, again, Searle's notion of conditions of satisfaction. In Searle's theory, having 
conditions of satisfaction is an essential feature which characterizes all intentional states. Yet, 
for him, some intentional states have no intentional object. In his theory, the term ‘intentional 
object’ can be understood in a stipulative sense; Searle’s use of this term is such that his 
theory does not accept the general statement that all intentional states have intentional objects. 
His claim is rather that intentional states have or represent their conditions of satisfaction.48 
To put it otherwise, according to Searle’s theory, having an intentional object (being directed 
to an existing entity) is not an internal or essential property of intentional states. For Searle, 
what are internal to an intentional state, besides the intentional content, are its conditions of 
satisfaction. They are also an internal property because, in contrast to intentional objects 
which must exist, “there is no way the agent can have [an intentional state] without it having 
its conditions of satisfaction”.49 For example, “part of what makes my wish that it were 
raining the wish it is”, says Searle, “is that certain things will satisfy it and certain other things 
will not”.50 So, in his view, the about-ness of intentional states is established not by the fact 
that they have intentional objects, but that they possess conditions of satisfactions. 
                                                          
46 Ibid. 16-17. 
47 Cf. Crane (2001), 14-15. 
48 Yet notice that, as mentioned above, the notion of conditions of satisfaction does not apply to all intentional 
states. 
49  INT, 22. 
50 Ibid. 11. 
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After these remarks on the notion of conditions of satisfaction, let us now consider 
(DET).   
 
 
4.2 On the relationship between intentional content and conditions of satisfaction 
 
At first glance, it seems that (DET) is an indisputable thesis; one can provide plenty of 
simple examples to explain it. For example, if I have a belief that it is raining, the content of 
this belief [that it is raining] determines the conditions of satisfaction that it is raining. 
However, given the above remarks on the term ‘conditions of satisfaction’, one should be 
careful as the meaning of (DET) can change depending on the sense in which this term is 
used. Setting aside features such as causal self-referentiality, there can still be two possible 
readings of (DET): 
 
(DETt):  Intentional content determines the conditions of satisfaction (as a thing 
               required) of the intentional state; 
(DETr):  Intentional content determines the conditions of satisfaction (as a 
               requirement) of the intentional state.  
 
In Searle’s view, there is no distinction between (DETt) and (DETr). For him, (DET) is 
true in both readings. However, this distinction is very important, because depending on 
which meaning of ‘conditions of satisfaction’ is used, (DET) can change its meaning and truth 
value. That is to say, (DETt) and (DETr) express two distinct ideas. (DETr) expresses the idea 
that an intentional state with a propositional content provides its satisfaction conditions. It can 
be formulated, like Tarski’s biconditionals, as follows: an intentional state S with a content p 
is satisfied if and only if p. Note that the second p here expresses satisfaction (truth) 
conditions (in Searle’s terminology ‘conditions of satisfaction as a requirement’). Drawing on 
Burge (1991) again, we can say that the satisfaction conditions in this sense also have 
referential properties; they also need a satisfaction in order for S to be satisfied. An actual 
entity in the world (in Searle’s terminology ‘conditions of satisfaction as a thing’), which 
counts among the (possible) entities which meet the conditions laid down by the content of S 
can satisfy it. Ipso facto it makes S satisfied as well. 
(DETt) is a much stronger thesis, because it says that the intentional content also 
determines the entity (conditions of satisfaction as a thing) which makes the intentional state 
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satisfied. In the remainder of this section, my discussion will be confined to (DETt) because it 
seems to be more disputable. 
The internalism-externalism debate on (DETt) between Searle and Putnam. Searle elaborates 
his ideas on (DETt) in the context of the internalism-externalism debate. As an internalist 
philosopher, Searle argues that intentional content (or meaning) determines conditions of 
satisfaction as a thing required (or extension).51 (Henceforth, following Chapter 8 of INT, I 
will use the term ‘extension’.) Searle draws on the tradition stemming from Frege in this 
respect. Frege maintained that each expression is associated with a certain abstract meaning 
(Sinn) in virtue of which the expression refers to the object in question. This abstract entity 
needs to be mentally grasped by the subject in order for her to understand the meaning of the 
expression. Now, Searle holds that it is in virtue of intentional content in the head of the 
subject that she understands the reference of the expression.52  
This view is set in opposition to externalism. The externalist philosophers (Putnam, 
Kripke, Burge, etc.) argue that “what is in the head” is not sufficient to determine reference 
(extension). They think that external features, such as casual relations between mental state 
(or expression) and reference, are also important in this respect. 
In INT, Searle criticises some leading externalist philosophers from the perspective of 
his internalist position. Here, I will focus on Searle's criticism of Putnam. The understanding 
of who is right in this debate can help to clarify whether (DETt) is true or not.    
Searle attacks Putnam's ideas which the latter develops in The Meaning of 'Meaning'. 
In this famous work, Putnam champions an externalist view of meaning, by arguing that 
psychological (intentional) state is not sufficient to determine extension. He supports this 
view with two important arguments on which Searle focuses: 1) the argument from the 
division of linguistic labor; and 2) the argument from the Twin Earth thought experiment.53 
Let me consider these arguments separately and then examine Searle’s criticism of them.  
“The division of linguistic labor”. For Putnam, this is the principle according to which, in 
every linguistic community, there are experts on whose usage the meanings of certain terms 
depend54 (Putnam provides many examples to explain his argument in favour of this principle, 
but I will consider only the example which is also used by Searle). For example, as a rule, 
                                                          
51 Searle thinks that intentional contents and meanings are identical. I will consider this issue later on.  
52 Cf. Ibid. 198. 
53 Searle says that “[Putnam] sometimes talks as if they were part of the same argument but, in fact, they are 
quite independent […]” (INT, 201). Searle is partly right. Putnam does not make an explicit division between 
these arguments. For expository convenience, I follow Searle’s division of Putnam’s arguments. 
54 Cf. Putnam (1975), 228. 
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biologists know the “criteria” for applying the terms ‘beech’ and ‘elm’ better than other 
people do. These terms refer to different kinds of trees, but these trees are so similar to each 
other that people without sufficient relevant knowledge cannot distinguish them. For Putnam, 
people who are non-experts, or ignorant of, the distinction between them have the same 
concept (intension) to attach to both words, although their extensions are different. And since 
having the same concept amounts to being in the same psychological state, Putnam says that 
their psychological states cannot determine the extensions.    
Searle’s reply to Putnam’s argument from the hypothesis of the division of linguistic 
labor consists of several parts. Let us consider them separately. 
Searle first maintains that this argument would create no worries for an internalist 
philosopher. He mentions that, according to the traditional internalist accounts,  
 
[T]he notions of intension and extension are not defined relative to idiolects [of the 
people who don’t have sufficient knowledge to distinguish elm trees from beech 
trees]. As traditionally conceived, an intension or Fregean Sinn is an abstract entity 
which may be more or less imperfectly grasped by individual speakers.55  
 
He goes on to say that the mental states of the speakers who grasp intensions imperfectly 
cannot determine relevant extensions, because they do not know the meanings of the words 
involved. 
But notice that this reply is flawed, because Searle mixes up his own position with 
Frege’s. The problem here is that although both philosophers have the internalist attitude 
concerning this issue, Searle does not accept Frege’s abstract (third) realm.56 In the same 
chapter of INT, a few pages above, Searle writes: 
 
[I]t is not necessary to postulate any special metaphysical realms in order to account 
for communication and shared Intentionality. If you think about the Evening Star 
under the mode of presentation "Evening Star", and I think about the same planet 
under the same mode of presentation, the sense in which we have an abstract entity 
in common is the utterly trivial sense in which, if I go for a walk in the Berkeley hills 
and you go for exactly the same walk, we share an abstract entity, the same walk, in 
                                                          
55 INT, 201; emphasis added. 
56 Cf. Ibid. 197. 
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common. The possibility of shared Intentional contents does not require a heavy 
metaphysical apparatus any more than the possibility of shared walks.57 
 
This passage clarifies that Searle distinguishes his own position from Frege’s with 
regard to the notion of Sinn, and this is important for dealing with the problem of ignorant 
speakers. This problem is not a trouble for Frege’s theory, because to him it is the grasp of a 
relevant third realm entity (Sinn) which determines extension and that entity is not a 
subjective mental content of any speaker. Yet, as seen in the passage above, Searle does not 
accept the abstract realm, the grasp of whose entities makes possible the determination of 
extension. Moreover, there is no other notion in Searle’s theory which could fill this gap (e.g. 
the notion of meaning, distinct from the notion of intentional content, could do this). He only 
places emphasis on intentional contents, but he neglects the fact that, for him, they are 
individual to each subject. The intentional contents which are “in the head” of ignorant 
speakers are distinct from the corresponding intentional contents of experts.58 Because these 
speakers do not share the relevant intentional contents of, or (to use Searle’s metaphor) “the 
same walk” as, the experts, their intentional contents cannot determine the extensions of the 
words. That is why the case of ignorant speaker does create a problem for Searle’s theory.  
Furthermore, Searle tries to refute Putnam’s argument on the ground that, even in the 
case of the ignorant speaker, there can be a difference between the speaker’s concept of elm 
tree and her concept of beech tree. For Searle, however imperfect the grasp of these 
intensions may be, the speaker can still know that “beeches are not elms and elms are not 
beeches”59; she can know that these are two distinct species of trees. Therefore, Searle 
concludes, the speaker’s concept of elm is distinct from her concept of beech. 
This remark is valuable as it shows that there might be conceptual differences even in 
some of those cases in which people attach very similar concepts to different words. 
However, this much is irrelevant to the point at issue with Putnam. The reason for this is that 
the ignorant speaker’s distinction between the concept of elm and the concept of beech does 
not show that her concepts determine their extensions; knowing the difference in terms of 
conceptual knowledge, as in the case of the example of ‘elm’/‘beech’, is clearly not sufficient 
for fixing real differences between the extensions of the terms. Such speakers do not know 
the features in terms of which elm trees differ from beech trees.          
                                                          
57 INT, 198. 
58 It is useful to remind here that, for Searle, intentional contents are features of the brain. 
59 Ibid. 202. 
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So I conclude that Searle’s refutation of Putnam’s argument from the division of 
linguistic labor is not successful. Let us now turn to Searle’s criticism of Putnam’s second 
argument.  
The argument from the Twin Earth thought experiment. This is an argument based on 
Putnam’s celebrated thought experiment. Suppose, Putnam says, that there is a planet in a 
distant galaxy which is exactly like Earth. Putnam calls this planet the Twin Earth. According 
to the thought experiment, everything that happens on Earth also happens on Twin Earth. The 
planets have the same geography and history. Also, the people on Twin Earth are 
indistinguishably similar to the people on Earth; their language and culture are also 
indistinguishable. Yet there is one important distinction between these planets: the molecular 
structure of water on Twin Earth is not H2O but a distinct liquid whose chemical compound is 
XYZ, though the surface features of both kinds of water, such as liquidity, transparency, 
tastelessness, etc., are the same. That is to say, the people on both Earth and Twin Earth have 
the same concept of ‘water’ (or, as Putnam puts it, the same psychological state relative to this 
term) before the discovery of the chemical composition of water on those planets. According 
to Putnam, despite this, the term ‘water’ on Earth in 1750, before the discovery, referred to 
H2O; but on Twin Earth in 1750, it referred to XYZ. This is to say, although people on both 
Earth and Twin Earth, while using the term ‘water’, had the same psychological state, the 
extensions of the term were different. Thus, for Putnam, psychological states cannot 
determine extension. 
Putnam’s idea that the term ‘water’ in both planets before 1750 referred to different 
entities can be challenged in the following way: ‘Water’ meant the same in both planets 
before 1750 and the microstructure was irrelevant to its meaning. However, to support his 
thesis against such assumptions, Putnam puts forward an interesting idea. He says that the 
extensions of natural-kind terms such as ‘water’ are determined indexically (he believes that 
the view that intension determines extension is not applicable to indexicals). Putnam’s 
intuition here is that, in an indexical definition, the introducer of a term has a direct causal 
contact with its reference. For him, once the term has been baptised in a direct ostensive way, 
it will also pick up the microstructure of the reference, irrespective of whether it is known or 
not. Suppose, Putnam says, that in the actual world, “I am giving a meaning explanation by 
pointing to this glass and saying ‘this is water’”.60 “When I say 'this (liquid) is water',” he 
goes on, “the 'this' is, so to speak, a de re 'this' – i.e. the force of my explanation is that' water' 
is whatever bears a certain equivalence relation (the relation we called 'sameL' […]) to the 
                                                          
60 Putnam (1975), 230. 
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piece of liquid referred to as 'this' in the actual world”.61 Putnam is in fact making two claims 
here: first, that the indexical definition picks up the “whole” entity including its micro-
structure, and, second, that the sample reference for the definition must bear the same liquid 
relation (“sameL”) to the entities referred to by ‘water’ not only in our actual world, but also 
in all possible worlds, viz. in Twin Earth as well. He calls the latter the sameness cross-world 
relation. That is to say, the entity called ‘water’ must have “the same important physical 
properties” (liquidity, colourless, tasteless, H2O microstructure, etc.) in all possible worlds, in 
order for the term to have the same extension. And because of its different (XYZ) 
microstructure, the extension of ‘water’ on Twin Earth cannot bear the sameness cross-world 
relation to the liquid which has the microstructure H2O, namely the entity which the term 
‘water’ is used to refer to on Earth. Therefore, for Putnam, what is called ‘water’ on Twin 
Earth is not water. 
Notice again that Putnam does not say that natural-kind terms such as ‘water’, ‘gold’, 
‘tiger’, etc. do not determine their extensions. To reiterate a point mentioned earlier, his 
purpose is to show that concepts (or psychological states with intentional contents) do not 
determine. In contrast to Searle, Putnam distinguishes indexically defined meanings from 
their psychological correlates. In Putnam’s picture, the meanings of natural kind terms 
determine the extensions not because the subject attaches certain concepts to the terms, but 
because their definition contains an indexical component.  
This shows that, in Putnam’s theory, the issue of indexicality is central to the question 
whether the meaning of a natural kind term determines its extension. Searle’s reply to the 
argument from the Twin Earth thought experiment is also based on his views on indexicality. 
Therefore, a short digression for this issue is required. 
The Indexicality of natural-kind terms. Putnam emphasises the role of indexicality 
because he thinks that, while using indexical expressions, the subject does not need to know 
the descriptive details of the entity which are being referred to. For him, indexical expressions 
such as ‘this’ or ‘that’ pick up the micro-structure as well, even if the subject using these 
terms is ignorant of it. This is to say that, in Putnam’s view, the referential powers of the 
indexical expression which designates a “whole entity”, overstep the conceptual resources of 
the subject. Therefore, as Searle points it out, “Putnam supposes […] that the traditional view 
that what is in the head determines extension cannot be applied to indexicals”.62  
                                                          
61 Ibid. 231. 
62 INT, 206. 
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Searle, however, does not agree with Putnam’s approach to indexicality. Although he 
shares Putnam’s view that the natural-kind terms contain an indexical component and the 
indexical definition determines extension, he thinks that, in the case of indexicality as well, 
the extension is only determined by “what is in the head”. Nevertheless, Searle acknowledges 
that the lexical meaning of indexical expressions is not sufficient to determine the reference. 
For him, in the case of indexicality, the Fregean sense has a more complex structure, which 
consists of three features: 1) the feature of self-referentiality; 2) the rest of the lexical meaning 
(the descriptive content); and 3) the awareness by the subject of the relevant features of the 
context of the utterance.63 Let me begin by explicating each of these features briefly, starting 
with the first one. 
Searle holds that, in uttering an expression, the expression shows the relation in which 
the reference stands to the utterance itself. He calls this the self-referentiality of the indexical 
expression. To him, self-referentiality is also a part of the lexical meaning of the expression. 
For example, if one says “I am a student”, one does not simply refer to a certain object, but 
one also indicates that the reference of the utterance is the person uttering this sentence. Or, to 
use another example, if somebody says “John is a student now”, somebody refers to John's 
being a student by also indicating that John is a student at the time of the utterance of this 
expression. Searle maintains that the self-referentiality here is shown because, like the causal 
self-referentiality of perception, the self-referentiality of indexical cases is not a representative 
part of the corresponding content. He writes:  
 
The sense in which the indexical cases are self-referential, like the case of Intentional 
self-reference, does not imply that the speaker in making the utterance performs a 
speech act of referring to the utterance, nor is the utterance explicitly represented in 
itself.64  
 
For Searle, in the specification of the truth conditions of the sentence with an indexical 
expression, self-referentiality is not stated.  
The other part of the lexical meaning of an indexical expression, for Searle, is non-
indexical descriptive content. Non-indexical descriptive content expresses “the sort of entity 
being referred to”. For example, expressions such as ‘now’, ‘yesterday’, ‘today’ indicate time 
relations between the utterer and the reference, ‘here’ and there’ indicate place-relations, etc. 
                                                          
63 Cf. Ibid. 222. 
64 Ibid, 223. 
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Searle adds that often an awareness of the context of an utterance is also important for 
the “completing Fregean sense”.65 (According to Searle’s theory, the latter is also a 
component in the head.) For example, if somebody only says “that man is drunk”, then “the 
descriptive content of ‘man’ together with the indexical does not provide the completing 
Fregean sense because the utterance is only meant and understood in the context of an 
accompanying visual perception of which man is meant […]”.66 Therefore, Searle says, “the 
proposition expressed has to contain the Intentional content of the perceptual experience that 
accompanied the utterance”.67   
In Searle’s theory, the burden of explaining why in the case of indexicality “what is in 
the head” is sufficient to determine extension lies with the feature of self-referentiality. The 
crucial question to ask here is: What does this self-referentiality have to do with “what is in 
the head”? Searle’s answer to this question is that the indexical expressions owe this feature to 
the intentional state expressed. On his view, it is the intentional content of the expressed 
psychological state “that indicates relations that the object [the speaker] is referring to has to 
the utterance itself”.68 For Searle, the intentional contents of such mental states contain the 
feature which is “sufficient to account for how the utterance of an indexical expression can 
have a completing Fregean sense”.69 He thinks that indexical cases are similar to some kinds 
of intentional states in this respect. This is suggested by the fact that, like the self-
referentiality of perception, intention, and remembrance, the specification of conditions of 
satisfaction of indexical expressions also makes reference to their utterances (since, according 
to Searle, to remind ourselves, the conditions of satisfaction and the intentional content have 
the same specification). For example, if somebody says “I am hungry now”, then, Searle tells 
us, the specification of the conditions of satisfaction of the utterance will be as follows:    
 
                                                          
65 A completing Fregean sense is needed when the sentence expresses an incomplete sense. For example, the 
sense of ‘John was here’ is incomplete, because the sentence alone does not completely express the thought in 
question. Or, to take another example, the sense of the sentence ‘John was in Paris yesterday’ is incomplete, 
because the sentence “does not suffice for the expression of the thought” (Frege (1956), 296), which also 
captures the time of John’s being in Paris. Frege therefore wrote that “[i]f a time indication is needed by the 
present tense one must know when the sentence was uttered to apprehend the thought correctly” (Frege (1956), 
296). He concluded that “the time of utterance is part of the expression of the thought” ((Frege (1956), 296).  
66 INT, 226. 
67 Ibid. 




(the person making this utterance, "I", is hungry at the time of this utterance, 
"now").70 
 
Here, we need to remember again that, for Searle, the sense of the expression is the 
same as the corresponding intentional content. In his picture, the intentional content that 
corresponds to the indexical expression is also self-referential. Thus, Searle’s theory suggests 
that, if somebody utters the sentence ‘I am a student’, the specification of the corresponding 
intentional content is as follows: 
 
(the person making the utterance ‘I’ is a student)71 
 
This view seems to me implausible, because, as already noted, the notion of 
intentional content captures those mental features which have representational capacities, 
whereas self-referentiality, for Searle, is a non-representational feature. Therefore, to say that 
it should be specified in the intentional content is not correct. However, this does not mean 
that an indexical expression does not indicate self-referentiality. It does because self-
referentiality is a feature of its literal meaning, which is distinct from the corresponding 
intentional content. 
To confuse meaning with intentional content is a salient mistake of Searle’s theory. 
Putnam is right when he says that intentional contents “[cannot be] identical with the 
meanings of words in a public language”.72 What makes the expression ‘I’ in my idiolect an 
expression about me (viz. a self-referential expression) is not that it meets a condition laid 
down by the corresponding intentional content, but that the meaning of ‘I’, as determined by 
(to use Wittgenstein’s phrase) the language-game of our community, is such that when used in 
a sentence, it refers to the speaker himself. Thus, self-referentiality is external to the 
intentional content. And this, in turn, suggests that an indexical definition can determine its 
extension not by virtue of the intentional content expressed, but by virtue of the meaning of 
the indexical expression established by that definition. 
On (DETt) again. What conclusion can be drawn for (DETt) from this discussion? I think that, 
after we have found that Searle makes a mistake by equating meaning with intentional 
content, two theses must be distinguished to determine whether (DETt) is true: 
 
                                                          
70 Ibid. 223. 
71 Cf. Ibid. 
72 Putnam (1996), xix. 
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(DETint): Intentional content determines extension; 
(DETm): Meaning determines extension. 
 
As discussed previously, the ignorant speaker case shows that (DETint) is false. The 
intentional content, as a psychological entity, is individual to each person; it cannot determine 
the extension. (Moreover, we have seen that Searle’s efforts to defend his position from 
Putnam’s attacks were not successful.) (DETm), however, is true. But here one should take 
into account that extension cannot wholly be understood as something readily given by 
nature. For the ways in which people see and deal with the world, and the different semantic 
policies they adopt based on them, also play an important role in determining what aspects of 
nature are relevant to the reference. That is to say, (DETm) is true not because, as Putnam 
thinks, the meaning definitions of natural kind terms contain an indexical element that picks 
up real joints of the nature, but because the extension determination is partly the result of our 





In this chapter, we have considered the main theses of Searle’s theory of intentionality. 
Searle uses a diversified conceptual apparatus to explain the intentionality of mental 
phenomena. Yet his concepts and theses derived from them are not good enough in this 
respect; they do not apply to all intentional states. Some intentional states possess neither 
conditions of satisfaction nor a direction of fit. Hence, (PM) and (DET) cannot explain all 
kinds of intentional phenomena.  
Furthermore, we have seen that Searle designs the notion of conditions of satisfaction 
to capture not only those conditions which can be determined by the contentual part of the 
intentional state, but also those features (such as causal self-referentiality) which depend on 
its psychological mode. Then, in order to make this idea compatible with (DET), he holds that 
features such as causal self-referentiality also “enter into” the intentional content. That is to 
say, to save the idea that features such as causal self-referentiality are part of the conditions of 
satisfaction, and that the conditions of satisfaction are determined by the intentional content, 
he pays a high price; namely, he accepts the false view that the intentional content also 
contains a non-representational part.  
Moreover, this chapter has shown that although Searle notes that the term ‘conditions 
of satisfaction’ is ambiguous, he neglects the fact that this injuries (DET). Therefore, two 
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readings of (DET) have been offered: (DETr) and (DETt). Nevertheless, we have seen that 
still another distinction within (DETt) is needed: (DETint) and (DETm). By examining Searle’s 
replies to Putnam’s externalist challenges, I have concluded that (DETint) is false. But (given 








CHAPTER III  
 
 
The Hypothesis of the Background 
 
  
In this chapter I will discuss Searle's hypothesis of the Background, which is an 
important part of his theory of intentionality. According to this hypothesis, an intentional state 
only determines its conditions of satisfaction relative to non-intentional Background 
capacities.1 Under the term ‘Background’, Searle mainly means our capacities such as 
walking, cycling, playing the piano, etc. For example, my desire to play the piano cannot be 
satisfied unless I have an appropriate capacity (finger motions corresponding to the sequence 
of notes). 
Searle considered and reconsidered the hypothesis of the Background at various stages 
of his philosophical development. In his works, the questions which motivated this hypothesis 
were different, despite their connection with one another. I think that the consideration of 
these motivations can help to better understand this hypothesis. Therefore, I will first focus on 
them individually. As we will see, although Searle’s basic motivation is the motivation from 
the literal meaning of a sentence, in his later works he also uses the notion of the Background 
to extend his theory of intentionality. For this purpose, he introduces another intermediary 
notion, namely the notion of Network of intentional states. I will claim that Searle is not 
successful in motivating the idea of the Background from both the notion of literal meaning 
and the Network. Furthermore, I will examine his idea that the Background is a mental 
phenomenon. By neglecting the role of the body in the constitution of Background capacities, 
Searle claims that these capacities consist of neurophysiological structures of the brain. I will 








                                                 
1 Cf. INT, 143; RM, 175.  
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1. Motivations for the idea of the Background 
 
1.1. Motivation from the literal meaning  
 
For Searle, the central thesis of his theory – (DET) – has some “complications”. 
According to this picture, this is partly because the intentional content alone is not sufficient 
for the determination of conditions of satisfaction. Yet, at first glance, there appears to be no 
difficulty in this thesis. Just by knowing what intentional state one is in, the conditions of 
satisfaction of this state can be easily identified. For example, if you assert that the cat is on 
the mat (Searle’s example), then I can assume that you are in a belief state and the conditions 
of satisfaction of your belief (or assertion) are the obtaining of the state of affairs that the cat 
is on the mat. However, this point is often not so easy to clarify, because there can be different 
contexts in which you can assert that the cat is on the mat, and depending on these contexts, 
your assertion can represent different conditions of satisfactions. Suppose that there are two 
cats in the room and one of them is not on the mat. In this case, if the contextual elements are 
unknown to the hearer, your expression of the belief, i.e. the assertion ‘the cat is on the mat’, 
can be confusing, because there can be a case where the hearer does not know which cat in the 
room is meant, and he cannot therefore specify the conditions of satisfaction of the utterance. 
That is why the hearer must additionally be acquainted with certain features of the situation in 
which the sentence is uttered. These are the features located near to the speaker/belief-holder. 
Correspondingly, the sentence ‘the cat is on the mat’ (or the corresponding belief) should 
already contain implicit indexical elements in its utterance. This is suggested by the fact that 
if we need to specify more exactly which cat is being referred to, the indexical elements can 
be explicitly added: this cat right here is now on this mat.2 Along with the literal meaning of 
the sentence, such indexical elements play an important role in the determination of the 
conditions of satisfaction. Yet, in contrast to the constant literal meaning, they are context-
dependent features of the sentence; they can vary from context to context, while the literal 
meaning of the sentence remains unvaried.  
This is a well-known issue in both philosophy and linguistics. In Literal Meaning, 
however, Searle argues that, in addition to contextual elements such as indexicality, there are 
also other contextual features, which are called background assumptions.3 These background 
assumptions, in contrast to indexical elements, are not realised in the semantic structure of the 
                                                 
2 Cf. Searle (1978), 210. 
3 In his later works, Searle capitalises “Background” (with a capital ‘B’). I will use the capitalised version of the 
term, where it corresponds to Searle’s usage.  
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sentence. To return to the example above, for Searle, to determine the truth conditions of the 
sentence “The cat is on the mat”, apart from the indexical features, “the presupposition” of 
some physical conditions – such as the gravitational field of the earth, the solidity of the place 
on which the mat is situated, etc. – is also needed. Suppose, Searle tells us, that these 
conditions do not exist – there is no gravitational field to determine whether the cat is on the 
mat or the mat is on the cat (“cats and mats floating freely in outer space”4) – and that one 
utters the same sentence without “presupposing” the gravity of the earth and the solidity of the 
mat. How, in this case, could the truth conditions of the sentence be determinable? For Searle, 
in such circumstances it is impossible to determine the truth conditions of the sentence, 
because “the notion of the literal meaning of the sentence ‘The cat is on the mat’ does not 
have a clear application, unless we make some further assumptions […]”.5 Thus, “the 
presuppositions” that the earth has a gravitational field and that the mat is solid, Searle tells 
us, are the background assumptions, which are necessary for fixing the truth conditions of the 
sentence in question.6  
The basic distinction between the background assumptions and the indexicality, for 
Searle, is that, whereas the latter is an element which indicates the speaker’s utterance 
meaning, the background assumptions (paradoxical as it may sound) are contextual elements 
for the application of the literal meaning.7 He therefore thinks that the background 
assumptions must be thematised separately. For him, such thematisation would help us to 
understand that they have “nothing to do with vagueness, indexicality, presuppositions, 
ambiguity, or any of the other stocks in trade of contemporary ‘semantic’ and ‘pragmatic’ 
theory […]”.8 So in Literal Meaning, by adding the background assumptions to the list of 
contextual elements such as indexicals (or the like), Searle broadens the notion of context. He 
thus claims that there is a new kind of contextual feature, namely background assumptions, on 
which the determination of the sentence’s conditions of satisfaction depend. 
We can hold that Searle’s reflections on the context-dependency of literal meaning are 
the main motivation for his hypothesis of the Background. In his later works, he maintains 
that to examine the understanding of literal meaning is “[t]he simplest way to see that 
                                                 
4 Searle (1978), 211.  
5 Ibid. 
6 This suggests that “the presupposition” of the gravity and the solidity of any y can also be a background 
condition of many other “x is on y” kind of sentences.  
7 In Literal Meaning, Searle puts forward his radical contextualist thesis: “[T]he notion of the literal meaning of 
a sentence”, he says, “only has application relative to a set of background assumptions…” (Searle (1978), 210). 
8 Ibid. 213. 
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representation presupposes a nonrepresentational Background of capacities”.9 (Notice that 
Searle uses two kinds of terms to talk about  Background phenomena. The first group of terms 
– ‘assumptions’, ‘presuppositions’ – which he mainly uses in his earlier works, are 
metaphorical; they are literally wrong, “because they imply the apparatus of representation”,10 
whereas the Background phenomena, as will become clear later, are non-representational. The 
second group of terms – ‘capacities’, ‘abilities’, ‘skills’, ‘know-how’ – characterises their 
extensions as dispositional features. In his later works, he prefers dealing with the second 
group.) As the continuation of the main idea of Literal Meaning, in INT too Searle argues that 
“[t]he understanding of the literal meaning of sentences […] requires preintentional 
Background”.11 To underpin this claim, he takes a phrase with an “impeccable” literal 
meaning, and uses it in the sentences whose truth conditions, for him, are determined 
differently because of the different Backgrounds against which they function. All these 
sample sentences are in the form x opened y, where x and y are variables and the predicate 
‘opened’ stays constant:  
 
(I)  Tom opened the door. 
       Sally opened her eyes. 
       The carpenters opened the wall. 
       Sam opened his book to page 37. 
       The surgeon opened the wound. 
 
(II)  Bill opened the mountain. 
        Bill opened the grass. 
        Bill opened the sun.  
 
Searle claims that although in all these sentences ‘open’ has the same literal meaning,12 
“the truth conditions marked by the word ‘open’ are different”13, because, to use the group (I), 
                                                 
9 RM, 178. 
10 INT, 156. 
11 Ibid. 145. 
12 In RM, Searle employs the method of conjunction reduction to illustrate how it can be determined that a word 
retains its literal meaning in different occurrences (cf. RM, 178f). He uses the following example to explain this 
method: instead of saying that “General Electric has invented a new device that will open the sun, open the door, 
and open the wound”, it can be said that “General Electric has invented a new device that will open the sun, the 
door, and the wound”. In other words, the last two occurrences of ‘open’ in the last sentence can simply be 
eliminated, without changing the meaning of the sentence. This suggests, for Searle, that the literal meaning of 
the word ‘open’ is the same in all three occurrences, although each occurrence of this word is interpreted 
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“[w]hat constitutes opening a wound is quite different from what constitutes opening a book, 
and understanding these sentences literally requires understanding each differently […]”.14 
That is to say that, in Searle’s view, since the verb ‘open’ “marks” different truth conditions in 
these sentences, they have different interpretations.  
This is, I think, a correct conclusion, but its argument needs qualification. As C. Beyer 
(1997) points out, 
 
[I]t is not true that the word ‘open(ed)’ marks different truth conditions […] – for the 
simple reason that this word, in either case, marks no truth conditions whatsoever. 
Rather, what happens in these cases is that due to different syntactico-semantic 
combinations of ‘opened’ with one of the expressions ‘Tom’, ‘Sally’, ‘the surgeon’, 
respectively, ‘on the left’ and with one of the expressions ‘the door’, ‘her eyes’ and 
‘the wound’, respectively, ‘on the right’ the three sentences of group [I], which all 
contain the verb ‘opened’ in one of these combinations, respectively, mark different 
truth conditions.15 
 
Nevertheless, Searle’s argument in question can be qualified in the following way: 
instead of saying that the word ‘open’ marks different truth conditions in these sentences, we 
can hold that the opening processes marked by the word ‘open’ are different. To put this 
another way, since we consider each of these activities – opening a door, opening one’s eyes, 
and opening a wound – as distinct from one another, the interpretation of the verb ‘open’ in 
each of these sentences will also correspond to distinct activities, which is to say, to distinct 
Background capacities; the opening process denoted in the first sentence of (I) is distinct from 
the opening relation denoted in the second and third sentences of (I). Thus, the conditions of 
satisfaction of the sentences in (I) will differ not only because of the distinct names in place of 
the variables, but also because of their distinct Background capacities.  
In order to demonstrate the necessity of Background capacities in the determination of 
conditions of satisfaction, Searle compares the sentences in (II) with the sentences in (I). He 
maintains that, like (I), (II) is also composed of perfect sentences, because the literal meanings 
of the words used in them are understandable and they do not violate grammatical rules. But 
in Searle’s view, the problem with (II), in contrast to (I), is that “we have no idea at all of how 
                                                                                                                                                        
differently because of the different Background capacities which stand behind their interpretations. 
13 INT, 146.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Beyer (1997), 341. 
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to interpret these sentences”.16 This is, for him, because “we simply have no common 
practices [Background capacities] of opening mountains, grass or suns”.17 On Searle’s picture, 
the lack of Background capacities in such cases makes it impossible to understand these 
sentences.18 And for him, this shows how the Background is important in the determination of 
conditions of satisfaction of sentences. 
However, to say that we do not understand the sentences in (II) is false. A competent 
English speaker does understand them sufficiently well, because he knows what the truth 
conditions of the sentence in question are. As E. Borg (2004) puts it,  
 
If the competent language user understands all the parts of the sentence (she knows 
the property denoted by the term ‘cut’, she grasps the meaning of the referring term 
‘John’and she understands the definite description ‘the sun’) and she understands this 
construction of parts, then she knows that the utterance of this sentence is true just in 
case John cuts the sun, that is, just in case John stands in the cutting relation to the 
sun. Now clearly any world which satisfies this condition is going to be pretty 
unusual […] but there will be, it seems, some pretty clear cases on either side of the 
divide. For instance, any world where John’s actions do not have any effect on the 
physical status of the sun is clearly going to be a world where the truth-condition is 
not satisfied. While any world where John’s actions do result in some kind of 
severing of the physical unity of the mass of the sun is a world where the truth-
condition is satisfied.19 
 
Drawing on what Borg says here, we can maintain that, pace Searle, the examples in II cannot 
show that the Background capacities are necessary for the determination of conditions of 
satisfaction of sentences. For the literal meaning of the sentence alone seems to suffice for the 
determination of their conditions of satisfaction.  
Here, a Searlean would reply that, since the verb ‘opened’ applies to different 
properties in all the sentences of I and II without being ambiguous, the conditions of 
satisfaction of the relevant propositions will also be different. After all, he would say, opening 
the door as a property has to be distinct from opening the sun, just as it is distinct from 
                                                 
16 INT, 147. 
17 Ibid. The bracketed expressions are mine. 
18 Cf. Ibid. 147. 
19 Borg (2004), 236. 
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opening the page of a book. Yet notice that, however distinct these relations may be, there is 
something common (more exactly, there is a common opening property denoted by the verb 
‘open’) to all these opening relations and this is what enables the established use of the x 
opened y kinds of sentences. Otherwise, the verb ‘opened’ used in the sentences above would 
be ambiguous. Therefore, that the verb ‘opened’ can denote different more specific properties 
in these sentences does not suggest that the literal meanings of these sentences 
underdetermine their conditions of satisfaction. For this reason, the Background capacities are 
irrelevant to the determination of conditions of satisfaction. 
 
1.2. Motivation from the notion of Network  
 
In INT, before introducing the hypothesis of the Background, Searle uses another 
notion – that of Network – to explain the intra-mental contextual features which, for him, 
affect the determination of conditions of satisfaction of an intentional state. This notion can be 
regarded as another motivation of Searle’s for introducing the hypothesis of the Background.  
Searle invokes the notion of Network because he thinks that the functioning of 
intentional states occurs in a holistic way. For him, intentional states “do not function in an 
independent or atomistic fashion, for each Intentional state […] determines its conditions of 
satisfaction only in relation to numerous other Intentional states”.20 In Searle’s view, an 
intentional state is always connected to the Network of other intentional states which play a 
role of (intra-mental) context in determining its conditions of satisfaction. Here is an example 
which Searle employs to explain the notion of Network: suppose Carter has an intention (or a 
desire) to run for the Presidency of the USA. For Searle, Carter cannot have this mental state 
in an isolated way; in order to possess the intention in question, Carter must have beliefs that 
the USA is a republic, that it has periodic elections, that the holding of elections is subjected 
to certain rules, and so on. Furthermore, he must have desires that “people work for his 
candidacy, that voters cast votes for him”,21 etc. Though none of these beliefs and desires are 
part of the conditions of satisfaction of the intention to run for the Presidency of the USA, for 
Searle, without such a Network of beliefs and desires this intention could not have the 
conditions of satisfaction that it does.  
Searle tries to explain this issue by contrasting the intention of Carter, as a politically 
ambitious man, with the same intention of a Pleistocene man, who, according to the thought 
experiment, lived in a totally different culture thousands of years ago:    
                                                 





Suppose there was a particular moment at which Jimmy Carter first formed the desire 
to run for the Presidency of the United States, and suppose further that this 
Intentional state was realized according to everybody's favorite theories of the 
ontology of the mental: he said to himself "I want to run for the Presidency of the 
United States"; he had a certain neural configuration in a certain part of his brain 
which realized his desire, he thought wordlessly and with fierce resolve: "I want to 
do it", etc. Now suppose further that exactly these same type-identical realizations of 
the mental state occurred in the mind and brain of a Pleistocene man living in a 
hunter-gatherer society of thousands of years ago. He had a type-identical neural 
configuration to that which corresponded to Carter's desire, he found himself uttering 
the phonetic sequence, "I want to run for the Presidency of the United States", etc. 
All the same, however type-identical the two realizations might be, the Pleistocene 
man's mental state could not have been the desire to run for the Presidency of the 
United States. Why not? Well, to put it as an understatement, the circumstances were 
not appropriate […] In order to have the desire to run for the Presidency, that desire 
has to be embedded in a whole Network of other Intentional states.22  
 
But, for Searle, the Pleistocene man had no appropriate Network of intentional states to 
embed his “desire” within it; he could not have the belief that the USA is a republic, the desire 
that voters cast votes for him, or the like. Therefore, in Searle’s view, the corresponding 
intentional state of the Pleistocene man could not have the conditions of satisfaction that he 
runs for the Presidency of the United States. Hence, for Searle, “Intentional states are in 
general parts of Networks of Intentional states and only have their conditions of satisfaction 
relative to their position in the Network”.23 
An important point here is that, in INT as well, where Searle speaks of the notion of 
Network, he comes to the idea that this notion is insufficient for the explanation of the large 
and interwoven context of mental states. For him, the context which determines the conditions 
of satisfaction seems to have more peculiarities than what is elucidated by the notion of 
Network. Searle reaches this point by raising the issue of “actually spelling out each of the 
intentional states in the Network”.24 He soon finds that this task is unrealisable because he 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 19-20. 
23 Ibid. 20-21. 
24 Ibid. 142. 
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thinks that an uncountable number of intentional states are all submerged in the deep 
unconscious and that they cannot be individuated. Moreover, what is more important for him 
is that part of these mental states is so fundamental that Searle avoids adding them to the list 
of intentional states in the Network. For example, the propositions such as [elections are held 
at the surface of the earth], [the earth has a gravitational field], [the things people walk on are 
generally solid], [the surface of the earth is solid] (all of which are applicable to Searle’s 
“Carter’s intention” example) are distinct from the unconscious beliefs with the content [the 
USA has periodic elections], [the USA is a republic], etc., because to him the former 
propositions are not near the surface of consciousness in order to be regarded as belonging to 
the Network. In Searle’s opinion, it is false to say that Carter’s Network, for the intention in 
question, must “contain” the belief that the things people walk on are generally solid, or other 
similar beliefs, “because they are in a sense too fundamental to qualify as beliefs even as 
unconscious beliefs”.25 For him, they should rather be regarded as entities that specify 
dispositions (or stances), or practical capacities that we adopt towards things, but not as 
contents of beliefs. (To better characterise such capacities, Searle uses the term ‘know-how’, 
which denotes our skills of dealing with the environment. In daily life, for example, we know 
how to cope with different things. We know how to sit at a table, how to walk, how to open a 
door, and so on.) 
Nonetheless, Searle does not deny that Carter could have such “fishy” beliefs. His point 
is that, in order to have a disposition towards a solid entity for walking on it, the belief that the 
surface of the earth is solid is not needed. Rather, what is necessary for Carter’s intention is a 
certain kind of “know-how”, namely his knowledge of how to walk on the solid surface of the 
earth, but not the corresponding belief.26 He explains this point as follows:  
 
A man might indeed believe unconsciously […] that larger states have more electoral 
votes than smaller states, but it seems wrong to say that I now, in that sense, also 
believe that the table that I am working on will offer resistance to touch. I would 
certainly be surprised if it didn't, and that at least suggests that we have something 
like conditions of satisfaction. Furthermore, a man certainly could have the belief 
that tables offer resistance to touch, but […] that isn't the correct way to describe the 
                                                 
25 Ibid.  
26 To use another example from Searle: “[W]hen I eat lunch I do not in that way eat lunch because I believe the 
external world exists. I do not engage in my activities on the basis of beliefs in the existence of the facts that are 
presupposed by my activities” (Searle (2010), 126). 
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stance that I, for example, now take towards this table and other solid objects. For 
me, the hardness of tables manifests itself in the fact that I know how to sit at a table, 
I can write on a table, I put stacks of books on tables, I use a table as a work bench, 
and so on. And as I do each of these things I do not in addition think unconsciously 
to myself, “it offers resistance to touch”.27  
 
Thus, Searle is convinced that, although in some special cases, in which we think 
about the solidity of tables, the propositions such as [the surface of the table is solid] can be 
the content of a belief, they are often not contents of beliefs. For him, these kinds of 
propositions are essentially distinct from propositions such as [the USA is a republic], in the 
sense that they often only specify the know-how kind of knowledge. In Searle’s picture, in 
addition to the corresponding know-how, one need not have the unconscious belief that the 
surface of the table is solid, in order to cope with the table and its solidity.  
However, there is room for disagreement as to whether one can ascribe such “deep” 
unconscious beliefs to Carter. For some philosophers, it can be said of Carter that, in addition 
to his practical capacities, he believes that the surface of the earth is solid.28 This idea can be 
endorsed for the following reason: If that person, Carter, possesses the corresponding 
concepts (in our example, the concepts the surface of the table and solidness) and can thereby 
entertain the corresponding propositional content in the belief mode, then there is no reason 
not to ascribe that belief to him. That such beliefs are “submerged” in the “deep” unconscious 
and that they “look fishy” do not change anything in that respect. 
Notice that this is not to say that there is only one entity here about which we should 
decide that it is either a corresponding Background capacity or an unconscious belief. Of 
course, the person has, or can have, the corresponding Background capacity towards entities. 
Nevertheless, that the person possesses that Background capacity does not exclude that he has 
the belief that the surface of the table is solid.29 
So, it seems that the notion of the Background cannot be motivated in that way from 
the notion of the Network. “Fishy beliefs”, with content such as [the earth is solid] are still 
beliefs. Hence, the Network contains them as well. 
 
 
                                                 
27 INT, 142. 
28 See e.g. Beyer (1997), 338. According to Beyer, D. Føllesdal thinks along similar lines.  
29 Cf. Stroud (1991), 252. 
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1.3. Motivation from the regress argument and from the consideration of physical skills  
 
Searle holds that he has a formal argument for the hypothesis of the Background, 
according to which Intentional or semantic contents cannot be endlessly self-applying 
“without generating an infinite regress”.30 Let us call this the regress argument.  
This issue is better explained by Searle’s motivation from the consideration of physical 
skills.31 According to this consideration, by focusing on how we acquire physical skills, Searle 
criticises the traditional cognitivist view according to which the learning of abilities, such as 
skiing, playing tennis, swimming, etc., consists in internalising the instructive rules. Cognitive 
scientists argue that although the rules, which also have semantic contents, become 
unconscious after the learning process, they still function as representations. To them, while 
skiing, for example, a skier makes harmonious, flexible movements, because on the basis of 
these “representations” that he exercises rapid unconscious calculations. Searle, however, 
thinks that this view is implausible. He believes that the skier, while practicing the rules, does 
not internalise them, “but rather the rules become progressively irrelevant”.32 In his opinion, 
the trained body of the skier responds automatically to different variations of the terrain, and 
the rules no longer have any role in this process. For Searle, if the unconscious rules 
continued to function as representations, a regress would ensue, because, as stated above, each 
                                                 
30 Cf. INT, 152. 
31 In INT, Searle maintains that the question of the understanding of metaphor is also a consideration which 
pushed him to the hypothesis of the Background. He criticises the view according to which the understanding of 
metaphors in the form X is Y (“The snow is a white blanket”, for example) is possible on the basis of interpreting 
it as follows: X is like Y with respect to certain features F (in our example, F is the feature of covering – the 
snow, like a blanket, also covers something). However, for Searle, this cannot be the general rule applied to the 
understanding of all metaphorical utterances. There are metaphors – for instance, sweetY personX, warmY 
welcomeX, lukewarmY friendshipX (Searle’s examples) – to which the rule above does not apply, because, for 
Searle, there are no similarities between the extensions of the first and the second words of these metaphors. 
“For example, the metaphorical utterance meaning of the expression ‘a lukewarm reception’”, says Searle, “is 
not based on any literal similarity between lukewarm things and the character of the reception so described” 
(INT, 149). On his view, in such examples, there is no rule that would determine associations between the words. 
But what, then, does enable to understand these expressions as metaphors? Searle’s choice is again Background 
capacities: 
 
It just seems to be a fact about our mental [Background] capacities that we are able to interpret certain 
sorts of metaphor without the application of any underlying 'rules' or 'principles' other than the sheer 
ability to make certain associations. I don't know any better way to describe these abilities than to say 
that they are non-representational mental capacities. (INT, 149) 
 
(See Stroud (1991) for criticism of Searle’s motivation of the idea of the Background from the consideration of 
metaphors. Stroud also shows how this consideration is related to the regress issue.)  
32 INT, 150. 
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rule has a “semantic” content and this content needs an application. And if applications were 
also (unconscious) rules –  if they had also “semantic” contents – then the infinite regress 
would threaten. This is because, insofar as the application itself has a “semantic” content, it 
would need further contents as an application, and that would have no end. However, the 
infinite regress is impossible because of the limited mental capacities of a person. Therefore, 
there must be a kind of knowledge (know-how) which is an application of the “semantic” 
content, but itself does not have a “semantic” content.  
Notice that the regress argument also goes for intentional states (including the 
understanding of literal meaning) in general. If a person entertaining an intentional state x 
must possess another intentional state y as its application, then insofar as y is also an 
intentional state, the person possessing y must also have another intentional state z for the 
application of y. Then the person will need another intentional state for applying z, and so on. 
Thus, the infinite regress is inevitable in the case of intentional states as well, and again the 
non-intentional Background is needed to stop it. That is to say, at the end of the chain, there 
must be a “deep” unconscious intentional state whose application is a Background capacity, 
but not another deeper unconscious intentional state. 
So it seems that Searle’s regress argument is a good motivation for the introduction of 
the hypothesis of the Background. But that, of course, does not show that the Background is 
relevant to the determination of conditions of satisfaction.  
 
 
2. Non-representationality of the Background 
 
The regress argument has shown an important feature of Background capacities: 
namely, that they are non-representational. For Searle, this is to say that Background 
capacities are not intentional phenomena. Searle treats the Background as a precondition of 
representation (intentionality), as “a bedrock of mental capacities that do not themselves 
consist in Intentional states (representations) […]”.33 He goes on to say the following:  
 
The Background is a set of nonrepresentational mental capacities that enable all 
representing to take place. Intentional states only have the conditions of satisfaction 
that they do, and thus only are the states that they are, against a Background of 
                                                 
33 Ibid. 143. 
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abilities that are not themselves Intentional states.34  
 
Another way to put Searle’s point is like this: The domain of the mentality not only 
consists of intentional states such as beliefs, desires, perception, etc., but it also contains 
applications of these states, which themselves are not intentional (or representational). For 
example, one can suppose a rule for walking and express this rule, as Searle puts it, as 
follows: “First move the left foot forward, then the right one, then the left one again, and 
continue on in this manner”.35 Obviously, the rule has a certain representative content per se. 
But walking itself, or the neurophysiological capacity that causes walking, is distinct from 
having the semantic content of the rule of how to walk. One can hear and understand the rule, 
yet these alone are not equal to walking itself. The latter requires more complex capacities 
than uttering/hearing (or deploying) the representative content of the rule, and these 
capacities, for Searle, are not representational. 
   
 
3. The Background as a mental feature 
 
An important question about the Background phenomena concerns their nature. As 
stated above, Searle argues that the Background, along with intentional states, is a mental 
phenomenon. However, for some philosophers, this view is disputable, as the background of 
intentional states can be very distinct entities. D. W. Smith, for example, building on 
Wittgenstein’s insight, characterises it as a social phenomenon.36 Smith argues against Searle 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 152. 
36 In On Certainty, which is to use Searle’s phrase, “one of the best books” on the Background, Wittgenstein 
considers some kinds of empirical propositions, such as the Moorean “Here is a hand”, or “The earth is solid”, 
“My name is Ludwig”, etc. and maintains that their peculiarity is that we know them with certainty. On his view, 
these are fundamental empirical propositions which form our “world-picture” (Weltbild), and are also grounds of 
our language-games. Wittgenstein indeed hesitates to call them bona fide propositions, because one of their 
important feature among thems consists in the fact that, they merge with rules of practice (see Wittgenstein 
(1969)). That is to say, although the sentences such as ‘Here is a hand’ have the form of an empirical proposition, 
they function as a rule which regulates our speaking about, or coping with, things. The fundamental empirical 
propositions, for Wittgenstein, can be regarded as propositions when we learn them for the first time, but then, 
after being internalised, they shade off into our practice. For example, when a mother, in order to teach her baby 
that a hand is called ‘hand’, utters the sentence “Here is a hand”, the baby forms a belief with the corresponding 
propositional content. But then this belief gradually shades off into the Background of practical rules. That is, 
after internalising that a hand is called ‘hand’, the baby, using this as an implicit “rule”, can have different 
intentional states with such propositional contents as [my hands are cold] or [I should raise my hand in order to 
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that we cannot say that the background of our intentionality is only a mental entity, because it 
is also extant in the community as “elements of communal knowledge”.37 For example, to say 
that the rule that a hand is called ‘hand’ is a background for uttering the sentence ‘My left 
hand is cold’ implies that some kinds of background exist in the social space, because it is up 
to the society to determine the rules of our language-games. In this sense, Smith tells us, (at 
least some kinds of) background of intentionality are distinct from our individual skills or 
capacities. 
So, prima facie, it seems that background phenomena, depending on their kind, can be 
either mental or socio-cultural. However, one might still argue that this is not the end of the 
story, because some examples can even give us reason to say that the background is a physical 
phenomenon. To see this, let us consider Searle’s example of “The cat is on the mat” again. 
One can suppose here different kinds of background conditions for uttering this sentence: 1) 
mental conditions: the capability to utter an English sentence, presupposition of the gravity of 
the earth, etc.; 2) socio-cultural conditions: the rules that a cat is called ‘cat’, that a mat is 
called ‘mat’, etc.; 3) ontological or physical conditions: that the truth conditions of the 
sentence are dependent on physical circumstances (e.g. on the gravity of the earth), the 
existence of cats and mats in the world, etc. According to these distinctions, one can argue 
that the background of intentional states is a heterogeneous phenomenon and the question 
“What kind of phenomenon is it?” has no precise answer. Or, like Smith, one can maintain 
that there are different kinds of entities in the background of our intentionality, and Searle’s 
notion of the Background applies to one of these kinds.38  
It might seem tempting to think that Background phenomena are so diverse and so to 
baptise ‘Background’ as an umbrella term denoting different kind of entities. However, such 
an understanding would suggest a conglomerate picture of the Background phenomena. Also, 
it would be difficult to say how far this can be helpful for a theory of intentionality, because it 
would contain irrelevant aspects.  
Searle therefore avoids conceptualising it in the way that Smith does. His purpose, of 
course, is to develop a theory of intentionality within the framework of the philosophy of 
mind. He therefore baptises ‘Background’ as a term referring to mental phenomena. Searle 
does not regard social or physical phenomena as the Background of intentional states per se. 
                                                                                                                                                        
answer the question], etc. 
37 Smith (2004), 160. 
38 Cf. Ibid. 161. 
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For him, they only have relevance insofar as they have effects on our mind or brain. He 
writes: 
 
[T]he Background is indeed derived from the congeries of relations which each 
biological-social being has to the world around itself. Without my biological 
constitution, and without the set of social relations in which I am embedded, I could 
not have the Background that I have. But all of these relations, biological, social, 
physical, all this embeddedness, is only relevant to the production of the Background 
because of the effects that it has on me, specifically the effects that it has on my 
mind-brain.39 
 
Nevertheless, Searle is not happy only with the claim that the Background must be 
distinguished from the corresponding social or other phenomena. In his later works, he 
collapses the Background into the brain capacities by neglecting the role of the body. For 
example, in his reply to B. Stroud’s criticism of his idea of the Background, Searle writes: 
“[I]t is important to emphasise that Background abilities are not dependent on how things in 
fact work in the world. All of my Background capacities are ‘in my head’ […]”.40 In 
Rationality in Action, he offers to regard these capacities “as a set of brain structures”.41 Also, 
in The Construction of Social Reality, Searle dwells on this view by identifying behaviours 
with their neurophysiological basis: 
 
When I say, for example, that I am able to speak English, I am talking about a causal 
capacity of my brain; but there is no objection to identifying that capacity as, e.g., 
“the ability to speak English” without knowing the details of its neurophysiological 
realization.42    
 
In light of this, the following points are conspicuous in Searle’s conceptualisation of 
the Background:  
 
1) The Background of intentionality is not an entity which exists in the social/cultural 
realm, or the like, but it is only mental; 
                                                 
39 INT, 154. 
40 Searle (1991), 291; emphasis added. 
41 Searle (2001), 58. 
42 Searle (1995), 129-130; emphasis added. 
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2) The Background is a dispositional feature of brain structures.  
 
The first point seems to be a verbal, rather than a substantial, issue. After all, Searle 
also does not deny that the socio-cultural (or the physical) realm contains entities which have 
effects on our mental life (e.g. the language rule that a hand is called ‘hand’ is a ground of our 
usage to refer to a hand while uttering ‘hand’). Yet Searle’s conceptualisation of the 
Background is such that these entities become irrelevant to his investigations per se. 
The second point, however, is substantial in the sense that it concerns the constitutive 
basis of our Background capacities. This view implies that dispositions to bodily actions (such 
as walking, dancing, skiing, etc.), along with dispositions to entertaining conscious intentional 
states, are also features of the neurophysiology of the brain. However, the view in question is 
problematic because one might ask: Given the empirical fact that bodily actions are realised in 
the body, why not regard them as the capacities of the whole body, instead of considering 
them to be the features of brain structures? 
I think that this (second) point concerning Background capacities is the result of 
Searle’s questions about clarifying boundary cases between the Network and the Background, 
which he poses in RM.43 How can one determine that the propositions that Carter wore 
underwear, and that Carter had two ears, belong to the Network of the intention to run for the 
Presidency of the USA? (One can find many such examples in which it is difficult to 
determine whether they belong to the Network or to the Background. But notice that such 
questions emerge because Searle denies that propositions, such as the earth is solid, are the 
content of a belief. For those who do not deny that a person normally possesses such 
unconscious beliefs, there is no such problem.) In order to avoid such questions, Searle comes 
up with the idea that the Network of unconscious intentional states is a part of the 
Background.44 To him, “when we describe a man as having an unconscious belief, we are 
                                                 
43 Cf. RM, 187. 
44 Searle argues that the questions about the boundary cases emerge because we regard the mind “as containing 
an inventory of mental states,” or “as a kind of big library or filing cabinet of representations” (RM, 187), and we 
then consider Network and Background to belong to parts of this “container”, because the former, we assume, 
consists of intentional states, but the latter is a set of non-representational capacities. But now, in RM, Searle says 
that it is a mistake to treat the mind as an entity containing an inventory of mental states. He instead offers to 
regard the mind “as a mechanism for generating current performance, including conscious thoughts and actions, 
based on past experience” (RM, 187). On this view of the mind, when somebody forms the intention to run for 
the Presidency of the USA, the unconscious belief that the USA has periodic elections and the Background 
disposition that the things people walk on are generally solid must not be considered to be something lying in the 
brain of the person. In fact, the brain of the person who forms the intention contains neuronal structures, which 
enable him to realise different mental phenomena, such as the belief that the USA has periodic elections, or 
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describing [his] neurophysiology in terms of its dispositional capacity to cause conscious 
thoughts  […]” and “the Background consists entirely in such capacities”.45 (Moreover, he 
maintains that some other capacities of the brain function to generate different actions such as 
running, walking, dancing, speaking, etc.46) It seems that it is this line of thought – the 
thought that focuses on the relationship of the brain and the Network (of unconscious 
intentional states) – pushed him to forget the essential role of the body in the Background 
phenomena.  
However, to regard the dispositions to bodily actions as structures of the brain is not a 
correct characterisation of the Background capacities, because, to repeat, the Background 
capacities are often realised not only in the brain, but in the whole body. This is to say that our 
(bodily) Background capacities involve more parts of the body than our neurophysiology. An 
example is speaking. On the one hand, it is true that neurons responsible for speaking are 
necessary for producing speech acts. But the ability to speak does not only consist of the 
corresponding neurophysiological capacity. In addition to the latter, we need tongue, mouth, 
etc. and their ability to function in the appropriate way. Speaking is embedded in the greater 
part of the body, and this ability cannot therefore be identifiable with the corresponding 
neurophysiological structures of the brain. Many other examples are also easily to hand: 
walking, skiing, playing tennis, dancing, etc. These are the kinds of knowledge (know-how) 
which cannot be possessed by the resources of the brain alone, because the realisation of all 
these activities necessarily involves the body. Hence, the ability to produce these actions 





In this chapter I have considered Searle’s hypothesis of the Background and his 
motivations. I have tried to show that his motivations for the hypothesis of the Background 
from the notion of the literal meaning and the Network are not successful. Furthermore, I have 
focused on Searle's attempt to reduce the Background to the neurophysiological structures. In 
                                                                                                                                                        
(Background) dispositions which we take toward solid things. That is to say, “the real occurrence” of both 
unconscious intentional states, which Searle calls Network, and the Background capacities is neuronal structures 
with their dispositions to cause conscious thoughts and behaviour. Therefore, Searle concludes: the Network is a 
part of the Background. 
45 RM, 188. 
46 Cf. Ibid.  
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my view, this is unacceptable because Background capacities often necessarily require the 





CHAPTER IV  
 
 
Arguments for the Intentionality of Perceptual Experiences 
 
 
To explain perceptual experiences, Searle uses the conceptual apparatus of his theory 
of intentionality, which we considered in the previous chapter. In this chapter, we shall see 
that he discusses the problems of perception mainly in the context of this theory. Searle 
maintains that:  
 
There are two phenomena in the conscious perceptual situation: there are 
ontologically subjective, conscious perceptual experiences in the head, and the 
ontologically objective states of affairs and objects in the world perceived, typically 
outside the head.1 
 
For him, the first phenomenon is directed at the second phenomenon. In other words, he 
claims that visual or perceptual experiences are also intentional.2  
Searle’s arguments for the intentionality of visual experiences can be said to fall under 
two names. His first argument is that visual experiences exhibit the features for intentionality, 
features which comprise intentional content, conditions of satisfaction, direction of fit, and 
causal self-referentiality (reflexivity).3 Let us call the first argument the Argument from Basic 
Features. Searle’s second argument is the Argument from Transparency, which can be 
formulated as follows: the description of the visual experience of x is the same as the 
description of the state of affairs that the subject sees x.  
In this chapter I will be concerned with these two arguments. I will start with the 
Argument from Basic Features. To examine it, I will begin with the exposition of the features 
                                                          
1 STT, 52. 
2 Searle indeed distinguishes between visual experience and perception. According to this distinction, “the notion 
of perception involves the notion of succeeding” (INT, 38). A visual experience, however, might be 
unsuccessful. On his view, hallucinations and illusions are visual experiences, but not perceptual experiences. I 
will use the terms ‘perception’ and ‘visual experience’ interchangeably where such a usage is not harmful to the 
sense at hand. 
3 Cf. STT, Chapter II. 
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such as intentional content, direction of fit, and causal self-referentiality. Of these features, the 
first two seem to me simpler to explain than the others, and the third has besides already been 
more or less explained in Chapter II. I will therefore consider these features in one section. In 
the second section of this chapter, I will turn to the Argument from Transparency. Then, in the 
third section, I will examine the feature of the conditions of satisfaction of perceptual 
experiences and the thesis (DET) for this applied to visual experiences. Lastly, at the end of 
the chapter, I will be concerned with Searle’s thesis that the content of a visual experience is 
always propositional. This thesis seems to support Searle’s idea that the content of visual 
experiences determines the conditions of satisfaction “in exactly the same sense” that the 
content of beliefs do. I will address the question whether Searle’s arguments for the thesis 
concerning the propositionality of the content of visual experiences are sound. 
 
 
1. Argument from Basic Features 
    
1.1. Intentional content 
  
Suppose there is a red ball in front of you. For Searle, if your eyes are open and you 
are conscious, then, given normal conditions, you see this ball. Even if your visual experience 
is a hallucination, there is still something that appears to you in front of you. This something, 
which in Searle’s view consists of “the sheer phenomenology”, is the intentional content of 
your experience. On the other hand, hallucinations or illusions show that the fact that a visual 
experience has an intentional content does not depend on whether the experience is veridical; 
the experience can also be non-veridical, though it always has an intentional content. And 
this, for Searle, “is a mark of intentionality”.4   
 
1.2. Direction of fit 
 
Searle maintains that, apart from intentional content, visual experience also has a 
direction of fit. This, for him, strengthens the thesis that visual experience is intentional. He 
writes:   
 
Visual perception, like belief, and unlike desire and intention, always [have] the 
mind-to-world direction of fit. If the conditions of satisfaction are not in fact 
                                                          
4 STT, 56. 
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fulfilled, as in the case of hallucination, delusion, illusion, etc., it is the visual 
experience and not the world which is at fault. In such cases we say that "our senses 
deceive us" and though we do not describe our visual experiences as true or false 
[…] we do feel inclined to describe failure to achieve fit in terms such as "deceive", 
"mislead", "distort", "illusion", and "delusion"[…]5  
 
We have to mention one point here. Given that not all intentional states have 
directions of fit, one might hold that the plausibility of this argument should come into 
question. Yet this caveat cannot be a serious trouble for Searle because it does not affect 
Searle’s use of the thesis that visual experiences have a direction of fit, in order to back up the 
idea that they are intentional. Rather, one can use this thesis to back up the latter idea, even 
having accepted that some, but not all, intentional states have directions of fit. This is because 
only intentional states (or entities that have derived intentionality), not non-intentional 
entities, exhibit this feature. 
 
1.3 Causal self-referentiality (reflexivity)6  
 
“Perceptual intentionality”, Searle tells us, “like memory and prior intentions, but 
unlike beliefs and desires, has as part of its conditions of satisfaction a causal relation between 
the intentional state and the external world”.7 Notice that here too, as in the case of the 
direction of fit, one might say that the idea that causal self-referentiality is a mark of 
intentionality is problematic because not all intentional states exhibit this feature. Yet Searle, I 
think, might respond to this objection by saying that this is not a feature exhibited by non-
intentional causal relations, and therefore it is a mark of intentionality. We cannot hold, for 
example, that the truth conditions of the sentence, ‘This coin made a sign on the wax’, are 
causally self-referential, even though the sentence refers to a state of affairs that exhibits a 
causal relation. The reason for this is that it is not the case here that part of the truth 
conditions of the sentence in question is caused by the rest of its truth conditions. In this 
sense, we can say that causal self-referentiality is a special feature of only (some) intentional 
states.     
 
 
                                                          
5 INT, 42-43. 
6 This is the feature which we have already discussed in Chapter II. Here I therefore won’t focus on its details. 
7 STT, 58. 
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2. Argument from Transparency 
 
In STT, Searle says that “the most powerful argument” for the intentionality of 
perceptual experiences is the Argument from Transparency. He puts this argument in the 
following way: “If you try to describe the subjective visual experience in your head, what you 
will find is that you are giving the same description that you would give of the state of affairs 
in the world”.8 For example, if you see San Francisco Bay (Searle’s example) and, following 
introspection of your visual experience, describe it in the manner I see San Francisco Bay, 
then you can note that in doing so you give the description of the state of affairs that you (or, 
rather, “I” in your idiolect) see San Francisco Bay. For Searle, the reason that the visual 
experience and the state of affairs the subject sees have the same description is that the visual 
experience is “a presentation of the state of affairs that constitutes its conditions of 
satisfaction”.9 On Searle’s view, presentation (an aspect which is to be discussed in the 
following chapter) is a special feature of visual experiences. “The visual experience […]”, he 
says, “does not just represent the state of affairs perceived; rather, when satisfied, it gives us 
direct access to it, and in that sense it is a presentation of that state of affairs”.10 Therefore, 
Searle thinks that the description of the visual experience of x and the description of the state 
of affairs that you see x is the same. And, more importantly in this case, for him, since this is 




3. Conditions of satisfaction:  
The continuation of the Argument from Basic Features 
 
An attentive reader may notice that Searle’s strategy to elaborate the Argument from 
Basic Features mainly consists in comparing visual experiences with paradigm intentional 
states. For example, in STT, he writes:  
 
                                                          
8 Ibid. 59. 
9 Ibid. 
10 INT, 46. 
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It ought to be obvious from everything I have said that perceptual experiences like 
beliefs, intentions, and desires will be either satisfied or not satisfied. The world will 
either be or not be the way it perceptually seems to me.11 
 
As the result of such a comparison, Searle puts forward an important idea of his theory 
of perception. He says that visual experiences also have conditions of satisfaction. Searle also 
uses this idea as the key argument, when in INT he speaks of the intentionality of visual 
experiences. Here, again, in comparing visual experiences with paradigm intentional states, he 
states the following thesis:  
 
(C): “The visual experience has conditions of satisfaction in exactly the same 
          sense that beliefs and desires have conditions of satisfaction”.12  
 
To explain this thesis, he then goes on to say that:   
 
In both the cases of belief and visual experience I might be wrong about what states 
of affairs actually exist in the world. Perhaps I am having a hallucination and perhaps 
it isn't actually raining. But notice that in each case what counts as a mistake, 
whether a hallucination or a false belief, is already determined by the Intentional 
state or event in question. In the case of the belief, even if I am in fact mistaken, I 
know what must be the case in order that I not be mistaken, and to say that is simply 
to say that the Intentional content of the belief determines its conditions of 
satisfaction; it determines under what conditions the belief is true or false! Now 
exactly analogously I want to say that in the case of the visual experience, even if I 
am having a hallucination, I know what must be the case in order that the experience 
not be a hallucination, and to say that is simply to say that the Intentional content of 
the visual experience determines its conditions of satisfaction; it determines what 
must be the case in order that the experience not be a hallucination in exactly the 
same sense that the content of the belief determines its conditions of satisfaction.13 
 
                                                          
11 STT, 57. 
12 INT, 39. 
13 Ibid. 39-40. 
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Thus, according to this passage, (C) is also presupposed by the thesis that the 
conditions of satisfaction of a visual experience are determined by its intentional content. That 
is, for Searle, to say that: 
 
(Dsame): (DET) applies to visual experiences “in exactly the same” sense that it 
               applies to beliefs.  
 
According to the same passage, in the case of both a visual experience and a belief, the 
subject knows what conditions satisfy her mental states. Since she knows them from the 
intentional content of the state, we can formulate this idea as follows:   
 
(Ksame): The subject entertaining a visual experience and belief knows, from 
               the intentional content of the relevant state, what the conditions of 
               satisfaction of the state are.14   
 
As stated above, (Dsame) presupposes (C). A simple reason for this is that, in the 
context of Searle’s theory, for an intentional state to have conditions of satisfaction is to 
determine it. Nevertheless, because (Dsame) seems to be more directly related to Searle’s 
central thesis (namely to (DET)), I will focus on it and (Ksame), which explains (Dsame).  
I will first examine (Dsame) and (Ksame) in the context of Dretske’s (2003) criticism of 
Searle’s theory of perception. Dretske’s criticism is interesting for the following feature: in 
rejecting (Ksame), and hence (Dsame), it attacks Searle’s notion of intentional content of visual 
experiences. Dretske’s argument for this is unconvincing to me and I will try to show the 
reasons why I think this. After having considered Dretske’s criticism, I will directly focus on 
the elucidation of (Dsame) and (Ksame). I will expound these two theses by considering their 
respective constituent parts.   
 
3.1. Dretske’s criticism  
 
Searle is committed to the view that an intentional content is a necessary condition for 
having a visual experience. Dretske is a philosopher who does not accept this view. He thinks 
that one does not need to elaborate a theory with the notion of intentional content in order to 
                                                          
14 Here, again, Searle does not apply his useful distinction between conditions of satisfaction as a requirement 
and conditions of satisfaction as a thing. I think that (Ksame) is true if we use the notion of conditions of 
satisfaction as a requirement in it. I elaborate on this issue below. 
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explain visual experiences. I think that Dretske’s arguments are interesting and that they are 
worth considered in connection with (Dsame) and (Ksame), which, as mentioned, are central 
theses in Searle’s attempt to show that visual experiences, like beliefs and desires, are also 
intentional.    
In his criticism of Searle’s theory, Dretske follows Searle’s comparison of visual 
experiences with beliefs. Yet, in contrast to Searle, he comes up with the idea that perceptual 
experiences do not represent objects in the way that beliefs do. Dretske’s view suggests that 
one does not need Searle’s notion of intentional content in order to give an account of 
perception. And that implies that, in Dretske’s view, (Dsame) and (Ksame) are redundant for a 
theory designed to elucidate perceptual experiences.  
To support his claim, Dretske compares perceptual experiences with photographs. He 
says that perceptual experiences are similar to photographs but that they are not similar to 
beliefs. In his view, just as a photograph is a photograph of a yellow station wagon because of 
the fact that the yellow station wagon is “the causal origin of the image on the paper”,15 so too 
a perceptual experience is a perceptual experience of a yellow station wagon because of the 
fact that a yellow station wagon causes that experience. Also, to stress that in both cases the 
casual relation is the only necessary point in question, Dretske maintains that even if the 
image on the paper does not look like the yellow station wagon, it is nevertheless a 
photograph of it, because “[w]hat makes a photograph of x a photograph of x is not that it 
looks like x”, but that x is “at the other end of an appropriate causal chain”.16 He then adds 
that the same goes for perceptual experiences as well: What makes a perceptual experience of 
x a perceptual experience of x is not that that experience has a content which “looks like” x, 
but rather that the experience is caused by x. Thus, for Dretske, all that is needed in the case 
of the experience, just as in the case of a photograph, is an appropriate causal relation between 
the subject and the object seen. Therefore, in his view, as in the case of the photograph, one 
does not need the notion of intentional content to explain perceptual cases. 
What is more interesting in Dretske’s criticism is that, to back up his view in question, 
he launches an attack against (Ksame). Dretske maintains that there can be cases in which, from 
the perceptual experience alone, one cannot know what one sees. For example, the yellow 
station wagon can look like a tiny speck from a long distance. Dretske tells that “[o]ne may, in 
fact, think that it actually is a speck (of dirt, say) on the windshield”.17 To him it seems that in 
                                                          
15 Dretske (2003), 156. 
16 Ibid. 157. 
17 Ibid. 161. 
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the case of “the speckish experience”, “one [could not], as it were, ‘read off’ the experience 
its conditions of satisfaction in the same way that one could ‘read off’ a belief or a statement 
about a speck (that it is a yellow station wagon) its conditions of satisfaction”. Yet “the 
speckish experience”, in his view, is still an experience of the yellow station wagon, because 
it is caused by that object.18 So Dretske’s view suggests that (Ksame) is false, because, for him, 
there are cases in which the subject entertaining a visual experience does not know (or, to use 
Dretske’s phase, cannot “read off”) from the intentional content of this visual experience what 
its conditions of satisfaction are.  
However, Dretske’s argument against (Ksame) is unacceptable. I say this because, even 
in the case of “the speckish experience”, the subject can know from (or “read off”) the content 
its conditions of satisfaction (as a requirement). To see this, let us first make a small remark 
concerning the term ‘know’ in this context: When we hold that we know, on the basis of a 
visual experience of x, something about x, in most cases we succumb to the temptation to 
think that the visual experience is rich enough to know from its content the essential kind 
properties of the object seen. (To use Searle’s example again, being a station wagon is the 
essential kind property of the object in question.) However, if seeing conditions are not good 
enough, as is so in Dretske’s example, then it is difficult for us to see the object as having its 
essential kind properties. In such cases, therefore, we do not know from the content of the 
experience what we see. But this, of course, does not mean that we see nothing. Searle rightly 
emphasises that the structure of our visual perception is hierarchical. That is to say, we see 
objects around us as having both basic and higher-level properties.19 In the case of “speckish 
seeing”, we see the object as having (at least) basic features (color and shape), even if we do 
not know precisely what kind of object it is. And this is sufficient to hold that, in such cases, 
we can know, from the content of the experience, that there is a thing/body in our visual field. 
For our perceptual system, delineating the borders of the object against the background of the 
visual field on the basis of attributing to it color and shape, enables us to see the object as an 
instance of a very general and basic kind, or in other words as a thing/body. Therefore, in 
such cases, although the perceptual content is not rich enough to determine the conditions of 
satisfaction in such a way that we can sufficiently answer the question “What are we seeing?”, 
the experience still has conditions of satisfaction. For this reason, Dretske’s attack on (Ksame) 
is flawed.   
 
                                                          
18 ‘Of’ here is used in the non-intentional sense. 
19 I shall have more to say on this issue in Chapter V. 
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3.2. Expounding the central theses  
 
Notice that to say that Dretske is incorrect in this debate does not imply that (Dsame) 
and (Ksame) are true. For it might be the case that these theses are false for different reasons. 
Therefore, we need to consider separately to what extent (Dsame) and (Ksame) are plausible 
theses.  
A simple way to examine (Dsame) and (Ksame) is to divide them into their constituent 
parts. They contain the following sub-theses:  
 
(Dvis): The content of a visual experience determines its conditions of 
           satisfaction;  
(Kvis): The subject entertaining a visual experience knows, from 
             the intentional content of that experience, what the conditions of  
             satisfaction of the experience are. 
 
Moreover, notice that, like (Dvis), (Kvis) also has a general version, which is part of (Ksame), as 
well:    
 
(K): The subject entertaining an intentional state knows, from 
          the intentional content of that state, what the conditions of satisfaction  
          of the state are. 
 
To answer the question whether (Dsame) and (Ksame) are true, we should examine all 
these sub-theses, whilst keeping additionally in mind our conclusions on (DETr)/(DETt) from 
Chapter II. 
Let us start with (Dvis). Here, we have to remember Searle’s distinction between 
conditions of satisfaction as a requirement and conditions of satisfaction as a thing. Because 
of this distinction, (Dvis) can be read in two ways:   
 
(DvisR):   The content of a visual experience determines its conditions of satisfaction 
              as a requirement; 
(DvisT):   The content of a visual experience determines its conditions of satisfaction 




Setting aside Searle’s idea that the intentional content determines the feature of causal self-
referentiality, (DvisR) seems to be true. (DvisT), however, does not.  
To show this, let us suppose that I, being ignorant of the fact that elms and beeches are 
different trees, enjoy a visual experience that the belm tree is P (where ‘belm’ stands for my 
visual percept of the unknown to me elm or beech tree,20 which, in turn, is directed to a 
composite set of (some) visual properties shared by both elm and beech trees; and where P 
denotes my percept of a property also shared by these two kinds of trees). Suppose, 
furthermore, that I cannot have a thought that the tree I am seeing is either an elm tree or a 
beech tree, because I do not know that beeches are not elms trees and elms are not beech 
trees. In this case, the content of my visual experience lays down the conditions of satisfaction 
(as a requirement) that the belm tree is P. This can suggest that (DvisR) is true.  
(DvisT), however, is not a true thesis. The reason for this is that, as with our example, 
the content of the experience often cannot determine the thing which satisfies the experience. 
My visual experience that the belm tree is P can be made satisfied by both an elm tree and a 
beech tree. In that case, the experience cannot determine which kind of tree it is about.  
Let me now focus on (K). Notice again that, because the term ‘conditions of 
satisfaction’ is ambiguous, (K) can also be read in two ways: 
 
(Kr): The subject entertaining an intentional state knows, from 
        the intentional content of that state, what the conditions of satisfaction 
        as a requirement are; 
(Kt): The subject entertaining an intentional state knows, from 
                   the intentional content of that state, what the conditions of satisfaction  
                   as a thing are. 
 
As with (DETr),
21 (Kr) seems to be true; but (Kt) is often not true.  
To see this, let us suppose that I have a true belief that Jones is the tallest man in our 
city, without knowing who he is. Then, assuming that I have mastered the concept of 
satisfaction, I know, from the content of my belief, that my belief is satisfied if and only if 
                                                          
20 By the visual percept of an object, I mean a set of visual experiences that can be caused by the same or similar 
kinds of entities in our perceptual system. For example, an elm tree can cause different visual experiences when 
seen from different perspectives. Yet although the experiences are different, the same object is perceived; that is, 
the percept of the object here remains constant. If the subject cannot distinguish elm trees from beech trees when 
he sees them, then he will perceive them as the same kind of entity. In other words, his percept of both kinds of 
trees will be the same.    
21 See Chapter II. 
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Jones is the tallest man in our city. That is to say, I know the conditions of satisfaction as a 
requirement of the belief. However, notice that, in that case, I do not know which thing 
(person) in the world can make my belief satisfied. For I do not know who Jones is and I have 
never seen him. In that case, I do not know the conditions of satisfaction as a thing of my 
belief.  
Now let me consider (Kvis). Notice that what goes for beliefs in the case above goes 
for visual experiences as well. Firstly, here too, because of the ambiguity of the term 
‘conditions of satisfaction’, it is important to distinguish between two readings of (Kvis):  
 
 (KvisR): The subject entertaining a visual experience knows, from 
             the intentional content of that experience, what the conditions of 
             satisfaction as a requirement are; 
(KvisT):  The subject entertaining a visual experience knows, from 
                        the intentional content of that experience, what the conditions of  
                        satisfaction as a thing are. 
 
Secondly, like (Kr) and (Kt), (KvisR) also seems to be true, but (KvisT) does not. That is to say, 
Searle’s idea in the passage above (from INT, p. 39) – the idea that if one hallucinates he 
knows “what must be the case in order that the experience not be a hallucination”– applies to 
(KvisR) but not to (KvisT). To use the example above, when I have a veridical visual experience 
that the belm tree is P, then I know, from the content of my visual experience, that the 
conditions of satisfaction (as a requirement) of the experience are that the belm tree is P. 
However, in this case, I do not know what kind of tree (an elm tree or a beech tree) it is which 
would be making my experience veridical.  
Now, putting altogether our examination of (Dvis) and (Kvis), as well as (K) on the one 
hand, and our conclusions on (DETr)/(DETt) from Chapter II on the other hand,
22 we can 
assert the following: to say that (Dsame) and (Ksame) are true means that both (DET)/(K) and 
(Dvis)/(Kvis) can be read in two ways, one of which is true and the other of which is false. 
Taken in this way, visual experiences are similar to beliefs. 
However, notice that what justifies our conclusion concerning (Dsame) and (Ksame) is 
different from Searle’s reasoning for the same claim. Searle does not come to his conclusion 
that (Dsame) and (Ksame) are true in the same way that we did. The reason for this is that he 
does not apply the distinction between conditions of satisfaction as a thing and conditions of 
                                                          
22 (DETt) here applies to intentional contents but not to meanings. 
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satisfaction as a requirement to this case, either. For Searle, to use this distinction is 
redundant because he falsely believes that the contents of intentional states determine both 
kinds of conditions of satisfaction. And it is in this sense that Searle takes visual experiences 
to be similar to beliefs.   
 
 
4. Arguments for the propositionality of the content of a visual experience 
 
A central thesis of Searle’s theory of perception that can support (Dsame) is the 
following:  
 
(P): The content of a visual experience is always equivalent to a proposition.23 
 
In other words, Searle thinks that (a part of the content of) the visual experience of (say) a 
station wagon is that there is a station wagon there, but not simply a station wagon. 
Therefore, he argues that (P) makes visual experiences more similar to the paradigm 
intentional states.24  
He uses two arguments to support this idea. The first is that “[v]isual experience is 
never simply of an object”, but rather it must always be of a state of affairs.25 The second, 
which he calls the syntactical argument, is that the description of a visual experience in the 
form “S sees x”, which can suggest that the content of the experience is non-propositional, can 
always be paraphrased as follows: S sees that there is x there.  
Let me reply first to the first argument. 
 
4.1. The first argument 
  
In Searle’s view, “[t]he fact that visual experiences have propositional Intentional 
contents is an immediate (and trivial) consequence of the fact that they have conditions of 
satisfaction, for conditions of satisfaction are always that such and such is the case”.26 
Searle’s line of reasoning in this assertion can be formulated as follows:  
 
1. A visual exprerience has conditions of satisfaction; 
                                                          
23 Cf. INT, 40. 
24 Those who think that (P) is not related to (Dsame) can regard the former as an independent thesis of Searle’s 
theory of perception. 
25 Cf. INT, 40. 
26 Ibid. 41. 
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2. Conditions of satisfaction are always that such and such is the case; 
3. Therefore, the content of the visual experience is propositional.   
 
This argument is incomplete and defective. To show this, let me first consider the 
premises of the argument.  
In the first premise of the argument, Searle uses the term ‘conditions of satisfaction’ in 
the sense of a state of affairs (= conditions of satisfaction as a thing). He maintains (in INT, p. 
40) that  
 
(SOF): The intentional content of a visual experience always requires the existence  
            of a state of affairs for its satisfaction.  
 
I will dwell on (SOF), for it is a more specific way of stating the first premise.  
For Searle, the reason for holding (SOF) is a special feature of visual experience –  
namely that, when we see objects, we also see them as having the property of location, 
specified by Searle as being there or in front of us. To me (SOF) (and so the first premise) is 
true.  (Here I want only to add that we see things not only as having location properties, but 
also as having other properties such as color, shape, etc. And this shows that, for the 
satisfaction of a visual experience, not only a state of affairs with a location property, but also 
states of affairs with a color, shape, etc. properties can also be required.)  
The second premise of the argument is true as well. However, it contains a linguistic 
trick to reach the conclusion. Searle describes conditions of satisfaction, viz. a state of affairs, 
in the form “that such and such is the case”. Notice that, from this, it is easy to succumb to the 
conclusion that the content is propositional. However, Searle neglects to say that the second 
premise could also be stated in the following way: Conditions of satisfaction, viz. a state of 
affairs, are always x’s (an object’s) being F (a property/attribute). The point here is that, in the 
case of the latter description, we would have less of a temptation to conclude (P) from the 
premises. Like the description of a state of affairs in the form “such and such is the case”, its 
alternative – the description of a state of affairs in the form “S’s being F” – is also right. Yet 
this alternative does not suggest that the content of the visual experience is propositional. 
The latter point, I think, is of greater importance. It shows that, although the premises 
of the first argument are true, this is not enough to say that the conclusion is also true.  
There is another important point concerning the first argument. Even if a state of 
affairs/conditions of satisfaction had only one kind of specification (the specification that 
such and such is the case), this still does not mean that Searle’s first argument is valid. For 
this argument is circular in the context of Searle’s theory. To see this, notice that the premises 
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per se are not sufficient to conclude the conclusion of the argument, because to have 
conditions of satisfaction alone, described in the form “that such and such is the case”, does 
not imply that the content of the intentional state possessing those conditions of satisfaction 
must be propositional. For this conclusion, the assertion of some additional relation between 
the intentional content and the conditions of satisfaction is needed.  
(DET) is the thesis that describes this relation. Also, for Searle, (DET) implies that 
“the specification of the content is already a specification of the conditions of satisfaction”.27 
Thus, Searle thinks that the determination relation between an experience’s intentional 
content and the conditions of satisfaction affects their specifications as well. That is to say, 
given that the content of an experience is propositional, the conditions of satisfaction must be 
specified by the sentence expressing a proposition.  
So, taking into account these issues from Searle’s theory, the first argument should be 
completely restated as follows:  
 
1. A visual experience (which necessarily has an intentional content) has conditions of 
satisfaction; 
a. The intentional content of this experience determines its conditions of satisfaction; 
b. Therefore, the specification of its content is a specification of the conditions of satisfaction; 
c. Therefore, given that the content is propositional, the conditions of satisfaction must also be 
    specified with a sentence expressing the proposition.28 
2. Conditions of satisfaction are always that such and such is the case; 
3. Therefore, the content of the visual experience is propositional. 
 
Thus, according to Searle’s theory, in order for the conditions of satisfaction to have a 
propositional specification, the intentional content (due to (DET)) must also be propositional. 
But the latter (the idea expressed by the sentence in italics) is the conclusion of the argument 
in question. So, it seems that, in order to conclude the conclusion of the first argument, we 
should also presuppose the conclusion. 




                                                          
27 Ibid. 13. 
28 Notice that, in c, we cannot change ‘given’ with ‘if’ because, for Searle, intentional states with conditions of 
satisfaction always have propositional contents.   
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4.2. The syntactical argument  
 
Searle says that he has an additional argument for (P), which he calls the syntactical 
argument. Here is the passage where this argument is explicated: 
 
[T]he verb "see" takes spatial modifiers that under natural interpretations require us 
to postulate an entire proposition as the content of the visual experience. When I say, 
for example, "I see a station wagon in front of me", I don't normally just mean that I 
see a station wagon which also happens to be in front of me but rather I see that there 
is a station wagon in front of me.29 
 
This argument is also unacceptable. To say that the sentence ‘I see x in front of me’ 
means that ‘I see that there is x in front of me’ does not show that the intentional contents of 
visual experiences must always be propositional. The reason for this is that the converse is 
also possible: We can just as well hold that the sentence ‘I see that there is x in front of me’ 
means that ‘I see x in front of me’. Just as paraphrasing sentences in the latter way cannot 
show that the intentional content must be non-propositional, so too the converse of the 
paraphrase (which is the Searlean way of paraphrasing) cannot show that the content must be 
propositional. 
Searle nevertheless says that he has “an additional clue that the ‘see that’ form 
expresses the Intentional content of the visual experience”.30 His clue is that the ‘see that’ 
form, in contrast to the ‘x sees y’ form, is intensional. For him, the ‘see that’ form does not 
allow the terms that refer to the same entity to be swapped, because it can be the case that the 
subject of the corresponding intentional state does not know that these terms have the same 
reference. And, in that case, we cannot preserve the truth value of the sentence. Searle uses 
the following example to support this idea:   
 
Jones saw that the bank president was standing in front of the bank 
together with the identity statements 
The bank president is the tallest man in town 
and 
The bank is the lowest building in town 
do not entail 
                                                          




Jones saw that the tallest man in town was standing in front of the lowest building 
in town. 
But 
Jones saw the bank president 
together with the identity statement does entail 
Jones saw the tallest man in town.31 
 
I think this argument does not work either, because the ‘see that’ form is not always 
intensional. In one reading of this sentence, it is also extensional. According to this reading, in 
such sentences, the substitution of the terms with the same reference is possible without 
changing the truth value of the sentence. Correspondingly, the sentence ‘Jones sees that the 
bank president is standing there’ can be read in two ways:32  
 
(Sn): Jones sees that the bank president is standing there [where ‘the bank 
        president’ stands for the mode of presentation in which Jones sees the relevant 
        person]; 
(Sw): There is exactly one object which is the bank president and Jones sees that he is 
          standing there [where ‘the bank president’ indicates the relevant person without 
         standing for the mode of presentation in which Jones sees that person].33 
 
The context of (Sn) is intensional because in it we are committed to reporting how Jones sees 
the state of affairs in question. The term ‘the bank president’ in (Sn), therefore, indicates the 
mode of presentation in which Jones sees the object. But this is not the case with (Sw). In 
(Sw), we simply say, without committing ourselves to the report of the relevant intentional 
content, that there is exactly one thing which is the bank president and Jones sees him. The 
                                                          
31 Ibid. 41-42; my italics. The italics indicate the statements used as an example.  
32 Here I simplify Searle’s example for ease of exposition. 
33 This kind of distinction originally belongs to Russell. However, according to Russell’s analysis, (Sn) should 
have been given in the following way:  
 
R(Sn): Jones sees that there is exactly one object which is the bank president and he is standing there. 
 
Russell prefers R(Sn) because he thinks that the sentence ‘The bank president is standing there’ is properly 
analysed by means of the sentence ‘There is exactly one object which is the bank president and he is standing 
there’. However, he forgets that, independent of whether this analysis is right or not, these two sentences cannot 
be swapped in the psychological contexts. For the psychological context is committed to how the state of affairs 
is given to the subject; Jones does not see the objects in a complex way as it is described by R(Sn). In this sense, 
R(Sn) is problematic.  
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context of (Sw) is extensional, and therefore we can change the term ‘the bank president’ with 
a term which also has the same reference as the former, without changing the truth value of 
the sentence. So there are two readings of the ‘seeing that’ sentences and Searle’s “clue” is 
not eligible for the extensional reading of these sentences. 
I thus conclude that neither of Searle’s arguments for (P) is acceptable, and that one 





In this chapter, I have considered Searle’s arguments for the view that visual 
experiences are intentional. In general, I agree with Searle on this idea. However, it seemed to 
me that there are some drawbacks in some of his arguments. We have seen that there is some 
trouble with (Dsame) and (Ksame), in particular; in stating these theses, Searle does not take into 
account the ambiguity of the term ‘conditions of satisfaction’. Moreover, I have tried to show 





CHAPTER V  
 
 
Special Features of Perceptual Intentionality 
 
 
In this chapter, I will consider the special features described by Searle to elucidate 
perceptual experiences. These are: consciousness, direct causation, presentationality (as well 
as some other features that derive from presentationality), and hierarchical structuredness. For 
Searle, the fact that the perceptual experiences exhibit these features suggests that they are sui 
generis intentional states. 
I have divided this chapter into four sections in which I consider these special features 
one by one. In the first section of the chapter, I will focus on Searle’s thesis that 
consciousness is a special feature of perception. On the basis of empirical findings, it will be 
shown that this thesis is false. In the second section, I will examine the feature of direct 
causation. Searle maintains that this feature can be experienced. I think, however, he is 
mistaken on this issue, and in this section I will try to show why. Then, in the third section, I 
will consider the feature of presentationality and other features – such as non-detachability, 
indexicality, continuousness and determinacy – which derive from presentationality. In the 
fourth section, I will be concerned with Searle’s ideas on the hierarchical structuredness of 




       
For Searle, an important feature of perceptual experiences which distinguish them 
from other paradigm representational states is consciousness. Beliefs and desires, as we know, 
can be either conscious or unconscious. However, when it comes to perceptual experiences, in 
Searle’s view, they are (in most cases) conscious.1  
                                                          
1 Here, I use the phrase “in most cases” because, as we will see later in this section, Searle does not hold that 
perception necessarily involves consciousness. He thinks that there can be unconscious perceptual phenomena, 
though they occur very rarely.     
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There are two important issues here. The first concerns the ontological implication of 
the thesis that consciousness is a special feature of perception. The second can be posed by 
virtue of the following questions: How exactly should we understand Searle’s thesis in 
question? Does it say that consciousness is a necessary feature of perception? I start with the 
first issue, and then move onto the second. 
Searle thinks that the fact that visual experiences are conscious also has ontological 
implications, because, for him, all conscious mental states are ontologically subjective. 
Contrasting visual experiences with paradigm intentional states, Searle maintains that the 
former are distinct from them in that we need to speak in ontologically neutral terms about 
beliefs and desires,2 whereas visual experiences have in general a subjective ontology.3 He 
thus writes:        
 
[V]isual and other sorts of perceptual experiences are conscious mental events. The 
Intentionality of a representation is independent of whether it is realized in 
consciousness or not, but in general the Intentionality of a perceptual experience is 
realized in quite specific phenomenal properties of conscious mental events. For this 
reason the claim that there are visual experiences goes beyond the claim that the 
perception has Intentionality, since it is an ontological claim about how the 
Intentionality is realized; it is, in general, realized in conscious mental events.4 
 
Let us now turn to the second issue.  
Searle’s thesis that consciousness is a special feature of perceptual intentionality is not 
true. A growing body of experimental work confirms the existence of unconscious perceptual 
phenomena. Let me mention some of them.  
One of these well-known experiments, studied by L. Weiskrantz (1986), concerns 
blindsight cases, which occur as a result of certain brain lesions. In such cases, although the 
patient can correctly answer the questions about objects in his blind visual field, he claims 
that he does not see anything. The results of this experiment give us a reason to say that the 
patient is able to perceive the objects presented to his blind visual field without 
phenomenology, because if he did not perceive the objects, he could not answer the questions. 
That is to say, although in his blind visual field the patient does not enjoy any conscious 
                                                          
2 To remind ourselves, for Searle, “there is no special ontology carried by the notion of representation” (INT, 45), 
which applies to beliefs and desires. 
3 See fn. 7 in Chapter I for the term ‘subjective ontology’. 
4 INT, 45. 
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visual experience, the stimuli presented to that field still produce certain processes in the 
patient’s perceptual system, as a result of which the patient gives correct answers. This kind 
of experiment5 motivates some philosophers (as well as some psychologists) to maintain that 
consciousness is not an essential feature of perception.6  
Searle is also well aware of the experiments which support the idea that there are 
unconscious perceptual phenomena. However, despite his awareness of them, he still 
maintains that consciousness is a special feature of perceptual intentionality. This seems 
problematic, because one might ask: Given that one is aware of the empirical data showing 
that there are unconscious perceptual phenomena, how can one still claim that consciousness 
is a special feature of perceptual intentionality? Those who think that this is a reasonable 
question might assume that there is a conceptual point at issue here. That is to say, one might 
think that if Searle holds that consciousness is a special feature of perception, then 
consciousness should be considered as a necessary condition for applying the concept of 
perception. However, this would be a wrong interpretation of Searle’s position. The reason for 
this is that, when Searle speaks of the specialness of consciousness for perception, he does not 
maintain that consciousness is a necessary feature of perception; for him, the point at issue 
here is not conceptual. In contrast, in Searle’s view, the claim that visual experiences are 
conscious mental events is an empirical claim. This claim should be understood in the context 
in which perception is contrasted with beliefs and desires. Searle maintains that most of our 
beliefs and desires are unconscious, but when it comes to perception, we can see that it is “in 
general” or “characteristically” conscious. For him, this means that what the experiments with 
the blindsight people show are “very marginal cases of perception”, in contrast with our daily 
activity, which is mainly based on conscious perception. By relying on common sense, he 
reminds us that “[n]obody can drive a car, or for that matter write a book or watch a movie, 
using only the resources of blindsight”.7 In Searle’s view, it is in this empirical sense that 
consciousness should be understood to be a special feature of perception. 
However, to respond to this issue in this way is itself not free from problems, because 
the empirical works on unconscious perception show that it is not only a marginal 
                                                          
5 There are also other kinds of similar experiments such as change blindness, binocular rivalry, etc., which back 
up the thesis that there are unconscious perceptual phenomena. 
6 See, for example, Jesse Prinz (2015). Prinz argues against the view that perception necessarily involves 
consciousness. In his picture, if there is empirical data showing that consciousness and perception can come 
apart, then we cannot hold that the former is a necessary feature of the latter. 
7 STT, 214-215. 
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phenomenon occurring in the pathological cases, but also a phenomenon that is characteristic 
of the perceptual systems of healthy people.  
One of the well-studied cases which shows that unconscious perception is 
characteristic of “normal” perceptual systems is visual masking. In this experiment, two 
different stimuli are presented to the subjects. The first stimulus is the target stimulus, which 
the subjects participating in the experiment are asked to identify. The purpose of the second 
stimulus is to ‘mask’ the first (the second stimulus is usually a stimulus from figures with 
different shapes). The main goal in the experiment is to illustrate that, if the first stimulus is 
presented for under 25 milliseconds, the subjects’ answers concerning its identification are at 
chance level of accuracy. This suggests that the subjects are not conscious of what is 
presented. Nevertheless, such a brief stimulus can also be perceived.8  
It is interesting that Searle also mentions some non-pathological cases of unconscious 
perception. For example, he holds that track runners start moving before they are conscious of 
the firing of the starter-gun that sets off the race.9 This is a case which shows that the sound 
waves from the starter-gun stimulate the auditory system of the runners and the auditory 
stimulation causes the runners to move before it gets to the stage of consciousness. That is to 
say, the runners’ movements are initiated before they consciously hear that the gun has gone 
off. 
Although, to repeat, such examples are well known to Searle, he tries to belittle their 
significance by holding either that they are pathological and marginal cases, or that only 
skilled sportsmen can begin moving before the corresponding stimuli are consciously 
experienced. For Searle, unconscious perception is not generally characteristic of normal 
perceivers.  
Yet Searle seems to be wrong. If what these empirical findings, including the 
experiments of visual masking, suggest is true, then we cannot assume that unconscious 
perception is a rare phenomenon. Unconscious perception can be considered to be 
characteristic of even normal perceivers as well. The reason for this is that, since, at any given 
moment when our eyes are open, our perceptual system can be exposed to very brief, different 
stimuli that never get to the stage of consciousness, it is reasonable to suppose that 
unconscious visual processing occurs on a much more frequent basis. And this suggests that 
unconscious perception is neither a marginal phenomenon nor a special feature of the 
perceptual system of experienced sportsmen or of blindsight people alone. Hence, Searle’s 
                                                          
8 See Naccache & Dehaene (2001). 
9 Cf. STT, 212. Unfortunately, Searle does not provide any reference to the literature about this empirical test. 
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thesis that (in the empirical sense) consciousness is a special feature of perceptual 
intentionality is false. 
 
 
2. Direct causation experienced 
 
By direct causation (experienced), Searle means the feature of being “experienced as 
directly caused by the conditions of satisfaction”.10 For Searle, when a person sees, say, a 
yellow station wagon, she sees that object as causing the experience (of seeing a yellow 
station wagon). In Searle’s view, this kind of causation is distinct from the other causal 
components of a perceptual state (such as the physiological make-up of a perceptual system, 
information-processing going on in the brain, etc.), because it is also experienced by the 
subject.  
To support the idea that perception has an experienced causal component, Searle 
compares visual experiences with imaginations. He writes:  
 
Imagine that you have the capacity to form visual images in your imagination that 
were just as vivid as actually seeing an object. Close your eyes and form a mental 
image of the scene around you and imagine that you had the capacity to form a 
mental image that had as much “force and vivacity” (to use Hume’s expression) as 
actually seeing the scene. All the same, there would be a tremendous difference in 
the phenomenology, because in the case of seeing the scene, you experience the 
visual experience involuntarily […] You experience the experiences as caused by the 
scene you are seeing, whereas the visual images that you voluntarily form are 
experienced as caused by you.11 
 
I think that Searle’s comparison in this passage is unhelpful and the ideas expressed in 
it cannot support his thesis that the direct causation is experienced. To see these points, let us 
dwell further on the passage by explicating the important points in it. 
In the passage, Searle maintains that, even if the imagination of an object x were as 
vivid as the visual experience of x, their phenomenology would still be different. As the 
passage claims, this is because the imagination is experienced voluntarily but the visual 
                                                          
10 STT, 61. 
11 STT, 61-62. 
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experience involuntarily. Searle considers visual experience to be involuntarily experienced, 
because, for him, given that our eyes are open, “[we] are forced to experience the visual 
experience by the presence of the scene in front of [us]”.12 And this involuntariness, in his 
view, makes a phenomenological difference while having a visual experience.  
Yet, strictly speaking, Searle makes a mistake when he says that the visual experience 
is experienced involuntarily. In a certain sense, the visual experience, like the imagination, is 
also experienced voluntarily, because it is up to the subject that undergoes the visual 
experience to stop it. (Here, I use the phrase “in a certain sense” because, in another sense, 
there might be room to argue that the visual experience is experienced voluntarily. If a subject 
with normal perceptual apparatus could not move his head and eyeballs, and could not close 
the eyes, then he would be forced to see the objects in front of him. But that, of course, does 
not mean that under normal conditions the visual experience is experienced involuntarily.) For 
example, under normal conditions, I, as a normal perceiver, can easily stop my visual 
experience of a yellow station wagon by changing the position of my head or body, so that I 
do not see that object.  
So Searle’s position needs qualification, and we can qualify it in the following way. 
We can maintain that the vivid imagination of x is distinct from the visual experience of x, 
because the ways that they depend on my “volition” are distinct. If I want to stop or continue 
enjoying the visual experience, I need to have different capacities from those which are 
needed for the imagination.  I can open or close my eyes if they are closed or open, or I can 
change the position of my body or head, if I want to change the content of the experience. 
However, to imagine something, I need no bodily movement, but only to “internally” 
entertain or stop the imagination. This is to say, as far as dependence on volition is concerned, 
the visual experience and the imagination are related to different Background abilities in 
entertaining or stopping these experiences. And since our Background capacities have an 
influence on our experiences, that can have different effects on their phenomenology as well.      
But how can the fact that this dependence of a visual experience on volition is distinct 
from that of the imagination show that the content of the visual experience contains a causal 
element? In my view, the experience-volition relation cannot show that there is a causal 
element in the content. Apart from the fact that this point seems to be irrelevant for the thesis 
that the content of a visual experience contains a causal component, this is explainable simply 
because causality cannot be part of the phenomenal content. If you are doubtful of this claim, 
just ask yourself: Given that an experience is a qualitative state, what is the “what-it-is-like-
                                                          
12 Ibid. 62. 
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ness” of causation? Suppose you first see a yellow station wagon. Then you turn around and 
see a big red house. If causality were experienced, there had to be some constant feature 
shared by these two different experiences. However, although both experiences are (also) 
caused by their objects, there is no constant experienced feature, no experiential core, between 
them which can be called an experienced direct causation.  
A Searlian might nevertheless object that the causal component need not be the same 
or constant in different visual experiences. He might say that each visual experience has its 
own causal component which is experienced distinctly. However, this view is question-
begging. In that case, the Searlian should answer the question, “Why should part of 
experienced components of visual experiences be causal?” In Searle’s works, I could not find 
a satisfactory answer to this question, apart from the passage from STT quoted above and his 
statement that we see objects as causing our visual experiences. The passage, as mentioned, 
seemed to be irrelevant as an argument; the statement in question is insufficient as an answer. 
Seeing objects as causing the visual experience can also be regarded as a specific form 
of seeing which involves the notion of causation. Nevertheless, for Searle, seeing objects as 
being caused by the objects seen cannot be a result of the fact that the subject can use the 
notion of causation while enjoying visual experiences. Searle is clear enough on this point. He 
thinks that subjects which do not possess the concept of causation, such as young children and 
animals, can also experience that causation. Therefore, in his picture, causation as 
experienced must be distinct from the notion of causation used in the experience. But, to 
repeat, Searle has no convincing answer to the question, “Why should we take causation to be 





Searle holds that the direct causation is also important because it is the basis for an 
“essential feature” of visual experiences, which he calls presentationality. In his view, 
because of this feature, the visual experience not only represents the object, but also “provides 
direct access to it”.13 For him in this sense too, visual experiences differ from beliefs and 
desires:     
 
                                                          
13 INT, 45-46. 
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The visual experience is not an independent entity that represents the objects and 
state of affairs I am seeing; it gives me direct perception of those objects and states 
of affairs. My beliefs, for example, are a series of propositional representations. But 
that is not how it is with visual experience.14 
  
One should be cautious here. Just because the visual experiences are presentations, it 
does not mean that they are not representations. To avoid such an implication, Searle reminds 
us that he uses the term ‘representation’ in a technical sense – namely, as mentioned in 
Chapter II, this term is for him “a shorthand” for denoting “anything that has conditions of 
satisfaction”.15 And to the extent that the visual experiences also have conditions of 
satisfaction and the other “defining conditions” of representations (intentional content, 
direction of fit, etc.), they are “species of representations”.16 
Furthermore, Searle maintains that presentationality, as a central feature of visual 
experiences, is a ground for other special features such as non-detachability, indexicality, 
continuousness and determinacy. Of these, the first and second features can be considered to 
be relational because they characterise the relations between visual experience and its 
conditions of satisfaction. The third and fourth, however, are features that can be 
characterised as intrinsic specificities of visual experiences.  
Let me consider each one in a more detailed way.      
  
3.1. Non-detachability and indexicality  
 
Searle thinks that it is a consequence of the fact that visual experiences are 
presentational (and conscious) that they are non-detachable from their conditions of 
satisfaction. He explains this feature by contrasting visual experiences with thoughts:   
 
I can shift my thoughts at will. I can stop thinking about San Francisco and think 
about something else or I can examine the thought independently of the thing that it 
is a thought about. But in the case where I am actually looking at the scene in front of 
me, there is no way that I can detach these experiences from the actual scene. I 
                                                          





cannot shuffle these experiences around at will, the way I can shuffle representations 
around at will.17   
 
In Searle’s view, another consequence of non-detachability, together with (conscious) 
presentationality of visual experiences, is that they are “essentially indexical” – namely they 
are “essentially of the here and now”. Here, again, Searle compares visual experiences with 
paradigm intentional states:   
 
My desires and my beliefs are not tied to my immediate environment in the way my 
visual experiences are. But when I open my eyes and look around in broad daylight, 
it is not up to me what I see; rather I am, by the very nature of the visual experience, 
forced to see the here and the now.18 
 
Since I accept these views without reservations, let me directly consider the next 
features. 
 
3.2. Continuousness and determinacy 
  
Searle maintains that provided that our eyes are open in full light and we are 
conscious, our visual experiences present the environment around us “in a continuous 
fashion”. (For the comparison, he adds that “beliefs have a kind of discreteness” in this 
respect.) Continuousness, on his view, is “both spatial and temporal”, because “the world 
itself is continuous spatially and temporally, and the perception presents the world to me”.19 
Another special feature of perception for Searle that “derives from the presentational 
character of the intentionality” is determinacy. An easy way to show how Searle understands 
this feature is to consider again his comparison of perception with paradigm intentional states. 
Searle writes that perception “gives determinacy in a way that representations do not”.20 For 
Searle, beliefs and desires do not represent their objects in a determinate way. On his view, 
objects (or the world) are always determinate but representations are not. He uses the 
following example to explicate the point:  
                                                          
17 Ibid. 63. 
18 Ibid. 65-66. 
19 Ibid. 67. 
20 Ibid. 68. Notice that Searle, in contrasting perception with the paradigm intentional states, treats it as not being 
a kind of representation. This is incompatible with his use of the term ‘representation’ because, as we noted 




If I have a belief that Sally has brown hair, that belief represents the world in an 
indeterminate way. What exact shade of brown? What exact texture of shade of 
brown? Sally’s actual hair is determinate in all its features, but the representation in 
the form of a belief is not in that way determinate.21  
 
Furthermore, in this context, Searle mentions Leibniz’s determinism. Like Leibniz, he 
also thinks that reality is determinate. And he adds that perception exhibit this feature as 
well.22 However, Searle is not clear enough on this issue. It is especially difficult to 
understand him when he mentions Leibniz’s determinism, because Searle does not clarify this 
remark. 
There is nonetheless here a point that can shed a light on what Searle means. This is 
again Searle’s comparison of visual experiences with beliefs. The main idea of the above 
example is similar to the idea of richness of visual experiences, as elaborated by Dretske 
(1981) and Martin (1992). The latter idea, when it is stripped of all details, comes down to the 
view that visual experiences usually convey more detailed information about their objects 
than the corresponding beliefs do. If what Searle means by the determinacy of perception is 
the same as, or similar to, what Dretske and Martin call the richness of perception, then he 




4. Hierarchical structuredness 
 
In STT, Searle also puts forward the view that visual experiences are structured 
hierarchically. Although he does not examine this feature in the chapter where he considers 
the special features of visual experiences, it is obvious that being hierarchically structured is 
                                                          
21 STT, 68. 
22 Searle nonetheless holds that if we compare the determinacy of perception with the determinacy of reality, we 
can see that the former is not as determinate as the latter: 
   
The visual experience cannot be fully determinate, because it is not reality itself. It is a presentation of 
certain aspects of reality, but not of all […] For example, humans cannot see the infrared and 
ultraviolet colors of the object that we are perceiving, because of the limitations of our perceptual 
apparatus […] (STT, 68). 
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also a special feature of perceptual intentionality; intentional states such as beliefs and desires 
does not represent their objects hierarchically. Searle explains this feature as follows: 
 
[T]he visual experience for normal humans is extremely rich in its intentional 
content. I do not just see colors and shapes, but I see cars and houses, and indeed, I 
do not just see cars and houses, I see my car and my house, for example. Now, how 
is all of that possible? It is possible because the rich intentional content requires a 
hierarchical structure of lower perceptual features, all of which are part of the content 
of the seeing as.23  
 
So, in this passage, Searle maintains that one sees all objects as having basic features –
colors and shapes – and without seeing basic features, one cannot see higher-level features 
(cars, houses, etc.). Moreover, he thinks that the higher-level features can also be subdivided 
into different levels. To use Searle’s example, I cannot see a black car unless I see its shape 
and color. Also, I cannot see this car as a 911 Carrera 4 (a more higher-level feature) unless I 
see it as a car. As Searle puts it, “in each case, the perception of the object as having the 
higher level feature requires perception of the lower level features”.24 Being a car or being a 
911 Carrera 4 are not basic features, because one sees the objects as having these features, 
only if their basic features are seen. Thus, the fact that one sees very different objects in the 





In this chapter, I have examined the features that Searle considered to be specifically 
possessed by visual experiences. I have argued that Searle makes some mistakes about this 
issue. His thesis that consciousness is a special feature of perceptual intentionality is false. 
Moreover, I have tried to show that, pace Searle, the feature of direct causation of perception 
cannot be experienced.  
                                                          
23 STT, 111. 










In STT, Searle reconsiders the central thesis of his theory of perception – the thesis that 
the intentional content of a visual experience determines the conditions of satisfaction – by 
focusing on the phenomenological features of visual experiences. The central chapters of STT 
are mainly dedicated to answering the following question:  
 
(Q): How do the phenomenological features of a visual experience determine  
         (“at least in part”) the conditions of satisfaction? 
 
Notice that, in this later work, Searle changes the central question of his theory of perception. 
Instead of asking “What are the conditions of satisfaction of a visual experience which are 
determined by the intentional content?”, in STT he focuses on the hypothesis that the 
phenomenological features of a visual experience determine or fix the conditions of 
satisfaction.  
In this chapter, in showing how Searle answers (Q), I will be concerned with two 
further issues: 1) I will try to show how Searle changes his method of investigation; and 2) on 
the basis of colour experience as an example, I will address the question “What are the 
conditions of satisfaction determined by the phenomenological features of a visual 
experience?”.  
Let me start with the first issue.    
 
 
1. Searle’s new method 
 
A specificity of STT, as a work of Searle’s later period, is that, in this work, Searle 
changes his method for answering some similar questions on which he already focused in 
INT. (Q) is one of these questions. In STT, this question is answered differently because the 
method Searle uses to answer it is distinct. The gist of the new method, which Searle calls the 
Backward road, is to reconsider the relation between a perceptual experience and its 
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conditions of satisfaction. The main idea of the Backward road boils down to the following: 
the direction of explanation of the relation between an experience and the conditions of 
satisfaction should go from the world to the experience, but not from the experience to the 
world. This means that, in STT, Searle does not follow the tradition of analytic philosophy, the 
tradition that in its analysis goes from representation to the world. To analyse the truth 
conditions of a sentence, a philosopher following the analytic tradition first focuses on the 
meaning of the sentence, because it is the meaning (representation) which determines its truth 
conditions. In INT, Searle applied the traditional method by asking “What are the elements 
that go to make up the truth conditions of sentences of the form ‘x sees y’ where x is a 
perceiver, human or animal, and y is, for example, a material object?”1 However, now he 
thinks that we need not apply the same method in order to analyse the truth conditions of the 
sentence which describes a visual experience or the conditions of satisfaction of that 
experience. 
In STT, Searle gives two reasons for choosing the new method. The first is that, 
because of the drawbacks he discovered later, he does not want to use the method of INT 
(which is the method of the analytic tradition), which he calls disquotational. (Searle says that 
he does not use the traditional notion of disquotation, according to which, for specifying truth 
conditions, we simply need to drop the quotation marks on the right-hand side as follows: ‘S 
is P’ is true if and only if S is P. Searle holds that he “[has] extended that notion in cases 
where we have a commonality but without quotation marks”.2) The second reason is that 
Searle now comes up with the idea that the relation between the experience and the conditions 
of satisfaction is internal.  
Let me consider these two reasons in detail, beginning with the first. Searle tells that, 
in INT, he did not think that “there was a substantive question of how intrinsic perceptual 
intentionality fixes conditions of satisfaction”.3 In this work, he simply took for granted that 
(intrinsically) intentional mental states, including perceptual experiences, determine their 
conditions of satisfaction. Therefore, to specify conditions of satisfaction, he used a 
“disquotational” method, without seeking any other specific reason for the specification in 
this way. In STT, to explain this point of INT with an example, he wrote: 
 
                                                          
1 INT, 37. 
2 STT, 134, fn5. To better understand what Searle means here, remember how we state conditions of satisfaction 
of intentional states: in stating them, we do not need to use quotation marks on the left-hand side, although there 
is a commonality with the specification of the truth conditions of sentences here. 
3 STT, 115. 
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The only reason that we can give why [the visual experience that there is a red ball 
there] fixes the conditions of satisfaction that there is a red ball there is that this 
experience is precisely one of seeming to see that there is a red ball there, in the 
sense that it is satisfied only if the presence and redness of the ball are causing this 
very visual experience.  
On this disquotational conception there cannot be any question of how the raw 
phenomenology fixes the conditions of satisfaction, because the raw phenomenology 
just is the presentation of those conditions of satisfaction.4 
 
Yet, as already stated, in STT Searle puts aside the method of INT, which is mentioned 
in this passage. He now comes up with the idea that “[(Q)] has to be answered non-
intentionalistically” (i.e. without using the disquotational method). Searle thinks this for two 
reasons: first, he regards visual experiences as events in the world; according to Searle’s 
viewpoint in STT, given that a visual experience is an event, it must have some non-
intentional features in virtue of which its conditions of satisfaction are determined. Second, 
Searle now thinks that the “disquotational” (i.e. intentional) specification is circular and it 
therefore “does not explain anything”.5 Here is how Searle, mentioning the basic visual 
experiences such as the seeing of colour or shape, explicates his second reason:  
 
[I]t is true that the experiences of the basic features have intrinsic intentionality, but 
those very intrinsic intentional features are intentional in virtue of something, and 
that something has now got to be specified, and it cannot be specified simply 
disquotationally. That they are basic and that they are intrinsically intentional seemed 
to me to imply that there is nothing more to be said. But that is a mistake. The point 
that the basic visual features have intrinsic intentionality does not by itself answer the 
question, How do they get the specific intentionality that they have?6  
 
These were the reasons why in STT Searle gives up the disquotational method. Let me 
now turn to Searle’s second reason for choosing the new method: the Backward road.  
The second reason that motivated Searle to choose the backward explanation, to 
remind ourselves, was that there is an internal relation “between the character of the 
                                                          
4 Ibid. 




experience and the condition of satisfaction”.7 By internal relation, Searle means a relation 
whose relata are essentially or systematically connected to each other. He explains this kind of 
relation by contrasting visual experiences with sentences. In his view, there is no internal 
relation between a sentence and its conditions of satisfaction, because the meaning of the 
sentence is conventional. This means that “that very sentence could be used to mean 
anything”.8 However, the relation between the visual experience, say, of red and the property 
of being red, is not conventional but internal. For Searle, this is because there is a systematic 
relation between the property of being red and the experience of seeing something as red. He 
maintains that it is the essence of the property of being red that it causes this kind of 
experience in normal perceivers under normal conditions. In Searle’s view, if two entities A 
and B instantiate an internal relation, then there must be a causal relation between them and 
that causal relation must be essential. In other words, for him, if A causes B, then in order for 
this causal relation to be an internal relation, it must be the essence of A that it is capable of 
causing B.  
Searle invokes the essentiality constraint because he believes that causality alone is not 
enough to characterise this kind of relation. For him, “[b]y itself causation has no explanatory 
power […]”.9 He presents the point in question in the following way: 
 
Let us suppose that a certain sort of experience is caused by red objects. That is 
indeed the case, but by itself that does not explain why the experience has red objects 
as the condition of satisfaction. Roughly speaking, anything can cause anything. 
Suppose seeing red objects invariably caused in me a painful sensation. This would 
not make the painful sensation into an intentional state that had redness as its 
condition of satisfaction.10 
 
Thus, in Searle’s view, because a causal relation between the experience and the 
external object that causes that experience can be abnormal, we need to confine that relation 
to those cases which are central to normal perceivers. And for him, this is to say that the 
internal relation in question is both causal and essential.11 
                                                          
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 119. 
10 Ibid. 119-120.  
11 Furthermore, Searle maintains that the point at issue here is definitional. He writes: “The internal connection 
between the experience and its object is guaranteed by the fact that the object essentially, so to speak, by 
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Yet Searle’s notion of internal relation is confusing. This is because there are passages 
in the same chapter of STT in which Searle also takes the internal relation to be the relation 
between the property of being red and the property of causing the experience of red. It turns 
out that, for Searle, the internal relation is not only a relation between a visual experience and 
its conditions of satisfaction. For example, on p. 125, he writes:   
      
The fact that makes [an object] red is, at least in part, that it is capable of causing a 
certain sort of experience. So you get an internal set of relations of something being 
red and it causing a certain sort of visual experience.12 
 
Notice that in this passage Searle does not say that the internal relation, which 
motivates him to prefer the Backward road, is a relation between the experience and the 
property of being red, but that it is a relation between the property of being red and the 
property of causing the experience of seeing something as red. The problem here is that, even 
if both were internal relations in the sense that there is a systematic or essential connection 
between their relata, these two relations still had to be regarded as different, at least in the 
context in which Searle considers them. The reason for this is that, as Searle states at the 
beginning of the corresponding chapter of STT, what should support the thesis that the 
phenomenal features of a visual experience determine the conditions of satisfaction is the 
assumption that there is an internal relation between the content of the experience and its 
conditions of satisfaction, not that there is an internal relation between the corresponding 
property of being x and the property of causing the visual experience of x. This is because the 
kind of relation which exists between “two” properties is distinct from the kind of relation 
which exists between the content of the experience and the conditions of satisfaction. Strictly 
speaking, for Searle, the property of being red and the property of causing the experience of 
seeing something as red are not two different properties, but one and the same property under 
two different names. In Searle’s view, the concept of causing the experience of seeing 
something as red defines redness. “[T]he essence of redness”, he writes, “is the ability to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
definition consists in, at least in part, the ability to cause that type of experience” (STT, 127; emphasis added). 
That is to say, we first assume that there is something in the world which has the ability to systematically cause a 
certain experience in normal perceivers, and then we invoke a concept defined to pick up this property. He thinks 
that this also shows that the relation between the experience and the conditions of satisfaction is conceptual (or 
necessary) (cf. STT, 144). 
12 STT, 125; emphasis added. 
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cause experiences that have this character […]”.13 This means that the property of being red is 
the property of causing the experience of seeing something as red14 (‘is’ here denotes the 
identity relation). If this is true, then we should keep apart the kind of relation which exists 
between the experience and its conditions of satisfaction from the kind of relation which 
exists between the property of being red and the property of causing the experience of red. 
The reason for this is that the former is not an identity relation (furthermore, in the former 
relation, the first relatum, in contrast to the latter, is not defined by the second relatum).  
However, to answer the question “What are the relata of the internal relation?” is not 
so difficult if we remember that Searle has invoked the notion of internal relation to ground 
the Backward road. This road is supposed to lead from the world to representations, and 
therefore it is reasonable to regard the notion of an internal relation as a notion which applies 
to the relation between the experience and its conditions of satisfaction.   
  
 
2. Answering the question of how phenomenological features of a visual 
experience determine the conditions of satisfaction 
 
So far, we have discussed Searle’s reasons for choosing the Backward road. Now let 
us focus on the issue of how Searle answers (Q) in virtue of this method. 
His answer to this question is as follows. The phenomenological features of a visual 
experience determine the conditions of satisfaction, because it is (in part) the essence of the 
conditions of satisfaction that they have the ability to cause this kind of experience.15 In other 
words, Searle’s “non-intentionalistical” answer to (Q) is that there is an internal or systematic 
relation between the experience and the conditions of satisfaction.16 And for him, the 
                                                          
13 Ibid. 124. In another place in STT, he says that “[t]he object of the experience [the property of being red, in our 
example] is its cause and these features are defined by their ability […] to cause these sorts of experiences” 
(STT, 134; bracketed expressions are mine). 
14 This point, of course, is “generalizable to all colors”. As Searle puts it, “[f]or an object to be a certain color is 
simply for it to be capable of causing certain sorts of experiences in normal perceivers under normal lighting 
conditions” (STT, 125). 
15  Cf. STT, 124. 
16 Searle indeed thinks that the systematic internal relation is not enough for holding that the property of being 
red is the condition of satisfaction of a visual experience of seeing something as red. On his picture, “for 
something to be the object of a perceptual experience is for it to be experienced as the cause of the experience” 
(122f). Here I set aside this point, because I have already focused on it in Chapter V.   
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obtaining of such a relation explains how phenomenal features of a visual experience 
determine the conditions of satisfaction. 
Searle extends this analysis to higher-level perceptual features as well. For him, 
higher-level features (being a book, being a computer, being a redwood tree, etc.) are seen on 
the basis of seeing basic features such as colour and shape. In other words, he thinks that we 
recognise higher-level features because we see basic perceptual features that make them up:  
 
I recognize [a California coastal redwood] in virtue of the fact that there is a 
particular set of features to the structure of the tree and the structure of fronds that 
constitute the visible features of the California redwood. Now the features that go to 
make up the fronds’ colors and shapes, and the bark color, shape, and texture, are all 
basic features. I can make a composite of the basic features to get the totality. I have 
been taught that anything that causes this sort of visual experience is a California 
coastal redwood.17 
 
So, for Searle, the content of the corresponding experience determines the conditions 
of satisfaction, because the property of being something (a higher-level feature) is partly 
constituted by being able to essentially cause the sorts of experiences that it causes. “[H]aving 
those features”, Searle tells us, “is a matter of causing certain sorts of visual experiences”.18  
Thus, for the explanation of higher-level cases as well, Searle uses the method which 
he has elaborated for the analysis of basic features. 
 
 
3. Conditions of satisfaction determined by the phenomenological features of  
a visual experience 
 
A remaining important issue here is to clarify the conditions of satisfaction of a visual 
experience which are determined by its phenomenological features. According to Searle’s 
theory of perception, the conditions of satisfaction of an experience are an entity which causes 
that experience. For example, to say that the conditions of satisfaction of the experience of 
seeing something as red are the property of being red is to say that this property causes this 
kind of experience. However, the problem here is that it is often difficult to specify 
                                                          
17 STT, 144-145. 
18 Ibid. 144. 
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phenomenological properties. When we think, for example, about colour, we can have two 
different specifications of it. On the one hand, under the influence of physics, we can be 
tempted to characterising colours as mind-independent entities in the world; on the other 
hand, we say that colours are entities to which we have access by virtue of our subjective 
visual experiences. According to the first characterisation, colour is a physical property, or 
more exactly, a certain reflectance profile of objects. On this characterisation, we see the 
world in different colours because the surfaces of objects reflect photons with different 
wavelengths. For example, the surface of a red object emits light waves at approximately 650 
nm. Nevertheless, those who tend to give a subjectivist characterisation of colour maintain 
that colour is a property which makes objects look colourful in normal circumstances and for 
normal observers. According to this view, we see the world in different colours because 
different objects have abilities to appear in distinctive ways to us. In other words, they have 
powers to cause different colour experiences. This view is often called subjectivist, because, 
on this view, colours are defined in terms of how the relevant aspects of the world seem to the 
perceiving subject. I think that both views are correct and they are not incompatible with each 
other. These views invoke two notions of colour which define it in two distinct ways: colour 
as a property of being able to reflect light waves, and colour as a property of being able to 
cause certain experiences in us.19  
Searle mainly uses the second notion of colour when he speaks of the conditions of 
satisfaction of a colour experience. For him, the content of the experience of seeing something 
as red determines its conditions of satisfaction as a property of being able to cause this kind of 
experience. Nevertheless, he does not deny that the corresponding reflectance profile is also 
part of the conditions of satisfaction. In STT, Searle says that the phenomenological features 
of a colour experience determine, at least in part, the conditions of satisfaction.20 In footnote 
6 of Chapter 4, he explains the purpose of using the expression “at least in part” by reminding 
us that, by the term ‘colour’, physicists mainly mean photon emissions. Searle therefore 
thinks that, strictly speaking, the conditions of satisfaction of the experience of seeing 
something as red should involve two properties: the property of being able to emit or reflect 
photons (which I henceforth refer to as RP), and the property of being able to cause this kind 
of experience (henceforth, CP). Searle’s view suggests that the content of the experience can 
only determine the latter as its conditions of satisfaction.  
                                                          
19 See Jackson (2007) for a more detailed explanation of how the distinction between these two properties is 
motivated. 
20 Cf. STT, 100. 
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It seems to me that Searle is right when he says that the conditions of satisfaction 
determined by the phenomenological features of an experience are CP. Yet I think that, in 
contrast to Searle, RP is not part of the conditions of satisfaction of the corresponding 
experience. This is not because, as Searle also holds, RP cannot be determined by the content, 
but because it is irrelevant to the content of the experience at all.  
To see this, let me specify the conditions of satisfaction of the experience of seeing 
something as red: 
 
(S): The experience of seeing something as red is satisfied if and only if it is 
       caused by CP in normal perceivers under normal conditions.  
 
(S) does not mention RP, because there is nothing in the content of the experience which 
(representationally) stands for it. Moreover, in (S) we cannot change CP with RP. This is 
because, first, RP is a distal cause of the experience; second, different reflectance profiles can 
be a ground for causing the same kind of experience (for example, photon emissions with 
wavelengths at 650 nm, 652 nm, 655 nm cause the same visual experience) ), such that RP, in 
contrast to CP, is a continuous magnitude which considerably outstrips our representational 
capacities. 
There are also empirical grounds for thinking that RP is irrelevant as conditions of 
satisfaction of the colour experience. One of them, I think, is the visual spectrum which shows 
that very different reflectance profiles can exemplify properties of being able to cause 
relatively similar visual experiences. Violet, which stands on the left end of the spectrum, is 
experientially much more similar to red, which is on the far right end of the spectrum, than to 
blue. Yet, if we consider them objectively, violet (390-455 nm) is much closer to blue (455-
492 nm) than to red (622-780 nm). This shows that qualitatively similar experiences can have 
very distinct external stimuli. 
Another empirical support for the point at issue here can be a rainbow. Goldstone & 
Hendrickson (2009) tell us about an interesting feature of the rainbow, when they write:  
     
When we look at a rainbow, we tend to see about seven distinct bands of colour, 
even though we know from physics that the dominant wavelength of light that meets 
one’s eye changes smoothly from the top to bottom of the rainbow. Although the 
rainbow presents itself to us with a continuous and full range of visible wavelengths 
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of light, we tend to see it in terms of distinct colors such as red, yellow, blue, and 
violet.21  
 
So, the rainbow case, like the visual spectrum, illustrates that there is no smooth 
correlation between CP and RP. And this can show how these properties come apart.  
All these aspects – the point concerning (S) and the above-mentioned empirical 
grounds – give us reason for saying that RP cannot be considered to be the conditions of 
satisfaction of the experience of seeing something as red.22 What is determined by the 
phenomenological features of the visual experience is only the property of being able to cause 
this kind of experience. That is to say, Searle’s addition of “at least in part” can be avoided 
because, by this expression, Searle means the property of being able to emit photons, which is 
irrelevant to the content of the experience.  
 
   
4. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have considered how (Q) is “nonintentionalistically” answered by 
Searle. We have seen that, in STT, Searle uses another method, the Backward road, to answer 
this question. By virtue of this method, he puts forward the view that the phenomenological 
features of a visual experience determine the conditions of satisfaction because there is an 
internal relation between the experience and the conditions of satisfaction. Moreover, in this 
chapter, I have tried to show that the expression “at least in part” in Searle’s thesis that the 
conditions of satisfaction are determined, at least in part, by the phenomenological features of 
the experience, is redundant, because the reflectance profiles of objects, for which the 
expression in question is added, cannot be a part of the conditions of satisfaction.    
 
                                                          
21 Goldstone & Hendrickson (2009), 69; emphasis added. 
22 Notice that, given that RP is not (part of) the conditions of satisfaction, here we cannot use the distinction 
between conditions of satisfaction as a requirement and conditions of satisfaction as a thing. The reason for this 
is that, provided that CP is the only conditions of satisfaction, there is no possibility from the side of the world to 
make the experience satisfied by a more specific entity. This is because what satisfies the experience, or the 
property of being able to cause this kind of experience, is defined in virtue of the kind of the experience. 
However, if RP is the conditions of satisfaction, we could assume that the conditions of satisfaction of the 
experience of seeing something as red are wavelengths at 650 nm in one case, but 655 nm in another case, etc. 
That is to say, in each different case, the conditions of satisfaction as a thing could be distinct reflectance 
profiles.     
107 
 
CHAPTER VII  
 
 
The Background of Visual Experiences 
 
 
In this chapter I will examine Searle’s following thesis:  
 
(VB): The content of a visual experience determines the conditions of satisfaction 
          against the Background.  
 
I will be concerned with (VB) by considering the examples that motivate Searle to postulate 
this thesis. In his works, Searle provides diverse examples to support (VB). Yet I think some 
of his examples are unhelpful in this respect. In this discussion I will try to show why it is so. 
Moreover, in my view, since there are some cases which indicate that visual experiences can 
also not be affected by the rest of the mind, (VB), as a general thesis, should be given up.  
I have divided Searle’s examples for (VB) into two groups. The first group contains 
the examples which, for him, suggest a certain relation between visual experience and the 
background intentional state that affects it. Searle gives these examples in INT. The second 
group tries to show how some Background capacities, which are part of the perceptual 
system, play a role in the determination of conditions of satisfaction. In STT, (VB) is 
explained in virtue of the second group of examples.  
Let me begin with the first group.    
  
 
1. The examples from INT 
 
In this work, Searle shows that (VB) is partially motivated by the empirical findings 
which indicate that our expectations and linguistic skills affect how we see the world. He 
makes recourse to L. Postman et al. (1951), which suggests that the expectations “select, 
organize, and transform” the perceptual information. Moreover, in INT, to support (VB), 
Searle maintains that concepts which we possess also affect our visual experiences. He 
provides three kinds of examples to illustrate these issues. However, I think that some of these 
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examples are not acceptable in this respect. Some of them are even incompatible with (VB). 
Let me focus on this issue by considering Searle’s examples one by one.  
Here is the passage with the first example:  
 
Consider, for example, the difference between looking at the front of a house where 
one takes it to be the front of a whole house and looking at the front of a house where 
one takes it to be a mere façade, e.g., as part of a movie set. If one believes one is 
seeing a whole house, the front of the house actually looks different from the way it 
looks if one believes one is seeing a false façade of a house, even though the optical 
stimuli may be identical in the two cases. And this difference in the actual character 
of the visual experiences is reflected in the differences between the two sets of 
conditions of satisfaction. It is part of the content of my visual experience when I 
look at a whole house that I expect the rest of the house to be there if, for example, I 
enter the house or go around to the back. In these sorts of cases the character of the 
visual experience and its conditions of satisfaction will be affected by the content of 
the beliefs that one has about the perceptual situation.1 
 
The passage with its example of seeing a house suggests the following points: 1) The 
belief that I see a house/façade affects the visual experience in the sense that, depending on 
the background belief, the conditions of satisfaction of the visual experience will be distinct; 
2) The content of the visual experience contains the expectation that the rest of the house is 
there. Let us consider these points.  
It seems that Searle is right concerning the first point – the background belief can 
affect the conditions of satisfaction. Nevertheless, this is not general for all such cases. To see 
this, we should clarify an important issue here. If we remember the idea of hierarchical 
structuredness of visual experiences, we can notice that seeing a house or the façade of a 
house cannot be possible without seeing its basic features, such as shape and color. And the 
point here is that the visual experience of the basic perceptual features of the object cannot be 
affected by such background beliefs. Namely, independent of whether I see the object as a 
house or as a mere façade in a movie set, the conditions of satisfaction of the experience of 
seeing the object’s color and shape do not change. That is to say, Searle’s thesis that the 
background beliefs affect visual experiences does not apply to the experience of seeing the 
basic perceptual features. Yet, in INT, Searle does not mention this point. The gist of the first 
                                                          
1 INT, 55. 
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example is only to show how the background belief affects seeing higher-level features of the 
object (or at least Searle’s example in question suggests only this). To put this otherwise, 
Searle does not show how (VB) is applicable to the experience of seeing objects as having 
basic perceptual features. This is, I think, an important point which suggests that (VB) is not 
general to all visual experiences.    
The second point of the first example seems simply false – the content of the visual 
experience cannot contain an expectation. Of course, we can expect, and believe, many things 
when we look at different objects. But this does not mean that we can hold that the content of 
the experience contains an expectation. An expectation is a kind of intentional state and the 
content of visual experiences cannot contain any other sort of intentional states. Moreover, it 
is important to notice that even if, for the sake of the discussion, we accepted that the content 
of the visual experience somehow contains the expectation, that would still not support (VB). 
The reason for this is that, even in that case, the expectation would not be part of the 
Background (or of the Network of intentional states) that affects the experience to determine 
the conditions of satisfaction. Rather, it would be part of the content itself. 
Searle’s second example concerns the cases “where the content of the beliefs is 
actually inconsistent with the content of the visual experience”.2 He reminds us that, when we 
see the moon on the horizon, it looks us to be bigger than it does when it is overhead. That is 
to say, in these two cases, we have inconsistent visual experiences. Yet although the 
experiences are inconsistent with each other, our belief that the moon is of the same size 
remains constant.3 In such cases, Searle says that “the Intentionality of belief [overrides] the 
Intentionality of our visual experiences”.4 In virtue of such examples, Searle comes to the 
conclusion that “[t]he same beliefs coexist with different visual experiences with different 
conditions of satisfaction even though the content of the experiences is inconsistent with the 
content of the beliefs and is overridden by the beliefs”.5 
                                                          
2 INT, 55. 




These lines exhibit an optical illusion. Although the lines have the same length, they look to be different lengths 
to us.   
4 INT, 56. 
5 Ibid. 57. 
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Yet Searle’s second example and that of Müller-Lyer lines (see footnote 3) are not 
only unhelpful to explain (VB) but also misleading in that respect. Such examples are 
famously used to show how our visual experiences can resist influence from the cognitive part 
of the mind. For example, Z. Pylyshyn (1999), who also mentions Müller-Lyer lines as an 
example, argues that perception is cognitively impenetrable. (To remind us, Searle’s purpose 
is contrary to Pylyshyn’s: (VB) suggests that the cognitive part of the mind affects 
perception.) Even if you measure Müller-Lyer lines and form the belief that the lines have the 
same length, this belief does not make the perceptual illusion disappear. Hence, we can 
conclude that the corresponding belief cannot play any role in the determination of the 
experience’s conditions of satisfaction. (The same goes for the “moon” example.) In that 
sense it is obscure why Searle uses this kind of examples when he tries to back up (VB). 
Searle’s third example is to show how visual experiences differ as a result of the 
Background effect, but that their conditions of satisfaction remain constant. He uses the 




Searle says that the above figure can be seen in different ways. One can see it “as the word 
‘TOOT’, as a table with two large balloons underneath, as the numeral 1001 with a line over 
the top, as a bridge with two pipelines crossing underneath, as the eyes of a man wearing a hat 
with a string hanging down each side, and so on”.6 Searle adds that, although the visual 
stimuli remain constant, these are different experiences. Because we have mastered different 
concepts and cultural skills, this enables us to see the above figure in different ways. In 
Searle’s view, using concepts in visual experiences and the corresponding cultural skills are 
“the Background capacities that [we] bring to bear on the experience”,7 and, without having 
them, we could not see the figure in such different ways. For example, without the ability of 
reading, one could not have the experience of seeing this figure as the word “TOOT”.  
Searle seems to be right when he says that the concepts and cultural skills the subject 
possess affect how the figure above is seen. This example shows that, given that bringing 
concepts to visual experiences is a Background capacity, the content of the experience can 
                                                          
6 INT, 54. 
7 STT, 74. 
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require this capacity to determine the conditions of satisfaction. However, this does not mean 
that the visual experience should always need the conceptual apparatus to determine the 
conditions of satisfaction. Suppose that a man who has never seen a duck and a rabbit, and 
who does not possess either the concept of duck or the concept of rabbit, is looking at 
Jastrow’s duck-rabbit picture.8 In that case, the visual experience of this man cannot have the 
conditions of satisfaction that there is a picture of a rabbit, or a picture of a duck, there. 
Nevertheless, his visual experience does have conditions of satisfaction. (The visual 
experience has non-conceptual phenomenological features and they determine certain other 
conditions of satisfaction.) That is why the content of his experience does not necessarily need 
the conceptual apparatus to determine conditions of satisfaction.  
Searle’s conclusion concerning the third example is also mistaken. He claims that 
seeing the above figure as the word “TOOT”, as a table with two large balloons underneath, 
as the numeral 1001 with a line over the top, etc. has the same conditions of satisfaction. His 
reason for this is that, in this case, “we are not in the least inclined to think anything is 
different in the real world corresponding to differences in the experiences”.9 For Searle, the 
figure is the same figure and the only thing that changes is the visual experience. This view is 
also incorrect, for the experiences have different conditions of satisfaction. Seeing the figure 
as the word ‘TOOT’ is distinct from seeing the figure, say, as a table with two large balloons 
underneath, because in the first case the conditions of satisfaction of the experience are the 
property of resembling a token of the word ‘TOOT’, but in the second case the conditions of 
satisfaction are the property of resembling a table with two large balloons underneath. If the 
figure, say, did not resemble the word ‘TOOT’, the experience of seeing figure as ‘TOOT’ 
would not be satisfied.  
Moreover, notice that, even if Searle were right on this issue, then he has to say the 
same thing concerning the first and the duck/rabbit example as well. The reason for this is 
that, in these examples too, our experiences are caused by the same stimuli. Or, to use 
Searle’s own phrase, in the first example (and in the duck/rabbit example), too, by seeing the 
object in one case as a house (a duck) and in another case as a façade (a rabbit), the subjects 
                                                          
8 Jastrow’s duck-rabbit picture: 
  
9 INT, 56. 
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do not think that there is a change “in the real world corresponding to differences in the 
experiences”10. However, as mentioned, when it comes to these examples, Searle does not say 
that the visual experiences have the same conditions of satisfaction.  
 
 
2. The examples from STT 
 
In STT, Searle tries to back up (VB) by considering some capacities of the perceptual 
system. In this work, he chooses the phenomenon of depth perception to explain the 
Background of visual experiences. Searle says that the perception of depth is also related to 
our Background ability. This is, for him, the ability which converts a two dimensional 
stimulus on our retina to the perception of three dimensional objects. In his view, that 
Background ability is subject to the laws of perspective, and the mastery of such abilities is 
important for the determination of conditions of satisfaction:    
 
The impact of the light on the visual system will produce effects in the subjective 
visual field that are consequences of the laws of perspective. So, if you are looking at 
the railroad tracks extending away from you into the distance, your subjective visual 
field will contain the subjective correlates of two lines getting progressively closer 
together toward the top of the objective visual field. The basic subjective elements 
[the visual correlates of lines and angels] do not fix the conditions of satisfaction of 
three-dimensional space by themselves. But given our Background mastery of 
perspective, the subjective visual field carries an intentional content that has the 
three-dimensional as its conditions of satisfaction.11  
 
Given that the ability to convert the two dimensional stimulus into the three-
dimensional perception is a Background ability, the example in this passage supports (VB). 
To understand this more clearly, we can assume a case in which this, or a similar, ability is 
distinct; and its result is that the visual experience has distinct conditions of satisfaction. 
There are some empirical findings which can be helpful here. W. H. R. Rivers’ (1901) 
research, for example, showed that the indigenous people of the Australian Murray Island had 
                                                          
10 Ibid. 
11 STT, 140-141; Bracketed expressions are mine. 
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a distinct perception of Müller-Lyer lines.12 He noted that since these people lived in the 
environment which did not contain many rectilinear entities, their perceptual system was less 
susceptible to the Müller-Lyer illusion.13 To use Searle’s terminology, that is to say that the 
indigenous people of the Australian Murray had a distinct Background ability to perceive 
some entities. This suggests that when they looked at the Müller-Lyer lines, their visual 
experiences were distinct from the corresponding experiences of the European people, also in 
the sense that their experiences had distinct conditions of satisfaction.    
If we compare Searle’s example from STT with the house/façade example from INT, 
we can see that, in these examples, there is a distinction in the kind of the relations between 
the visual experience and the Background.14 In the example of STT, the Background is a 
constitutive part of the perceptual system. In other words, the two-dimensional stimulus on 
the retina alone, which is a subjective correlate of the basic perceptual feature of (say) the 
railroad tracks, is not sufficient to be able to see the railroad tracks as extending away into the 
distance.15 We need here the corresponding ability which makes the experience possible by 
converting the stimulus to the three-dimensional perception. However, when it comes to the 
house/façade example, we cannot say that the background belief that affects the visual 
experience in question is a constitutive part of the experience. (As has been stated above, the 
belief that I see a house/façade cannot be part of the perceptual system.) 
Most of Searle’s unhelpful examples we discussed above concern cases in which the 
relation between the Background and the visual experience is similar to the relation between 
the background belief and the experience in the house/façade example. This might at first 
glance suggest that, if we want to back up (VB), we should consider the cases in which the 
Background is a constitutive part of the visual experience. However, there can be cases which 
show that this view is incorrect. In STT, Searle mentions an interesting feature of the paintings 
of the prominent Spanish Renaissance artist El Greco. El Greco painted elongated figures. In 
the early 1900s, there was an explanation according to which the reason for El Greco’s weird 
painting style was that he suffered from uncommon astigmatism, and so he perceived 
everything as elongated. On this hypothesis, when El Greco saw an object which would look 
ordinary to normal perceivers, he experienced the object as vertically stretched-out, and 
therefore he painted an elongated object. However, as Searle also emphasises, this is not a 
                                                          
12 See footnote 3. 
13 A similar experiment with different people was conducted by M. H. Segall, et. al. (1963) and John W. Berry 
(1968). 
14 Here I compare them because they both support (VB). 
15 The example has been taken from STT. 
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correct explanation; even if El Greco truly saw the object as vertically stretched-out, that 
could not be the reason for the fact that he painted elongated objects. This is because, given 
that El Greco painted exactly what he saw, he would see not only the objects, but also the 
paintings of these objects as elongated. Yet although El Greco’s paintings looked elongated to 
him, we would see them as normally as we see the objects which the paintings are of.  
Now, let us forget about the paintings and suppose that El Greco really suffered from a 
certain kind of astigmatism so that he saw objects as vertically stretched-out. To use Searle’s 
terminology, that would be to say that El Greco had a distinct Background capacity to see 
objects. To this Searle would add that this astigmatism would affect the determination of 
conditions of satisfaction of his visual experiences. Thus, Searle’s theory suggests that, if El 
Greco really suffered from this kind of astigmatism, the conditions of satisfaction of his 
experience of seeing an object as having, say, a height of one meter would be distinct from the 
conditions of satisfaction of the corresponding visual experiences of normal perceivers. 
However, I think that this would be wrong; El Greco would not perceive objects as having 
different heights. If a normal perceiver and El Greco saw an object with one meter height, 
they would have different visual experiences. Nevertheless, the conditions of satisfaction of 
both experiences would be the same. This is because El Greco would see the object as 
vertically stretched-out not only from one perspective but from all perspectives. Furthermore, 
he would see not only one object as elongated but all objects. And that is to say that these 
distortions would cancel each other out.    
The message we can draw from this thought experiment is the following. There can be 
cases in which the Background abilities of subjects, which are constitutive parts of their 
perceptual systems, are distinct, but the visual experiences still have the same conditions of 
satisfaction. In such cases, the differences in the Background abilities do not affect the 
conditions of satisfaction.  
 
 
3. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have tried to show that there are examples in Searle’s works which do 
not support (VB), and that Searle’s interpretation of some of them is incorrect. The Müller-
Lyer illusion and the “moon” example cannot show that (VB) is true. Also, Searle’s 
conclusion on the “TOOT” example is incorrect. Furthermore, in the second paragraph of the 
chapter, we have seen that even if we regard the capacities of the perceptual system as a 
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Background ability, this still does not ensure that (VB) have to be accepted. Nevertheless, it 
has also been shown that there are many cases that can support the thesis in question. Searle’s 
first example in INT was one of such cases. (There are plenty of empirical studies in the 
psychological literature, which are called top-down effects in visual perception, and which 
indicate that our concepts, expectations, goals, and desires can affect visual experiences.) 
However, since some cases show that the Background does not always affect perception to 
determine the conditions of satisfaction, (VB) is falsified by these cases, and therefore this 





























The following questions are eminently important in the philosophy of perception: 
Does perception give us direct access to the world? Do we perceive objects and states of 
affairs as they really are? Or do we perceive them by way of perceiving something else which 
mediates our perceptual experiences in the world? These are hotly debated questions in the 
philosophy of perception. In this chapter I will examine Searle’s response to them.  
In response to the questions above, two different trends have generally been given in 
the history of philosophy. One group of philosophers (Searle mentions as examples Descartes, 
Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Ayer) holds that we cannot directly perceive the world. On the 
other hand, another group, which is called direct (naïve) realists, argue against them. Searle 
considers himself to be a direct, or naïve, realist. Nevertheless, he also criticises the theories 
of the disjunctivist philosophers, who are also regarded as the representatives of Naïve 
Realism.1 Searle argues that the disjunctivist philosophers and the classical theorists of 
perception (Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Ayer, etc.) commit the same fallacy. He calls their 
argument the Bad Argument. In this chapter, I will first consider the general features of 
Searle’s own understanding of Naïve Realism, before going on to expound his criticism of 
“the Bad Argument”. In the third section of the chapter, I will focus on Searle’s second 
argument against the Argument from Illusion (this latter being one of the most influential 
arguments against Naïve Realism). In sections four and five, I will return to “the Bad 
Argument”. In these sections, I will examine Searle’s claim that, in the works of both the 
classical theorists and the disjunctivist philosophers, different versions of “the Bad 
Argument” are found. Furthermore, Searle argues that “the Bad Argument” arises as a result 
of the fact that these philosophers do not understand the intentionality of perceptual 
experiences. In the remainder of the chapter, I will turn to this issue.  
 
                                                          
1 The disjunctivists, in contrast to Searle, defend Naïve Realism by arguing that veridical perceptual experience 
and the hallucination indistinguishable from it are not the same kind of mental states. I will have more to say 
about this issue later.  
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1. General features of Searle’s Naïve Realism 
 
Searle says that his account of visual experiences is “a version of ‘naïve’ (direct, 
common sense) realism”.2 The main thesis of his naïve realist view is that “[subjects] directly 
perceive objects and state of affairs”.3 Here, Searle also uses the term “Direct Realism” in 
order to distinguish his version of Naïve Realism from the realism of the disjunctivist 
philosophers. He maintains that “[his view of perception] is called ‘realism’ because it says 
we do have perceptual access to the real world, and ‘direct’ because it says that we do not first 
have to perceive something else by way of which we perceive the real world”.4  
These ideas fit together with Searle’s view that there are two important phenomena in 
the case of a veridical visual experience. He describes these two phenomena respectively as 
“an ontologically objective state of affairs in the world outside your head and an ontologically 
subjective visual experience of that state of affairs entirely inside your head”.5 The latter view 
is indeed important for Searle to back up his version of Naïve Realism. To show that, in the 
case of perception, the subjective experience and the objective state of affairs (i.e. the object 
of perception) are distinct phenomena, Searle adopts a simple line of explanation. He 
maintains that if, when seeing something, we close our eyes, the subjective experience in our 
head will cease to continue, but the object seen will not cease to exist. The important relation 
between the subjective and the objective phenomena in perception is that the former is caused 
by the latter. Moreover, in the veridical cases, the causal relation between the experience and 
the object perceived is such that objects are perceived as how they really are. Searle pictures 
this relation in terms of the following diagram:6 
 
   
 
                                                          
2 INT, 57. 
3 STT, 15. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 17. 
6 Cf. INT, 57. 
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In the diagram, the arrow above illustrates the intentionality of visual experience, by 
indicating that the subject’s experience is directed at an intentional object; the arrow below 
represents the direction of causation in the visual experience. 
In this context, Searle also compares veridical experience with non-veridical cases 
(hallucinations and illusions). In the case of a hallucination, of course, there is no external 
object to cause the visual experience. In such cases, the experience is not caused by anything 
other than internal processes in the brain. Here is the diagram which Searle uses to illustrate 




Apart from the question of the intentionality of perception, in STT Searle devotes more 
pages to rebut arguments against Naïve Realism instead of further elucidating his own 
position. Yet in one sense this is not surprising. The central theses of Naïve Realism are 
simple. It says that there is a real, mind-independent world and that, in the case of veridical 
perceptual experiences, we directly perceive it. However, when it comes to the criticism of 
this view, one can easily see by looking at the history of philosophy that different prominent 
philosophers have put forward different arguments against Naïve Realism. As Searle stresses:  
 
[Naïve Realism] is denied by just about every famous philosopher who writes on this 
subject. Indeed of the philosophers that have written about perception since the 
seventeenth century, I do not know of any Great Philosopher who even accepted 
Naïve or Direct Realism. (“Great Philosophers” in this period begin with Bacon and 
Descartes and end with Kant. They include Locke, Leibniz, Spinoza, Berkeley, 
Bacon and Hume […]).8 
 
For this reason, one of Searle’s primary concerns is to defend his version of Naïve Realism 
against the attacks of these “Great Philosophers”.  
                                                          
7 Cf. Ibid. 58. 




To do this, Searle undertakes to argue the following steps. First, and most importantly, 
by generalising the arguments of those who refute his version of Naïve Realism and of the 
contemporary disjunctivist philosophers, he tries to show what their mistake consists in. He 
calls their argument the Bad Argument. Second, drawing on J. L. Austin, he tries to rebut the 
Argument from Illusion separately. 
In what follows, I will first examine Searle’s objections to the arguments against his 
version of Naïve Realism.9 Then, in the following sections, I will consider Searle’s criticism 
of some classical theories of perception and of some disjunctivist philosophers. Lastly, as 
already mentioned above, I will focus on how Searle relates “the Bad Argument” to the 
intentionality of perception.    
 
 
2. “The Bad Argument” 
   
A central contention in Searle’s criticism of these theories is that he subsumes the 
arguments against his position under one name – The Bad Argument. For him, although one 
can find different arguments against Naïve or Direct Realism, they “rest on exactly the same 
mistake”.10 To show this, Searle first considers the well-known arguments against Direct 
Realism: the Argument from Hallucination and the Argument from Illusion.11 A hallucination 
is an experience which, by definition, the subject cannot distinguish from a corresponding 
veridical perceptual experience. For example, suppose that one is having a veridical 
experience of seeing a red ball. The idea that there can be hallucinations implies that the same 
subject could have a visual experience which is, for the subject at the very moment of 
experience, qualitatively indistinguishable from the experience of seeing a red ball, when 
                                                          
9 I often write “his version of Naïve Realism” because, as noted, Searle also criticises the contemporary 
philosophers who advocate the other forms of Naïve Realism. These philosophers are called the disjunctivists. 
The disjunctivists also hold that we directly perceive objects in the world, although, as will be shown later, there 
are some fundamental tenets which Searle and the disjunctivist philosophers do not share. 
10 STT, 20. 
11 In STT, Searle also mentions the Argument from Science as another argument against Direct Realism. 
According to this argument, perceptual processes begin when photons reflected off the surface of objects 
stimulate the photoreceptor cells in the retina. This in turn causes a sequence of neurological processes in the 
brain. The scientific analysis of perception does not mention that we see real objects such as a table, a cup of tea, 
etc. According to the science of perception, “we never see the real world but see only a series of events that are 
the result of the impact of the real world, by way of light reflectances, on our nervous system” (STT, 22). I will 
not go into further details of this argument because focusing on the Argument from Illusion and the Argument 
from Hallucination is sufficient for our purposes. 
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there is indeed no red ball being perceived. To put this in another way, the point at issue here 
is that, in both the veridical and the hallucinatory cases, the subjective qualitative element of 
these experiences is common. This motivates some philosophers to think that both cases must 
be explained by the same account. Also, because in the hallucination case there is no physical 
object causing the visual experience, the same account requirement entails that the object of 
the hallucination must be a mental entity or sense-datum. For some philosophers, the latter 
conclusion, together again with the same account requirement, entails that the object of the 
veridical case is also sense-data. Therefore, they conclude, we do not see real objects in the 
veridical case either.    
A similar kind of reasoning is known to us from the Argument from Illusion. An 
illusion is here understood as “any perceptual situation in which a physical object is actually 
perceived, but in which that object perceptually appears other than it really is”.12 Searle uses 
the example of the “bent” stick to illustrate the Argument from Illusion. Perhaps someone 
who has seen a straight stick partly immersed in water will have noticed that it appears to be 
bent. Those who try to refute Direct Realism say that, if something appears to us to be bent 
when it is in fact not bent, then in such cases we do not see real objects but only appearances 
or sense data. As a next step, they claim that, because the veridical and illusory cases must 
have the same account, and because in the illusory cases we do not see how objects really are, 
we do not see real objects and their properties in the veridical cases either. 
Searle, as a naïve realist, does not think that he should block the Argument from 
Hallucination and the Argument from Illusion in different ways. He holds that both these 
arguments “rest on the same fallacy”. To expose this fallacy, Searle combines these 
arguments by analysing them together in the series of steps. He writes:   
 
Step One: In both the veridical (good) case and in the hallucination (bad) case, there 
is a common element—a qualitative subjective experience going on in the visual 
system. 
Step Two: Because the common element is qualitatively identical in the two cases, 
whatever analysis we give of one, we must give of the other.  
Step Three: In both the veridical case and the hallucination case we are aware of 
something (are conscious of something, see something). 
Step Four: But in the hallucination case it cannot be a material object; therefore, it 
must be a subjective mental entity. Just to have a name, call it “sense datum.” 
                                                          
12 Smith (2002), 23. 
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Step Five: But by step two we have to give the same analysis for both cases. So in 
the veridical case, as in the hallucination, we see only sense data. 
Step Six: Because in both hallucinations and in veridical perceptions themselves we 
see only sense data, then we have to conclude that we never see material objects or 
other ontologically objective phenomena. So Direct Realism is refuted.13 
 
The philosophers’ approaches diverge as to whether the Argument is defective or not. 
(To refer to the argument in question, I use the word “Argument” with a capital ‘A’.) For 
example, classical theorists of perception hold that the Argument is valid and its conclusion is 
true. However, the disjunctivist philosophers and Searle think that there is a problem with the 
Argument. Most of the disjunctivists do not accept Step One in the Argument. Searle 
nevertheless argues that there is a problem in Step Three. I will come back to the 
disjunctivists’ concern later. In the remainder of this section, I want to elaborate Searle’s 
approach to the Argument in particular.      
 
2.1. On Step Three of the Argument 
 
According to Searle’s account of the Argument, the crucial step here is Step Three, 
“which says that in both the hallucination and the veridical case we are ‘aware of’ or 
‘conscious of’ something”.14 To Searle this step contains an ambiguous phrase – “aware of” –
which has two senses. Searle calls the first sense of this phrase the “aware of” of 
intentionality, and the second the “aware of” of constitution or identity.15 He explains this 
distinction in the following way: 
 
You can see the difference if you contrast two common-sense claims. First, when I 
push my hand hard against this table, I am aware of the table. And second, when I 
push my hand hard against this table, I am aware of a painful sensation in my hand. 
(a) I am aware of the table.  
(b) I am aware of a painful sensation in my hand.  
                                                          
13 STT, 22-23. 
14 STT, 24. 
15 Furthermore, Searle distinguishes the kind of ambiguity in “aware of” from the ambiguity in the homonymous 
words. He says that the ambiguity in “aware of” is distinct from the ambiguity in the “bank”, which can mean 
either “a finance house” or “a side of the river”. For Searle, this is “because there is a common phenomenon to 
both the hallucination and the veridical perception” (STT, 26). 
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Both of these are true and though they look similar, they are radically different. (a) 
describes an intentional relation between me and the table. I had a sensation where 
the table was its intentional object. The presence and features of the table are the 
conditions of satisfaction of the sensation. In (a) the “aware of” is the “aware of ” of 
intentionality. But in (b) the only thing I am aware of is the painful sensation itself. 
Here the “aware of” is the “aware of” of identity or the constitution of the 
experience. The object I am aware of and the sensation are identical. I had only one 
sensation: a painful sensation of the table. I was aware of (in the sense of identity or 
constitution) the sensation, but I was also aware of (in the sense of intentionality) the 
table.16 
 
After having distinguished two senses of “aware of”, Searle reconsiders the Argument. 
He holds that, in the description of the veridical experience, we use the intentionalistic sense 
of “aware of”, but in the case of the description of a hallucination, “aware of” is used in the 
sense of constitution or identity. For Searle, in the hallucinatory experience, the subject is not 
aware of anything in the same sense as he is when he is aware of something (say, a table), in 
the veridical case. The hallucinatory experiences, on his account, do not possess any external 
object, they have only intentional content. Searle therefore thinks that, in the description of a 
hallucination, we do not use the intentionalistic sense of “aware of”. In his view, because, in 
the hallucination case, the visual experience is identical with the awareness, in the description 
of it “aware of” is used in the sense of identity (constitution). Thus, according to Searle, it 
turns out that there is “a simple fallacy of ambiguity, over the use of the English expressions 
‘aware of’ and ‘conscious of’”17 in Step Three of the Argument. And this infects both the 
Argument from Illusion and the Argument from Hallucination.18  
This point, however, can be disputed. Against Searle, one might argue that the word 
“aware of” in the sentence used to describe a hallucinatory experience can also be used with 
the intentionalistic sense. The reason for this can be simple. A hallucination, one might say, is 
also an intentional state; it is also about, or directed at, something that does not exist. After all, 
there is a good reason to think that this is in fact so. The possibility of being about a non-
existent object is a peculiarity of intentional states. And visual experiences, like beliefs and 
desires, can also be about objects that do not exist. Thus, it seems that, since hallucinations 
                                                          
16 STT, 24-25. 
17 Ibid. 25.  
18 Searle claims that “the Argument from Science commits the same fallacy”, as well. See STT, 29. 
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are also intentional states, it is pretty safe to say that in the Argument “aware of” can be used 
with the intentionalistic sense without using this phrase ambiguously.19 And this can suggest 
that the conclusion that we perceive mind-dependent objects in the case of veridical 
perceptual experiences is true, because the Argument is valid. However, it seems to me that, 
even if “aware of” were used only in the intentionalistic sense – that is, even if Searle’s 
ambiguity claim were incorrect – the conclusions of the Argument would still be false. Let me 
elaborate this issue.  
Suppose that “aware of” is used only in the intentionalistic sense in the Argument. 
This would suggest that, in the hallucination case, the subject is aware of a mind-dependent 
(intentional) object that does not exist. From this, those who advocate the classical theories of 
perception would conclude (together with Step Two and Step Five) that the veridical case also 
has a mind-dependent object. Yet, to repeat, this conclusion is false. To see this, let me pose 
the question in a more explicit way. From the idea that the object of a hallucinatory 
experience is mind-dependent, how could one infer that the veridical perceptual experience 
also has a mind-dependent object? The answer to this question can be formulated as follows. 
What in the Argument premise such an inference are Step One and Step Two, which say that 
the hallucinatory and the veridical cases should be analysed in the same way because of the 
common element that they both have. But if the analysis only concerns the “qualitative 
subjective experience”, i.e. the common element, then the intentional objects of these states, 
which are not part of the experience,20 cannot be the subject of the analysis.21 Therefore, from 
the fact that the hallucination has a mind-dependent (more exactly, an experience-dependent) 
object, one cannot infer that the veridical perceptual experience also has a mind-dependent 
object. Hence, one cannot conclude that we do not see material objects.     
                                                          
19 Notice that what we have said about the use of “aware of” goes for illusions as well. Although illusions are 
non-veridical experiences, they are still intentional – they are still about something. That is to say, in the 
description of illusory cases, “aware of” can also be used in the intentionalistic sense.  
20 A hallucination also has a non-existent intentional object which is not part of the experience. Suppose that I 
am hallucinating that there is a unicorn in front of me. The unicorn, as the intentional object of my experience, is 
not part of the experience. In the hallucination case, the unicorn, like a real physical object, seems to be located 
physically in space. I “see” it from a certain perspective and, as in the veridical case, I presuppose that this object 
has other hidden dimensions that I cannot now “see”. That is to say, the intentional object of my hallucination, 
i.e. the unicorn, supposedly does not consist in only what is given to the visual experience.  
21 Searle would not agree that a hallucination has an intentional object. As mentioned earlier, he considers 
intentional objects to be real objects. But this is not a substantial issue because Searle, instead, uses the notion of 
conditions of satisfaction. Therefore, in the context of this discussion, we can replace the term “intentional 
object” with the term “conditions of satisfaction” without doing any harm to the gist of the discussion. So, to 
retain Searle’s vocabulary, we can say that a hallucinatory experience also has conditions of satisfaction and that 
those conditions are not part of the experience.   
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3. Searle’s objection to the Argument from Illusion 
 
If somebody who is under the influence of the Argument from Illusion perceives a 
round coin turned at an angle as elliptical, he is prone to think that he does not directly see the 
coin, because the coin itself is round. Therefore, he would insist that he sees his sense data. 
However, Searle thinks that this is wrong. He writes: 
 
The literally false step in the argument is the one that says: because I directly 
perceive something elliptical and because the coin itself is not elliptical, it follows 
that I do not directly perceive the coin. But it does not follow, because the meaning 
of the sentence, “I see the elliptical appearance of the coin,” implies “I see the way 
the coin looks.” And that in turn implies that I see the coin. There is no way I can see 
the appearance of the coin without seeing the coin. And from the fact that I see that 
the coin looks elliptical from this point of view and the fact that the coin is not 
elliptical, it does not follow that I do not see the coin.22 
 
Searle owes the argument in this passage to J. L. Austin (1962). According to Searle, 
Austin held that “there is no way you can see the appearance of the coin without seeing the 
coin itself, because the appearance is just the way the coin looks”.23 The important point in 
this argument is that it points out that objects always look in a certain way to perceivers. One 
might see a round coin as elliptical because there is at least one aspect in which the round coin 
looks elliptical. And because there is no way to see the coin without seeing it in a certain 
aspect, the elliptical appearance of the coin is also (abstract) part of seeing the same coin.  
What about the stick in water which looks bent? It seems that in this case we cannot 
say that one can see a straight stick as bent, because there is an aspect of the stick whereby it 
is perceived as bent. The reason for this is that, whatever the stick’s positioning and its 
orientation relative to the subject might be, if a part of the stick is immersed in water, then it 
will always look bent. And since the bentness we “see” is not a real property of the stick, the 
suggestion is to accept that what we “see” is a mind-dependent entity.  
However, the latter sentence is false. We can see this if we remember that the 
refractive features of the physical environment also have an important role in the seeing of 
objects. That is to say, in a visual experience, the way that an object appears to an observer 
                                                          
22 STT, 91. 
23 Ibid.  
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also depends on the conditions of refraction.24 In air, we see the straight stick straight also 
because the refractive features of air is such that when light waves are reflected off, the 
straight stick is perceived to be straight. Yet when the stick is immersed in water, it is 
perceived as bent from the part from which the immersion in water begins. This is because the 
refractive features of water are distinct from that of air. So, given that the refractive features 
of a medium through which light waves are transmitted are also a condition of our seeing 
objects, it seems that there is no reason to state that, if something is straight, then it must look 
straight under all conditions. The same object will cause a different kind of visual experience, 
if we alter the refractive features of the environment. Thus, the bent appearance of the 
straight stick immersed in water is also a way of the givenness of that object – crucially, a 
way of givenness that does not depend on the object’s positioning and its orientation relative 
to the subject, but that depends on the refractive features of the environment. As Searle puts it, 
“[t]he important thing to see in these cases is that the subject does not literally see anything 
bent [...] What he sees is something that, under those conditions, ‘looks bent’[…]”.25 
Searle also tries to refute the Argument from Illusion by using the conceptual 
apparatus of his own theory. He argues that to say that the straight stick immersed in water 
looks bent or that the round coin looks elliptical “is not to describe an actual bent or elliptical 
object of […] perception but rather the conditions of satisfaction of a perceptual 
experience”.26 For Searle, this is to say that the conditions of satisfaction of the visual 
experience are that there be an elliptical coin (or a bent stick) which causes this (or that) 
experience. Yet, because the coin is not elliptical (or the stick is not bent), the experience is 
not satisfied.  
Searle makes a mistake when he conflates these two examples. In contrast to the 
example of bent stick, when one sees a round coin as elliptical from a certain angle, the 
conditions of satisfaction of the experience do not change. In the case of the coin, the 
conditions of satisfaction of the visual experience are not that there is an elliptical coin which 
causes the experience but that there is a round coin which causes the experience. This is 
because of the phenomenon of shape constancy, which is a kind of perceptual constancy. 
Shape constancy is a feature of the perceiver’s perceptual system which enables the shape 
properties of objects to remain representatively the same, despite significant changes in the 
retinal image. The retinal image of the object changes if there is a change in the orientation of 
                                                          
24 According to physicists, “[a] light ray is refracted when it passes from one medium into another” (Feynman et 
al. (1963), 26-2). In our example, air and water are different mediums. 
25 STT, 91; emphasis added. 
26 Ibid; emphasis added. 
126 
 
the object relative to the subject. Yet, despite this, the percept of the shape remains constant.27 
Now, to apply this to Searle’s example, the retinal image of the round coin depends on its 
orientation relative to the subject. If the coin is slightly slanted at an angle, its retinal image 
will be elliptical. In other words, the coin might look elliptical to the subject.28 However, the 
percept of the coin’s shape will not be affected. In other words, the subject will still have the 
experience of seeing the round coin. And, accordingly, its conditions of satisfaction will not 
be that there is an elliptical coin which causes the experience.   
Yet, in the case of the “bent” stick, we cannot say that the condition of satisfaction for 
the visual experience of the “bent” stick is the straight stick, although what the subject in fact 
sees is a straight stick. This case, of course, has nothing to do with the phenomenon of 
perceptual constancy. The “bent” stick case, in contrast to the “elliptical” coin case, is an 
illusion in which the content of the experience does not match the world itself. 
 
 
4. The classical theories 
 
In STT, Searle criticises some well-known philosophers on the grounds that their 
theories illustrate versions of “the Bad Argument”. Throughout the history of philosophy, 
there are two grand theories which share this argument: the Representative Theory and 
Phenomenalism. To explain perception, both theories postulate an entity above subjects and 
the world, which is however given different names (idea, impression, representation, sense-
datum), and which suggests that we cannot directly perceive the world. (I shall henceforth use 
the term ‘sense-datum’ to refer to what these theories regard as the object of perception.) 
However, in Searle’s view, to say that, in perception, there is a sense-datum or an “internal 
visual experience” between us and the world is “one of the major mistakes” of these theories. 
For him, the main drawback here is that they cannot answer the question, “What is the 
relationship between the sense data which we do see and the material object which apparently 
we do not see?” According to Searle, it is one of the most beneficial advantages of Naïve 
Realism that, in contrast to classical theories of perception, it does not meet with such a 
                                                          
27 Cf. Pizlo (1994). 
28 I write “might look” instead of “look” because I am not sure that this is always so. I cannot myself have the 
visual experience of an elliptical coin when I hold up a round coin in front of my face and turn it at an angle. 
Under normal conditions, I will always see the coin as round.   
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difficulty. Yet, he thinks, if one does accept sense-data as objects of perception, then it is 
difficult for him to answer this question.  
In an attempt to answer the question above, the representative theorists (Descartes, 
Locke, etc.) hold that there is a resemblance relation between our sense data and material 
objects. For example, in their view, when one looks at a cup, one’s experience represents the 
real shape of the cup, because the content of the experience resembles the shape of the cup. 
Searle, however, does not accept this answer. He mentions the well-known difficulty with this 
theory: that the Representative Theory of perception does not answer the question “What 
reason can one offer for the view that representations or ideas resemble objects, if objects are 
by definition inaccessible to our senses?”  
This is an important criticism also stated by Berkeley. Searle agrees with its value, 
especially because there is another similar, and for his theory important, question which the 
classical theories of perception cannot answer. This question is, “How is it that the specific 
features of the perceptual experience determine the conditions of satisfaction that they do?”29 
Searle thinks that if a representative theorist also used his terminology, he would say that the 
visual experience determines the conditions of satisfaction because there is a resemblance 
relation between the experience and its conditions of satisfaction. However, Searle is not 
happy with this answer, because, as mentioned, the resemblance relation between the 
experience and its object cannot be grounded.30     
Searle does not accept Phenomenalism either. He has three objections against it in 
particular. First, according to his account, the main difficulty with Phenomenalism is that “it 
reduces the public ontologically objective world to a set of private ontologically subjective 
phenomena” and “this results in solipsism”.31 That is to say that, according to 
Phenomenalism, our experiences cannot “reach right out to independently existing objects and 
states of affairs in the world”.32 Second, for Searle, Phenomenalism has difficulties in 
explaining how communication in a public language is possible. He thinks that a public 
language presupposes “a public world”, and to say that what we perceive is our private sense 
datum is to deny that there is a public language at all. 
The first and the second objections Searle mentions here are well-known criticism of 
Phenomenalism, having been made by several other critics as well. Yet Searle’s third 
objection is motivated by his own theory. He complains that, if we try to answer the question 
                                                          
29 STT, 231. 
30 Cf. Ibid. 226. 
31 Ibid. 226-227. 
32 Ibid. 229. 
128 
 
of how perceptual experiences determine “conditions of satisfaction such that the experiences 
are presentations of objects and states of affairs in the ontologically objective world”, we can 
see that “the phenomenalist theory is even worse” in that respect. For Searle, the reason for 
this is that “[i]n the phenomenalist theory there is not anything to the object except the 
sequence of our experiences”.33 Hence, according to Phenomenalism, Searle thinks that his 
“central question” cannot be posed.34   
Yet despite this, in STT, Searle mainly considers the phenomenalist philosophers. To 
illustrate examples for “The Bad Argument”, he focuses on G. Berkeley, D. Hume, and A. J. 
Ayer. In the remainder of this section, I will consider Searle’s criticism of Berkeley and Ayer, 




To offer a classic example for “The Bad Argument” in the phenomenalist tradition, 
Searle first focuses on Berkeley’s arguments. Berkeley holds that the objects which we 
perceive consist of combinations of different sensible qualities – qualities that are 
“immediately perceived by sense”. Searle quotes a passage from Berkeley, where the latter 
tries to show that the object “immediately perceived” and the experience are the same. Searle, 
in criticizing this view, points out the following: 
 
[Berkeley’s] argument is a beautiful illustration of the fallacy of ambiguity in the 
Bad Argument. “Immediately perceived” has two different senses, one where what is 
immediately perceived is an ontologically objective state of affairs in the world, in 
this case the heat of an actual fire. This is the intentional sense of “immediately 
perceived,” and in this sense the quality perceived is ontologically objective. In the 
other sense of “immediately perceived,” what is immediately perceived is the 
sensation itself, the painful sensation of heat. This is the constitutive sense of 
“immediately perceived,” and in this sense the quality perceived is ontologically 
subjective. Berkeley starts with the first of these in his notion of “immediately 
                                                          
33 Ibid. 231. 
34 Notice that to criticise a theory because of the fact that the critics’ central question cannot be posed is not 
reasonable. A phenomenalist could respond that, if Searle cannot pose his central question, this is a point in favor 
of Phenomenalism, because in that case there will be one problem less to worry about. I thank Andreas 
Kemmerling for mentioning this point. 
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perceived,” but he then uses the ambiguity to establish that all we perceive are 
ontologically subjective experiences.35  
 
Berkeley, however, could object to Searle’s ambiguity claim in the following way. He 
could say that there is no ambiguity in his use of the phrase “immediately perceived”, because 
this phrase, in the context of his philosophy, cannot denote the material world (or, to use 
Searle’s term, ontologically objective states of affairs). The reason for this would be simple to 
him. Berkeley is an idealist philosopher who rejects the existence of the material, mind-
independent world; in his account, all we perceive are our ideas. Therefore, it seems that 
whether Searle is right on this issue depends on whether Berkeley’s ontological views are true 




Searle also considers the arguments of more recent philosophers of the phenomenalist 
tradition. In STT, he analyses a passage from Ayer’s work The Foundations of Empirical 
Knowledge. In this passage, Ayer maintains that even in the case in which we do not see “the 
real quality of a material thing” (for example, in the case of an illusion), we still see 
something. To use Ayer’s example, if one “sees” a mirage in the desert, one does not perceive 
any oasis or any other material object. Nevertheless, for Ayer, this does not mean that “his 
experience is […] an experience of nothing”.36 Rather, in his view, this perceptual experience 
also “has a definite content”. He calls the content “sense-datum” and claims that it is the 
object of perception. Also, because experiencing an illusion is “similar in character” to 
experiencing veridical perceptual cases, Ayer generalises this point to include veridical visual 
experiences as well.  
Searle, however, claims that Ayer’s reasoning in this line of argument is fallacious. He 
especially focuses on Ayer’s thesis that the illusory experience is “not an experience of 
nothing; it has a definite content”. For Searle, this thesis suggests the following false idea: the 
content of the experience is its object. In his account, provided that “of” is used here in the 
intentionalistic sense, “[it] is precisely an experience of nothing because in the oasis line of 
business there is nothing there”.37 The illusory experience has only an intentional content 
                                                          
35 Ibid. 83. 
36 Ayer (1953), 4. 
37 STT, 86. 
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which, for Searle, “presents an oasis as the condition of satisfaction”, and its content is not the 
object of the experience. He thus writes:  
 
The fact that the experience has a definite content does not show that it has an object. 
The content is not itself the object of the experience, unless, of course, we are using 
“experience of” in precisely the constitutive and not the intentionalistic sense. When 
Ayer writes the clauses, “his experience is not an experience of nothing; it has a 
definite content,” he thinks that the second clause substantiates the first, that the 
existence of the content proves that it is not an experience of nothing. But it does not. 
The experience is precisely the experience of nothing in the intentionalistic sense. He 
can only suppose that the existence of the content is a something because he is 
committing the fallacy of ambiguity. The intentional content is only the object in the 
constitutive, but not in the intentionalistic, sense.38 
 
Therefore Searle’s criticism of Ayer, again, mentions the fact that the phenomenalist 
philosophers, including Berkeley, often falsely treat the content of the experience as the object 





As earlier noted, in STT, Searle criticises the disjunctivist philosophers as well. The 
disjunctivists deny that there is a common component between hallucinatory and veridical 
experiences. In other words, they think that the good (veridical) and the bad (hallucinatory 
and illusory) cases share no mental core in common.39 These philosophers hold that the 
philosophical theories of perception do not need to give the same account for both the good 
and the bad cases. The main disjunctivist argument for this is that the nature of veridical 
perceptual experiences is distinct from the nature of hallucinations. That is to say, whereas in 
the veridical case, there is a direct perceptual relation between the experience and the mind-
                                                          
38 Ibid. 86-87. 
39 By rejecting the commonality thesis, the disjunctivists do not deny that veridical perceptual experiences and 
hallucinations can have nothing in common. They allow that some aspect of these mental events can be common 
or similar. Rather, the central claim of Disjunctivism is that veridical experiences and hallucinations cannot be 
mental events of the same fundamental kind. See Soteriou (2014).   
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independent object, in the case of the hallucination, no mind-independent object is perceived. 
And this, for the disjunctivist philosophers, affects the phenomenology of the experience. 
 
5.1.Stipulation vs. Hypothesis  
 
In his criticism of Disjunctivism, Searle focuses on several important aspects of it. He 
first begins with idea that the commonality thesis – the thesis that veridical perceptual 
experiences and the hallucination indistinguishable from it have a common qualitative 
subjective element – is a stipulation. That is to say, Searle does not accept any empirical or 
introspective argument against the idea that the good and the bad cases are the same kind of 
experiences. He puts forward this idea against the disjunctivist view that the commonality 
thesis is a false hypothesis without any empirical and introspective grounds of reasoning.40 
Without going into the details of this discussion, Searle maintains that the empirical or the 
introspective issues are irrelevant here. For him, it is a stipulation that there can be 
hallucinations indistinguishable from the veridical experiences: 
 
In philosophy (unlike neuroscience), the idea that there can be hallucinations that 
have the same phenomenology and the same intentional content as the veridical 
experience is not a hypothesis, it is a stipulation. We just decide as a thought 
experiment to stipulate not only that there are hallucinations and veridical 
experiences that are indiscriminable, but that they are indiscriminable for the reason 
that they have exactly the same phenomenological features.41  
 
As outlined here, Searle thinks that, to refute the commonality thesis, we need neither to show 
that we can be mistaken about our experiences while introspecting the good and the bad cases, 
nor rely on any empirical investigation. On his view, it is a mere logical possibility that there 
can be hallucination cases that are phenomenologically indistinguishable from the veridical 
cases. Thus, to refute the commonality thesis, “[one] would have to show that it is logically 
impossible that there could be a common phenomenology”.42  
However, notice that to say that something is only logically possible is cheap; there is 
an indefinite number of things that can be logically possible and to mention them has 
sometimes no cognitive value. One need not stipulate the commonality thesis if there are 
                                                          





empirical grounds to suppose that hallucinations and veridical perceptual experiences can 
have a common intentional content. 
Some other investigations on this issue confirm this hypothesis. For example, Teunisse 
et al. (1996), relying on the reports of patients, maintain that in some cases hallucinations can 
be indistinguishable from veridical experiences. They say that some patients report that 
“hallucinated objects [look] ordinary and [fit] realistically in the surroundings […]”.43 It is 
interesting that Searle also mentions a number of articles about empirical investigations on 
this issue.44 He considers an article by ffytche et al. (1998), in which the authors investigated 
patients that suffer from Bonnet’s syndrome. Searle says that “[ffytche] reports that [the 
patient’s] response to the question, “What goes on in the brain when you hallucinate?” is “It’s 
the same as when you experience real things””.45 Such investigations can give us reason to 
suppose that the good and the bad cases indeed have common features, and that this is not a 
hypothesis without empirical grounds.  
Nevertheless, the disjunctivists can maintain that the common features in question are 
not essential features of these experiences. As mentioned, the disjunctivist philosophers 
indeed argue that the veridical experience and the hallucination indistinguishable from it are 
essentially distinct, because, in the former case, the subject perceives a mind-independent 
object, but in the latter case, there is no such an object perceived. So, the disjunctivist might 
say that the good and the bad cases are fundamentally distinct because they have different 
(intentional) objects. 
At this point, Searle makes an interesting claim about Disjunctivism. He argues that 
the disjunctivist philosophers also ground their theses on the basis of the stipulation. On his 
account, the following two important claims of the disjunctivists are based on the stipulation: 
1) “[P]erceptual experiences are individuated by whether or not they are veridical”46; 2) The 
commonality thesis is false. I think, however, that the second claim cannot be true about all 
disjunctivist philosophers. To show this, let me focus on M. F. G. Martin’s ideas on this very 
issue. (An important justification for my choice to consider Martin’s ideas is that Searle also 
examines his disjunctivist views.) 
Searle claims that, to distinguish hallucinations from veridical cases, Martin also uses 
a stipulation. He writes: “Martin stipulates that [veridical experience and hallucinations] 
                                                          
43 Teunisse et al. (1996), 795-796. 
44 Cf. STT, 165. 
45 Ibid. 
46 STT, 170. 
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cannot be ‘of fundamentally the same kind’”.47 However, if we look at Martin’s works, it 
would be difficult to find any reason to claim that there is such a stipulation there. Martin is 
committed to the view that, in the veridical cases, the objects of perception and their 
properties partly constitute the subject’s experience, and that the phenomenal character of the 
experience is determined by them. For Martin, since in the case of a hallucination the subject 
does not perceive mind-independent objects, its phenomenal character should have a distinct 
account. He thus maintains that “[n]o experience like [the good case], no experience of 
fundamentally the same kind, could have occurred had no appropriate candidate for awareness 
existed”.48 This is to say that, on Martin’s picture, the fact that in the veridical case we are 
aware of, or perceive, a mind-independent object has an essentially distinct effect on the 
phenomenology of the experience. This shows that, even if we accept that there is a 
stipulation in Martin’s work that “perceptual experiences are individuated by whether or not 
they are veridical”, there is no reason to claim that his rejection of the commonality thesis is 
also a stipulation. The latter is implied from Martin’s thesis that, in the veridical cases, in 
contrast to the indistinguishable hallucinations, the objects and their properties partly 
constitute the perceptual experience, and this distinctly affects the phenomenology of the 
veridical experience.  
 
5.2. The central claim of Disjunctivism  
 
The idea that in the veridical experience the object seen is literally part of the 
experience, and hence is “fundamentally” different from the hallucinatory experience, is 
shared not only by Martin but also by many other disjunctivist philosophers. This is the 
central thesis of Disjunctivism.  
Searle therefore considers this thesis in a more detailed way. He says that there are two 
ways of interpreting the claim that the object is literally part of the perceptual experience. The 
first way, which, for Searle, is trivially true, is to focus on the truth conditions of the sentence 
“the subject S sees object O”. In this sentence, the term “O” occurs extensionally. That is, if 
the sentence is true, then O exists. And “in that sense”, says Searle, “the object is part of the 
total set of truth conditions of the statement, so the [disjunctivists’] claim is trivially true”.49 
According to Searle’s second interpretation, however, this claim is trivially false, because “the 
                                                          
47 Ibid. 169; emphasis added. 
48 Martin (2008), 273. 
49 STT, 174. 
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physical object seen cannot literally be a piece of the subjective perceptual experience in the 
head”.50  
Searle’s second interpretation is correct but the first is not. The mistake in Searle’s 
first interpretation of the disjunctivists’ claim consists in the fact that he conflates the truth 
conditions of the experience of seeing an object O with the truth conditions of the sentence 
“the subject S sees object O.” Yet, these two truth conditions are distinct, because the 
experience in question, in contrast to the truth conditions of the sentence, does not make 
reference to the subject of this experience. The perceptual experience is not of oneself seeing 
the object but simply of seeing the object. To put this in another way, in contrast to what the 
sentence says, the subject of the experience is not the intentional object of the experience. 
Therefore, the truth (satisfaction) conditions of the experience and the truth conditions of the 
sentence are not the same. Hence, to say that “the object is part of the total set of truth 
conditions of the [sentence]” should be taken as distinct from the claim that the object seen is 
part of the perceptual experience.  
For Searle, there is also another sense in which the disjunctivists’ claim can be 
understood. Searle relates this interpretation to the presentational intentionality of the 
experience. He writes:  
 
[T]here is also a deeper sense in which the object is a constitutive part, and that is 
precisely because the form of the experience is that of presentational intentionality. 
The conditions will not be satisfied unless the intentionality reaches right up to the 
object and unless the object causes the experience of it. Remember, perception is not 
just a representation, but a direct presentation. So once again, direct perception is not 
an argument in favor of Disjunctivism; rather, it is a natural consequence of the 
presentational intentionality of perception.51 
 
This is one of the most difficult passages in Searle’s works to understand. The passage 
does not explicitly say a part of what the object is, and this creates the following difficulty. 
Given that Searle writes this passage when he discusses the disjunctivist claim that the object 
perceived is part of the experience, one might suppose that what he wants to say here is that 
the object is “a constitutive part” of the perceptual experience. But this would be confusing, 
because it would mean that, in this passage, Searle is accepting the disjunctivists’ claim which 
                                                          
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid.; emphasis added. 
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he is trying to refute throughout the corresponding chapter of STT. However, there might be 
another reading according to which what Searle wants to say here is that the object perceived 
is a constitutive part of the perceptual situation that involves both the subject and the object 
(recall the picture on p. 120). This interpretation, which seems to me to be correct, might be 
more attractive if we remember the central theses of Searle’s naïve realistic view.52 It is a fact 
that throughout the chapter on Disjunctivism, Searle tries to refute the disjunctivists’ claim 
that the object seen is part of the perceptual experience and, after all, he has good arguments 
for this. I now want to consider them one by one.  
Searle’s first argument is entirely intuitive and common-sensical. In it he says that 
there are two important components in a perceptual situation: the subjective experience in the 
head and the object that is not in the head. For him, the object seen cannot literally be part of 
the perceptual experience, because, when the subject closes her eyes, the subjective 
experience in her head ceases to exist, but the object seen does not.  
His second argument is also made against those who (like M. Martin and A. Noë)53 
think that, in the case of the veridical perceptual experience, “consciousness goes outside the 
head and envelops the object itself”.54 Searle rightly thinks that this is wrong because 
consciousness is only realised in certain physical and biological systems. To him, if there is 
no appropriate physical condition, the consciousness cannot “go outside the head”. To put this 
in another way, for Searle, a conscious state is realised “in systems of cells—in this case, 
neurons—and there is no way that [it] could, so to speak, leak outside the brain and be 
floating around the neighboring area”.55 Therefore, Searle thinks that the object perceived 
cannot be part of the experience. When elaborating his criticism further, Searle asserts that the 
disjunctivist accounts of perception have this drawback in question because they do not give a 
coherent account of the spatial and causal relationships between the object and the 
corresponding perceptual experience. He thinks that, according to their account, we cannot 
pose the question “What exactly are the relations between the ontologically subjective 
conscious experience and the ontologically objective objects seen?”56  
Another argument which Searle puts forward against the disjunctivist claim in 
question is the argument from time delay. Consider, Searle says, the following example: 
 
                                                          
52 See the first pages of this chapter. 
53 See STT, 36. 
54 Ibid.179. 
55 Ibid. 175. 
56 Ibid. 178. 
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I now see a star through a telescope that I know ceased to exist twenty-seven million 
years ago. In one respect, the experience is not veridical because, again, all 
experiences are of the here and now, and it seems to me that the star is existing here 
and now when I know in fact it does not. All the same, I know that I am seeing that 
particular star. Now I can draw a picture of that, indeed I have drawn such a picture 
in this chapter. The star causes in me a visual experience. I would like to see the 
picture drawn by the Disjunctivists. I do not think they can draw a coherent picture. 
In what sense exactly for them is the star a constituent part of the experience of it? It 
is pretty tough to describe that for an object that ceased to exist twenty-seven million 
years ago.57  
 
Since I have no specific reservations towards Searle’s arguments here, let me consider 
the next issue. 
 
5.3. The commonality thesis as a threat to Naïve Realism? 
 
The disjunctivist philosophers often regard themselves as naïve realists, and they 
consider the commonality thesis to stand against Naïve Realism. On the disjunctivists’ 
picture, if we do not deny the commonality thesis, we have to accept that Naïve Realism is 
false. For them, the commonality thesis and Naïve Realism are incompatible. This is, they 
think, because if one holds that the commonality thesis were true, then “the highest common 
factor” between the good and the bad case would be the object of the perceptual experience. 
But the latter, for the disjunctivist philosophers, cannot be true. In their view, at least some of 
our visual experiences are direct presentations of the real world, and there is no “highest 
common factor” between the good and the bad cases.   
Searle also shares the view that perceptual experiences are presentations. But he thinks 
that the commonality thesis does not show that Naïve Realism is false. On the other hand, on 
Searle’s view, to say that the commonality thesis threatens Naïve Realism is “a variation of 
the Bad Argument”. He thinks that, like the classical theorists of perception, the disjunctivist 
philosophers also make the same mistake, when they claim that “the commonality thesis 
implies that the common element is perceived in both the veridical and the hallucinatory 
case”.58  
                                                          
57 Ibid. 198. 
58 Ibid. 173-174. 
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It seems that Searle is correct on this issue. The fact that there is a “highest common 
factor” between the good and the bad cases does not imply that we have to perceive the 
common factor instead of real objects. I am convinced that the common factor in question is a 
way of givenness by virtue of which a subject can perceive objects. A hallucination, say, as of 
a red ball represents that there is a red ball in front of the subject, and it represents a non-
existent red ball in the very way that an existent red ball appears to the subject. This is to say 
that the same kind of appearance can occur in the veridical case as well. 
To further press on Searle’s views about Disjunctivism, let us now consider his 
criticism of John Campbell’s theory.  
 
5.4. Searle’s criticism of Campbell  
 
In STT, Searle puts forward two important claims about Campbell’s theory. The first is 
that Campbell denies the existence of consciousness. The second is that Campbell also shares 
the view that the object perceived is part of the experience. Let me begin with the first claim.  
In Searle’s view, Campbell’s denial of the existence of consciousness is implicit in his 
theory; for Searle, Campbell does not explicitly say that consciousness does not exist. Searle 
thinks, however, that this is suggested by Campbell’s theory, because in his theory Campbell 
maintains that there are three components in the perceptual situation: the perceiver, the object, 
and the point of view. On Searle’s view, this amounts to the denial of the perceptual 
consciousness.59 To me this criticism is implausible for two reasons. First, to say that 
perception consists of the three abovementioned components does not entail that conscious 
perception does not exist. Campbell might argue that there are conscious perceptual 
experiences, but consciousness is not a necessary feature of perception because there is a 
phenomenon that we call unconscious perception. And the three components, Campbell might 
continue, are necessary components of perceptual experiences. Second, if we look at 
Campbell’s work in question,60 we can see that he often uses the notion of consciousness by 
giving a central role to this notion in his theory. One of Campbell’s central claims in this work 
is that conscious attention to the object seen is necessary for the demonstrative reference in 
                                                          
59 Ibid. 196. Furthermore, Searle maintains that Campbell’s account denies the following essential features of 
perceptual experiences – the fact that the veridical experience is caused by the object perceived and intrinsic 
intentionality. He says that Campbell’s argument for denying these features, including consciousness, is the 
transparency of perception. Searle thinks that transparency cannot be argument for denying the abovementioned 
features of perception. On the contrary, as mentioned in Chapter IV, in Searle’s view, transparency is an 
argument for the intentionality of perceptual experiences.  
60 Searle quotes from Campbell (2002). 
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perception. Moreover, in this work, he also pursues the question “Why do we need the notion 
of the phenomenal character of experience?”61 Obviously, one cannot pose such a question by 
denying the existence of consciousness. Therefore, it is difficult to see a ground for Searle’s 
claim that Campbell denies the existence of consciousness.   
Searle’s second important objection to Campbell has to do with the relational theory of 
perception. According to this theory of Campbell, says Searle, 
 
the phenomenal character of your experience, as you look around the room, is 
constituted by the actual layout of the room itself: which particular objects are there, 
their intrinsic properties, such as color and shape, and how they are arranged in 
relation to one another and to you.62  
 
This passage suggests that Campbell, as a disjunctivist philosopher, is also committed 
to the view that objects and properties perceived are part of the experience. Searle, however, 
argues against Campbell’s (relational) account, namely that conscious perceptual experience 
does not contain its object. He uses the following simple example to illustrate his argument 
for this: feeling the smoothness of the table in one’s fingertips is distinct from the smoothness 
of the table itself. This is because, he continues, when one who feels the smoothness of the 
table in his fingertips lifts his hand from the table, the feeling of smoothness ceases, but the 
smoothness of the table does not cease.63 
In my view, Campbell and the other disjunctivist philosophers make a mistake when 
they maintain that the object perceived is part of the experience. The physical object cannot 
be part of the experience because the object and the experience belong to different ontological 
categories. As Husserl puts it, an experience is distinct from a physical object, say, from a 
tree, which is a thing in nature and, in contrast to the experience, “can burn or may be 
dissolved in its chemical elements, etc.”.64 That is to say, the nature of a physical object is so 




                                                          
61 Campbell (2002), 139. 
62 STT, 195. 
63 This argument is a version of Searle’s first argument against Disjunctivism (see p. 138).  
64 Husserl, Ideen I, 222.3. 
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6. “The Bad Argument” and intentionality 
 
An important aspect of Searle’s criticism of the classical theories of perception and the 
disjunctivist philosophers is that he relates this issue to the problem of intentionality. He holds 
that the mistake in “the Bad Argument” derives from the fact that some philosophers fail to 
understand the intentionality of visual experience. As noted, Searle distinguishes the 
intentional content of experience from its intentional object. Moreover, he holds that although 
there is no intentional object in the hallucination case, the latter, nonetheless, as an intentional 
state, possesses conditions of satisfaction. Therefore, for him, there are two common entities 
in both the veridical perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucination – intentional 
content and conditions of satisfaction. Searle argues that both the classical theorists and the 
disjunctivist philosophers fail to distinguish these entities from the object of the experience. 
He places special emphasis on the fact that these philosophers conflate the intentional content 
of the experience with its object. For Searle, as just mentioned, the intentional content is a 
common element of the veridical experience and the indistinguishable hallucination, and if 
somebody fails to see this common element and commits the fallacy of “the Bad Argument”, 
he is “likely to think that the something in common is itself the object of perception”.65 Not 
only that, what is for Searle more special in this issue is that it is directly related to the 
problem of intentionality: 
 
The Bad Argument is an instance of a very general fallacy about intentionality, and it 
results from confusion about the very nature of intentionality. It is a confusion 
between the content of an intentional state and the object of the intentional state. In 
the case of a hallucination, the visual experience has a content, indeed it can have 
exactly the same content as the veridical experience, but there is no object. The 
assumption that some authors make is that every intentional state must have an 
object, but this is confusion between the true claim that every intentional state must 
have a content and the false claim that every intentional state must have an object.66 
 
So, for Searle, what combines the classical theorists and those who advocate different 
forms of Disjunctivism is that they both confuse the intentional content with the object of the 
experience. They repeat “the basic principle that gives rise to the Bad Argument, namely 
                                                          




same content implies same object”.67 However, in Searle’s view, the common content 
between the hallucinatory and veridical cases does not imply that they have the same object. 
To repeat the point made earlier, for Searle, this is false, because the hallucinatory case has no 





In this chapter, I have considered Searle’s Naïve (or Direct) Realism and his criticism 
of the classical theories of perception and Disjunctivism. Although the disjunctivist 
philosophers also do not accept the classical theories because of their anti-naïve realistic 
views, Searle compares them with each other by arguing that the disjunctivist philosophers 
also make the mistake that one can find in the classical theories. For him, the “serious” 
argument for Disjunctivism should also be recognised as “the Bad Argument”. I have agreed 
with Searle on the main points of his criticism of both the classical theories and 
Disjunctivism. Furthermore, I have agreed with Searle on the point that, like the disjunctivists, 
to deny Step One on the ground that commitment to the existence of the common element in 
both the good and the bad cases runs up against the plausibility of the idea that the object of 
perception is a mind-independent one, is not correct.  
Nevertheless, we have seen that Searle makes some mistakes when he criticises the 
classical theories of perception and Disjunctivism. Let me now summarise them in the 
conclusion of this chapter:     
 
1) Searle conflates the stick case with the coin case. Because of the phenomenon of shape 
constancy, in contrast to the stick case, the conditions of satisfaction of the experience of 
seeing the round coin do not change, even if the coin might appear to be elliptical from a 
certain angle. 
2) Searle maintains that the commonality thesis is a stipulation. However, as has been 
shown, one need not stipulate the commonality thesis, given that there are empirical 
grounds for stating it. Furthermore, by drawing on M. Martin’s ideas, we have seen that 
Searle’s assumption that the disjunctivists stipulate the commonality thesis is false. 
3) Searle’s first interpretation of the disjunctivist claim that the object is part of the 
perceptual experience is not correct. For the truth conditions of the sentence “the subject 
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S sees object O” are distinct from the truth conditions of the corresponding visual 
experience.  






In this PhD dissertation, I have tried to critically study Searle’s theory of 
intentionality, including his ideas on perceptual intentionality. I argued that Searle’s theory of 
intentionality is not general enough to explain all intentional mental states. Searle also 
hesitated to regard his theory as a general one, because in INT he did not discuss all kinds of 
intentional states. Yet I tried to show that there are also other reasons for claiming that 
Searle’s theory is not general. In order to show that his theory is not confined to the central 
intentional states, Searle put forward a hypothesis according to which intentional states 
without a propositional content, conditions of satisfaction, and a direction of fit (such as fear, 
sorrow, etc.) can also be explained by his theory, because those states “contain” a belief or a 
desire (i.e. paradigm intentional states), which possess all these features. Nevertheless, he 
neglected to point out that some other intentional states (such as non-propositional 
imaginations) do not “contain” either a belief or a desire, and that they do not possess either a 
direction of fit or conditions of satisfaction. That is to say, the central concepts and theses of 
his theory – that the intentional content determines the conditions of satisfaction and that the 
psychological mode determines the direction of fit – do not apply to those intentional states. 
I also focused on the issue that a central term of Searle’s theory – ‘conditions of 
satisfaction’ – is problematic in other respects as well. This term is ambiguous. It has two 
meanings – conditions of satisfaction as a requirement and conditions of satisfaction as a 
thing. Although Searle himself made reference to this ambiguity, he neglected the fact that the 
ambiguity in question infects one of his central theses. Because of this ambiguity, the thesis 
that an intentional content determines the conditions of satisfaction can be read in two ways. 
Searle did not distinguish between these two readings. However, this distinction is important 
because, on one reading, the thesis in question – (DETr) – is true, but on another reading – 
(DETt) – it is false: the intentional content does not (always) determine the conditions of 
satisfaction as a thing. (Notice that, as was shown in Chapter IV, this ambiguity infects in the 
same way the thesis that the intentional content of a visual experience determines the 
conditions of satisfaction – (Dvis).)     
I also tried to show that Searle’s notion of conditions of satisfaction is loose. This 
notion is designed by Searle also to capture the features such as causal self-referentiality. 
However, as has been shown in Chapter II, the causal self-referentiality of perceptual 
experiences (or of intentions and memories) depends on the psychological mode of the 
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intentional state, and therefore the question whether the intentional content determines such 
features as part of the conditions of satisfaction cannot be put properly.  
The other interesting point about the term ‘conditions of satisfaction’ concerned its use 
in the sense of conditions of satisfaction as a thing. This notion can be confused with the 
notion of intentional object, which is used more often in other theories of intentionality. 
Searle also uses the term ‘intentional object’, but the sense of this term in his usage is 
different from the sense used in other theories. Whereas in most theories of intentionality the 
term ‘intentional object’ applies to both existent and non-existent entities, in Searle’s usage 
this term denotes only existent entities. In order to denote both existent and non-existent 
entities, Searle uses another term – ‘conditions of satisfaction’. However, I tried to show that 
using the latter term instead of the term ‘intentional object’ in its classical sense created a 
problem for Searle’s theory. The problem was that the term ‘conditions of satisfaction’, unlike 
the term ‘intentional object’ in the classical sense, is not general enough to cover all 
intentional states. As mentioned above, some intentional states have no conditions of 
satisfaction, but they do have intentional objects (in the classical sense of the term).     
In this dissertation, I also tried to show that some aspects of Searle’s hypothesis of the 
Background (Chapter III) are problematic too. I argued that, pace Searle, this hypothesis 
cannot be motivated from the notion of literal meaning and the notion of the Network. 
Moreover, an unacceptable point in the hypothesis in question was that, by neglecting the role 
of the body in the constitution of our Background capacities, Searle tried to reduce them to the 
neurophysiology of the brain. Searle also made some mistakes when he applied the hypothesis 
of the Background to perceptual experiences (Chapter VII). In Searle’s works, the thesis that 
the content of a visual experience determines the conditions of satisfaction against the 
Background – (VB) – was explained with recourse to examples, some of which do not support 
the hypothesis. Searle’s interpretations of the Müller-Lyer illusion and the “moon” example, 
for instance, were incorrect. I argued that these examples indeed falsify (VB) as a general 
thesis, because they show that visual experiences can also not be affected by the rest of the 
mind. 
In Chapter V, I considered the features described by Searle as special features of 
perceptual intentionality. I accepted without specific reservations Searle’s ideas on 
hierarchical structuredness, presentationality, and the features that derive from 
presentationality (i.e. non-detachability, indexicality, continuousness and determinacy). 
However, I argued that Searle makes a mistake when he holds that consciousness is also a 
special feature of perception. On the basis of empirical findings about unconscious 
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perception, I tried to show that consciousness is not a special feature of perceptual 
experiences. Moreover, it seemed to me that Searle was unsuccessful in justifying his thesis 
that the direct causation (another special feature of perception) is experienced by the 
perceiver.      
In Chapter VI, I focused on Searle’s new method to answer the question “How do the 
phenomenological features of a visual experience determine (at least in part) the conditions of 
satisfaction?” In this chapter, on the basis of colour experience as an example, I tried to show 
that the expression “at least in part” in Searle’s thesis that the phenomenological features of 
the experience determine (at least in part) the conditions of satisfaction is redundant. 
Furthermore, in this dissertation, I considered the ideas of some prominent 
philosophers (such as Dennett, Putnam, and Dretske) who have previously criticised Searle’s 
theory of intentionality. Dennett’s criticism of the distinction between intrinsic and derived 
(or as if) intentionality seemed to me to be flawed, because the problem identified by Dennett 
concerning this distinction – the alleged problem that, if there were derived intentionality, our 
own intentionality, i.e. intrinsic intentionality, would also be derived, because it is derived 
from the intentionality of our genes, which is not regarded as intrinsic (or original) 
intentionality – rests on the conflation of two meanings of ‘derivedness’: biological 
derivedness and semantic derivedness (Chapter I). I argued that the notion of biological 
derivedness – which is the one that Dennett uses when he states that “our intentionality is 
derived from the intentionality of our ‘selfish’ genes” – is irrelevant to Searle’s notion of 
derived intentionality, which is mainly applicable to language (or sentences). 
Moreover, I tried to show that Searle’s replies to Putnam’s externalist arguments are 
flawed (Chapter II). In his debate with Putnam, Searle defended an internalist position. The 
distinction between the views of these philosophers mainly stemmed from their different 
approaches to indexicality. Putnam argued that the definition of natural-kind terms (such as 
water, tiger, etc.) contains an indexical component which determines extension and, thanks to 
this indexical component, the subject using the natural-kind term does not need to know the 
descriptive details of the entity to which the term refers. However, Searle maintained that the 
indexical component in question does not show that Putnam’s externalism is a cogent theory. 
For Searle, the indexical component is also part of “what is in the head” and, hence, to say 
that the definition of the natural-kind term contains an indexical component does not mean 
that what determines the extension is external to the mind. According to his picture, the 
meaning of an indexical expression has the feature of self-referentiality in virtue of which the 
reference stands in a certain semantic relation to the utterance itself. He claimed that the 
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indexical expression owes the feature of self-referentiality to the corresponding intentional 
state. For Searle, the content of the intentional state which is expressed by the speech act 
containing the indexical expression possesses this feature as its non-representational part. I 
argued that this view is implausible, because intentional contents do not contain non-
representational parts, and that the self-referentiality is a feature of the meaning of the 
indexical expression, which, pace Searle, is distinct from the intentional content. Hence, it 
seemed to me that Searle’s version of internalism is not correct.        
Furthermore, I considered Dretske’s criticism of Searle’s notion of the intentional 
content of visual experiences (Chapter IV). His criticism was based on visual experiences in 
which the subject cannot know from the content of the experience what kind of entity she 
perceives. Dretske maintained that even if, because of bad seeing conditions, the subject does 
not know from the content that she is seeing x, the experience is nevertheless an experience of 
x because x is at the end of the causal chain, or, in other words, x is causing the experience (x 
here denotes a kind property, such as a tree, a station wagon, etc.). On Dretske’s view, the 
appropriate causal relation is sufficient to maintain that the experience is of x. Therefore, for 
him, to say that the experience is of x because of its intentional content does not make any 
sense. I tried to defend Searle’s position by maintaining that, even in the case of bad seeing 
conditions, the subject can know from the content the conditions of satisfaction. My argument 
was that, even if seeing conditions are not good enough to see the object as having its 
(essential) kind properties, the experience still has conditions of satisfaction which can be 
“read off” from its content. This is because, in such cases, we see the object as having (at 
least) basic features such as color and shape, even if we cannot see precisely what kind of 
object it is. Therefore, in the case of bad seeing conditions too, we can know, from the content 
of the experience, that there is a thing/body there. Hence, the notion of intentional content 
keeps its explanatory role for such cases as well. 
In this dissertation, I also focused on Searle’s criticism of the disjunctivist 
philosophers such as Campbell and Martin (Chapter VIII). Like these philosophers, Searle is 
also regarded as a naïve realist philosopher. Yet we saw that Searle criticises them by arguing 
that they repeat the mistake of the classical theories of perception, which he calls “the Bad 
Argument”. For Searle, the disjunctivist philosophers make a mistake when they reject the 
(commonality) thesis that veridical experiences and their corresponding hallucinatory 
experiences share a common element. Pace the disjunctivist philosophers, Searle held that the 
commonality thesis is not a threat to Naïve Realism because the common element between the 
hallucinatory and the veridical cases is not the object of the experience. He maintained that 
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the disjunctivist philosophers, like the classical theories of perception, do not distinguish the 
content of the perceptual experience from its object, and therefore they do not notice that the 
common element in question is the intentional content of the experience. Searle seemed to be 
correct in this debate. However, I also argued that he makes some mistakes in criticising the 
disjunctivist philosophers. Given that there are empirical grounds to state the commonality 
thesis, Searle considered this to be a stipulation or a mere logical possibility. Furthermore, he 
falsely claimed that Martin’s view that the commonality thesis is false is also a stipulation 
(Chapter VIII). Moreover, I argued that it is a mistake to think that Campbell denies the 
existence of consciousness (Chapter VIII). Searle considered consciousness to be a special 
feature of perception and criticised Campbell on the ground that he implicitly denies that 
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